The Case for Decrimininalization of Prediction Markets

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[This article is cross-posted from Major Wager.]

A recent article in the prestigious academic journal Science (May 16, 2008, Vol 320, p. 877-8) once again makes the case for regulated prediction markets, more commonly known as &#8220-betting exchanges&#8221- to online gamblers. The authors make the case that such markets are useful in forecasting future events with less error than traditional measures such as polling. This argument is hard to ignore, with the authors including 21 top economists from such esteemed institutions as Yale, Stanford, Berkeley, and the University of Pennsylvania. Notable among the authors is Justin Wolfers from the Wharton School of business at UPenn, an economist who has gained notoriety in gambling circles due to his work on such topics as NBA referee bias (highlighted in a May 2008 article from MajorWager: http://www.majorwager.com/index.cfm?page=27&amp-show_column=660).

The concept behind using prediction markets as a decision-making tool is simple. &#8220-Shares&#8221- are made available on an open market, and the participants use their capital (and the promise of profits) to make predictions on future events, which is incorporated into the share price. In general, information tends to be widely dispersed, and a market allows wide-ranging opinions to be gathered and consolidated into a market-wide prediction. In other words, an infinite amount of opinions can be aggregated, and an open market with potential for profit provides an incentive for individuals to make their opinions publicly known.

Prediction markets always get more than their fair share of press near the end of the 4-year U.S. Presidential election cycle. The Iowa Electronics Market, housed at the University of Iowa, is perhaps the most well-known. The authors of the Science paper show that, in the week immediately preceding the Presidential elections from 1988 through 2000, the Iowa Electronic Markets erred by an average of only 1.5 percentage points from the actual vote results, while the traditional Gallup poll was off by 2.1%. Numerous other studies have shown the superiority of markets compared to other forecasting tools.

Of course, there have been some dust-ups regarding prediction markets in the past, most notably the &#8220-terrorist strike market&#8221-, unveiled a little too close to 9/11 to be palatable to the general public. The official name was the &#8220-Policy Analysis Market&#8220-, and it was established by the Pentagon to act as a prediction market for Middle East political events. It was quickly scuttled after heated comments from U.S. Senators, calling it &#8220-grotesque&#8221- and &#8220-stupid&#8221-, due to the perception of using catastrophic events such as assassinations as profit-making tools. Regardless of its political correctness (and the misinformed opinions of a few politicians), such a prediction market still holds value as a glimpse into the collective mindset of everyone with an understanding of political currents in the region. Utilizing such a prediction market as a component of foreign policy decisions may have ultimately spared the U.S. much grief in Iraq.

In recent years, prediction markets have grown beyond academic and government roles. Dublin-based InTrade is rapidly growing and provides many more options than the Iowa Electronic Markets. Others such as MatchBook have focused more on sporting contests, but provide coverage of other events as demand calls. Of course, those outside the U.S. have access to the largest betting exchange of them all, the massive European markets of BetFair. The success of these exchanges speaks to the public interest and feasibility of prediction markets.

One factor holding back the growth of online prediction markets is their close association with the quasi-legal world of sports betting and internet casinos. InTrade has been fairly proactive in this regard, spinning off from Tradesports to clean up its corporate slate, but it is still knee-deep in the legal sludge surrounding offshore &#8220-gambling&#8221-. All have to deal with the legal and financial hurdles of operating offshore.

The authors of the Science paper propose that clarification of internet gambling laws is needed to exploit the benefits of prediction markets within the United States. Clearly, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) of 2006 is one such mechanism restricting the widespread use of prediction markets. Another is the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the regulatory agency which oversees futures markets in the U.S. The CFTC has provided a &#8220-no-action letter&#8221- to the Iowa Electronic Markets, an assurance that they will not seek any enforcement action against the exchange. However, this protection is not absolute and may not trump state and federal law if challenged. The Science authors propose a number of legal reforms which will allow prediction markets to begin to gain acceptance within the U.S. financial regulatory structure.

By no means does the Science article condone large-scale public markets, at least not initially. They take a (typically academic) conservative approach, recommending new legal framework to allow for the establishment of small markets with limited scope so as to evaluate the promise and use of prediction markets. But baby steps are going to be a necessity in the growth and acceptance of regulated public markets.

Clearly, there are negative aspects to financial markets, and regulation certainly has its place. Bear Sterns, Enron, the S&amp-L scandal of the 80s, and the current housing bubble all caused tremendous loss of wealth resulting from missteps in the financial markets. The current oil crisis is due at least in part to speculation, leading to the introduction of no less than 9 separate bills in the U.S. Congress seeking tougher regulation over the trading of commodities. However, the existence of problems in the financial markets does not necessitate their dissolution. Likewise, prediction markets are sure to encounter bumps in the road, but their utility should far outweigh the risks.

Should prediction markets be legalized in the U.S.? Almost certainly. They would have benefit across numerous industries, from business decisions to political policies to financial forecasting. Unfortunately, this would require building an unlikely bridge over the Puritanical moral moat placed around gambling in the U.S. But there is no inherent difference in betting on who will win in an election than what the price of oil will be in 6 months, or what the S&amp-P 500 will close at on a particular date. Distancing prediction markets from &#8220-illegal&#8221- gambling, and instead likening them to regulated financial markets, will be a necessary first step towards broader acceptance.

The academic groundwork on prediction markets has already been laid, and offshore exchanges have begun to turn these concepts into functioning businesses. As these markets grow and begin incorporating more diverse opinions, we can expect their success rate at predicting the future to only grow. To restrict such a promising tool simply due to its perception that it is a gambling outlet is silly indeed.

6-25-08
Jay Graziani
MajorWager.com
[email protected]

[This article is cross-posted from Major Wager.]

The BetFair blog claims a worldwide victory.

UPDATE: I just got it that Professor Leighton Vaughan-Williams&#8217-s story and the BetFair compound chart published on top of his story should be understood independently from each other, as this chart was pasted there by the BetFair blog editor.

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Winston Churchill

Professor Leighton Vaughan-Williams on the official BetFair blog:

[&#8230-] Those taking the same advice on Tuesday evening [2008-01-15 = date of the Michigan primary] were similarly well rewarded as well-backed Mitt Romney stormed into clear favouritism in the markets and a comfortable victory at the polls. After a blip in the New Hampshire Democratic primary the old certainties – that election favourites tend to win elections – was re-established.

As in the Republican New Hampshire primary, the polls and pundits had declared the race between Senator McCain and Governor Romney as a toss-up while the betting markets pointed to a comfortable victory in both cases for the eventual winners. Once again, in the battle of the polls, pundits and markets, the power of the betting markets to assimilate the collective knowledge and wisdom of the crowd had prevailed. [&#8230-]

No BetFair charts are provided. Bad prediction market journalism.

UPDATE: The compound chart was under my very nose:

Michigan BeFair

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UPDATE: I just got it that Professor Leighton Vaughan-Williams&#8217-s story and the BetFair compound chart published on top of his story should be understood independently from each other, as this chart was pasted there by the BetFair blog editor.

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UPDATE: The BetFair blog has added a new label on the infamous compound chart&#8230-

Compound chart - BetFair blog fiasco

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NEXT: Did the BetFair blog use trading data from InTrade to hint at BetFair&#8217-s accuracy??

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For your information, I re-publish below the InTrade charts of the last 3 primary races (Wyoming excluded). [BetFair and NewsFutures do not provide on their site the charts of expired contracts. I could ask them later, though.]

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Iowa

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The Democrats.

The Barack Obama event derivative was expired to 100.

Dem Iowa Obama

Dem Iowa Clinton

Dem Iowa Edwards

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The Republicans

The Mike Huckabee event derivative was expired to 100.

Rep Iowa Huckabee

Rep Iowa omney

Rep Iowa McCain

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New Hampshire

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The Democrats

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The Hillary Clinton event derivative was expired to 100.

Dem NH Clinton

Dem NH Obama

Dem NH Edwards

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The Republicans

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The John McCain event derivative was expired to 100.

Rep NH McCain

Rep NH Romney

Rep NH Huckabee

Rep NH Giuliani

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Michigan

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The Democrats

The Hillary Clinton event derivative was expired to 100.

MI Dem Clinton

MI Dem Obama

MI Dem Edwards

MI Dem Field

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The Republicans

The Mitt Romney event derivative was expired to 100.

MI Rep Romney

MI Rep McCain

MI Rep Giuliani

MI Rep Field

Source: InTrade


Author Profile&nbsp-Editor and Publisher of Midas Oracle .ORG .NET .COM &#8212- Chris Masse&#8217-s mugshot &#8212- Contact Chris Masse &#8212- Chris Masse&#8217-s LinkedIn profile &#8212- Chris Masse&#8217-s FaceBook profile &#8212- Chris Masse&#8217-s Google profile &#8212- Sophia-Antipolis, France, E.U. Read more from this author&#8230-


Read the previous blog posts by Chris. F. Masse:

  • Are David Pennock’s search engine prediction markets the worst marketing disaster since the New Coke?
  • Midas Oracle is incontestably [*] the best vertical portal to prediction markets.
  • Comment spam paid by Emile Servan-Schreiber of NewsFutures-Bet2Give
  • BetFair Games needs a Swedish provider to develop its gambling offerings.
  • When Markets Beat the Polls – Scientific American Magazine
  • Robin Hanson has some fanboy in India. Great. Tiny caveat: The parroting Indian writer does not acknowledge Robin Hanson by name.
  • Molecular Nanotechnology

Prediction markets are forecasting tools of convenience that feed on advanced indicators.

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Why were the political prediction markets so wrong about Barak Obama and Hillary Clinton in New Hampshire?

&#8230-asks Slate&#8217-s Daniel Gross &#8212-via Mister Usability (Alex Kirtland), who needs to go and get his own gravatar.

So, I&#8217-ve been watching the action in one of the political futures markets this evening, Intrade. And the action in this prediction market has reinforced my opinion that these are less futures markets than immediate-past markets. The price movement tends to respond to conventional wisdom and polling data- it doesn&#8217-t lead them.

Throughout the day and into the early evening, while polls were still open, Democratic investors, mimicking the post-Iowa c.w. and polls, believed Obama was highly likely to be the Democratic nominee. The Obama contract was trading in the lows 70s, meaning investors believed he had a 70 percent chance of being the nominee, while Hillary Clinton contracts were in the 20s. […] At 6 p.m., this market had written Hillary Clinton&#8217-s entire presidential campaign off. At 9:30 p.m., it was calling a dead heat. What caused investors to change their minds so drastically in the space of a couple of hours? A few data points that went against the day&#8217-s prevailing conventional wisdom and polls. […]

See also Niall O&#8217-Connor&#8217-s assessment:

I am looking forward to the post New Hampshire Caucus, when all you prediction market advocates crawl out from under your stones. For the record at one point the market on Intrade and Betfair was suggesting that Obama had a 95% probability of winning the caucas- whilst Intrade had him at 77% to win the nomination.A case perhaps of both the foolery of crowds and, the market biting back.

New Hampshire will go down as the Black Wednesday of prediction markets and unless there is now objective transparent debate (as opposed to the usual biased sabre rattling) – prediction markets will be dead in the water.

My answer to Dan Gross&#8217- legitimate question and to Niall O&#8217-Connor&#8217-s snarky comment:

  1. Prediction markets are forecasting tools of convenience that feed on advanced indicators. When those advanced indicators are wrong, the prediction markets are wrong.
  2. If you prefer the polls or the pundits, your call &#8212-but polls and pundits were also wrong, this time, right? Required reading for mister Niall O&#8217-Connor: &#8220-New Hampshire&#8217-s Polling Fiasco&#8221- + &#8220-Analysis: pundits eat crow&#8220-.
  3. The ultimate forecasting tool would be a way to reverse our psychological arrow of time &#8212-so as to remember the future instead of the past. Only science-fiction writers and some imbecile ( :-D ) believe in that.
  4. The prediction market approach is to stick with the markets, on the long term. Take their successes. Take their failures. Unlike Donald Luskin and Markos Moulitsas, Chris Masse will not turn against the prediction markets when they fail punctually. What counts is the long series.
  5. My first point should be included in the prediction markets approach definition, in my view, but others (like economist Michael Giberson) might have different opinions.
  6. With respect to my first point, I bet that the prediction markets will never replace the polls as the forecasting tool of choice for political analysts &#8212-on that particular point (but not on a myriad of others), I break away from Justin Wolfers&#8217- irrational exuberance and I side with Emile Servan-Schreiber of NewsFutures (my preferred play-money prediction exchange). Prediction market reporting will have a function, indeed (as suggests Justin Wolfers), but not the dominant function.
  7. Going forward, prediction market journalism should emphasize relative accuracy (as opposed to absolute accuracy) &#8212-that is, comparing prediction markets with polls and pundits, which is what Robin Hanson has said from day one. Our good friend Niall O&#8217-Connor has difficulty to compute that, apparently. He should eat more fish. :-D

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Justin Wolfers:

In a few years, we may regard the second half of the 20th century as the aberration in which the press used polls rather than markets to track political races,” Justin Wolfers, a business professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, wrote in an e-mail message. “And in the 21st century, we may return to the habits of the early 20th century, reporting on political races through the lens of prediction markets rather than polls.

Emile Servan-Scheiber:

1) The traders themselves are the first to look at the polls to inform their trades. So the polls are here to stay.

2) Our recent experience in Western Europe seems to indicate that the superior accuracy of markets over polls when predicting elections may be a U.S. artifact that isn’t so easily reproducible elsewhere. I’ve discussed this with Forrest Nelson of IEM [Iowa Electronic Markets], and apparently, ever since the Truman-Dewey polling debacle of 1948, U.S. pollsters have adopted a policy of reporting mostly raw numbers rather than projections based on sophisticated secret formulas, so they can’t be accused of manipulating opinion. However, raw numbers are notoriously unreliable when based on small samples, and Western European pollsters never report them, preferring instead to publish projections based on historically-informed statistical formulas. What we’ve observed in France and Holland is that it it’s very hard to beat the accuracy of such projections.

[I don’t make mine Emile Servan-Schreiber’s second point, but that’s a minor.]

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InTrade&#8217-s expired prediction markets:

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New Hampshire

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The Democrats

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The Hillary Clinton event derivative was expired to 100.

Dem NH Clinton

Dem NH Obama

Dem NH Edwards

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The Republicans

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The John McCain event derivative was expired to 100.

Rep NH McCain

Rep NH Romney

Rep NH Huckabee

Rep NH Giuliani

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Iowa

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The Democrats.

The Barack Obama event derivative was expired to 100.

Dem Iowa Obama

Dem Iowa Clinton

Dem Iowa Edwards

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The Republicans

The Mike Huckabee event derivative was expired to 100.

Rep Iowa Huckabee

Rep Iowa omney

Rep Iowa McCain

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Source: InTrade

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[A more complete prediction market reporting should have included expired contracts from NewsFutures and BetFair. Sorry for that. Note that InTrade-TradeSports is the only exchange to offer a “closed contacts” section.]

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NEXT: Prediction Markets 101 + Who did best in explaining the prediction markets to the lynching crowd? + After the New Hampshire fiasco, 16 people came to defend the prediction markets, so far. + The prediction markets deserve a fair trial. + Prediction Markets = the greatest time-saving invention of this century

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HISTORY: Prediction Markets Timeline

For an updated version of this document, see the &#8220-paged&#8221- Prediction Markets Timeline.

CHRONOLOGY &amp- HISTORY: Prediction Markets Timeline

Feel free to post a comment or contact me, and I&#8217-ll correct or add a factoid. Thanks.

#1. Historical Prediction Markets

According to Paul Rhode and Koleman Strumpf, prediction markets almost never got it wrong forecasting the 19 presidential elections that took place from 1868 to 1940. (PDF)

#2. The three Iowa Electronic Markets founders (Robert Forsythe, Forrest Nelson and George Neumann)

&#8220-We ran our first market in 1988. We didn’t have regulatory approval at that point so we were restricted solely to the University of Iowa community. We had under 200 traders and under $5,000.&#8221- &#8211- [Robert Forsythe – PDF file]

– [CFTC’s no-action letter to the IEM – 1992 – PDF file]

– [CFTC’s no-action letter to the IEM – 1993 – PDF file]

#3. Robin Hanson

a) Robin Hanson set up and ran a rudimentary prediction exchange (a market board, PPT file) in January 24, 1989. The outcome to predict was the name of the winner of a Poker party.

b) Until evidence of the contrary, it seems that Robin Hanson was the first to set up and run a corporate prediction exchange &#8212-at Xanadu, Inc., in April 1989. See: A 1990 Corporate Prediction Market + Anonymity is important for employees trading on internal prediction markets.

Robin Hanson: &#8220-I started a market at Xanadu on cold fusion in April 1989. In May 1990, I started a market there on whether their product would be delivered before Deng died.&#8221-

c) Until evidence of the contrary, it seems that Robin Hanson was the first to set up and run a bunch of imagination-based prediction markets. See the Murder Mystery Evening described by Barney Pell &#8212-circa June 8, 1989.

d) Until evidence of the contrary, it seems that Robin Hanson was the first to write a paper on prediction markets created and existing primarily because of the information in their prices (as opposed to markets created primarily for speculation and hedging).

Could Gambling Save Science? &#8211- (Reply to Comments) &#8211- by Robin Hanson &#8211- 1990-07-00
Market-Based Foresight: a Proposal &#8211- by Robin Hanson &#8211- 1990-10-30
Idea Futures: Encouraging an Honest Consensus &#8211- (PDF) &#8211- by Robin Hanson &#8211- 1992-11-00

e) Robin Hanson godfathered the Foresight Exchange (created in 1994) and NewsFutures (created in 2000).

f) Robin Hanson invented the concepts of decision markets (PDF) and decision-aid markets.

g) Robin Hanson invented a new market design (for the 2000-2003&#8242-s Policy Analysis Market), the Market Scoring Rules, a mix between CDA and Scoring Rules &#8212-now in use for most enterprise prediction markets and public, play-money prediction exchanges. Note that MSR is mainly used in a one-dimension version, but many researchers are interested in its combinatorial version.

#4. Other Pioneering Public Prediction Exchanges (Betting Exchanges, Event Derivative Exchanges) and Inventors/Innovators/Entrepreneurs

a) The Foresight Exchange was founded on September 22, 1994 by Ken Kittlitz, Sean Morgan, Mark James, Greg James, David McFadzean and Duane Hewitt. The Foresight Exchange is a play-money prediction exchange (betting exchange) managed by an open group of volunteers. It pioneered user-created and user-managed, play-money prediction markets. Any person can join the Foresight Exchange and interact with the rest of the Web-based organization. An independent judge (independent from the owner of the claim) should be appointed among the volunteers. [Thus, it’s not “DYI prediction markets”.]

b) The Hollywood Stock Exchange was founded on April 12, 1996, by Max Keiser and Michael Burns. See the patent for the Virtual Specialist. For more info, see: Is HSX the “longest continuously operating prediction market”??? &#8211- REDUX

c) BetFair was founded in 1999 by Andrew Black and Edward Wray, and was launched in England in June 2000. As of today, BetFair is the world&#8217-s biggest prediction exchange (betting exchange, event derivative exchange).

d) NewsFutures was founded in March 2000 and launched in September 2000 in France and in April 2001 in the US by Emile Servan-Shreiber and Maurice Balick. See: NewsFutures Timeline. NewsFutures was the first exchange to let people buy or sell contracts for each side of a binary-outcome event. The advantage of this design is that it avoids the need for &#8220-shorting&#8221-, a notion that tends to confuse novice traders. NewsFutures later extend that approach to deal with n-ary outcome events while implementing automatic arbitrage.

e) TradeSports was launched in Ireland in 2002 by John Delaney. InTrade was later purchased and became a non-sports prediction exchange (betting exchange). As of today, InTrade is the biggest betting exchange on the North-American market &#8212-where betting exchanges are still illegal. As for TradeSports, it closed at the end of 2008, alas.

#5. The Policy Analysis Market Brouhaha

a) Robin Hanson was the main economist behind the 2000–2003 US DoD&#8217-s DARPA&#8217-s IAO&#8217-s FutureMAP–Policy Analysis Market project. (For this project, Robin Hanson invented a new market design, the Market Scoring Rules.) On July 28, 2003, two Democratic US Senators called for the termination of PAM, the the big media gave airtime to their arguments, and the US DOD quickly ended the IAO&#8217-s FutureMAP program.

b) The second branch of the 2000–2003 US DoD&#8217-s DARPA&#8217-s IAO&#8217-s FutureMAP program was handled by the Iowa Electronic Markets and was intended to predict the SARS pandemic. (This project later gave birth to IEM&#8217-s Influenza Prediction Market.)

#6. James Surowiecki&#8217-s The Wisdom Of Crowds

a) James Surowiecki&#8217-s book, The Wisdom Of Crowds, was published in 2004.

b) Impact of The Wisdom Of Crowds.

#7. Recent Public Prediction Exchanges (Betting Exchanges, Event Derivative Exchanges) and Inventors/Innovators/Entrepreneurs

a) US-based and US-regulated HedgeStreet was launched in 2004 by John Nafeh, Russell Andersson, and Ursula Burger. A designated contract market (DCM) and a registered derivatives clearing organization (DCO), HedgeStreet is subject to regulatory oversight by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). In November 2006, IG Group bought HedgeStreet for $6 million.

b) Inkling Markets was launched in March 2006 and co-pioneered (with CrowdIQ, which later bellied up) the concept of DIY, play-money prediction markets.

c) In September 2006, TradeSports-InTrade was the first prediction exchange (betting exchange, event futures exchange) to apply Chris Masse&#8217-s concept of X Groups. See: TradeSports-InTrade prediction markets on Bush approval ratings.

d) HubDub was launched in early 2008 and is the second most popular play-money prediction exchange, behind HSX.

#8. Enterprise Prediction Markets

a) Until evidence of the contrary, it seems that Robin Hanson was the first to set up and run a corporate prediction exchange &#8212-at Xanadu, Inc., in April 1989. See: A 1990 Corporate Prediction Market + Anonymity is important for employees trading on internal prediction markets.

b) In the 1996&#8211-1999 period, HP ran a series of internal prediction markets to forecast the sales of its printers.

c) Eli Lilly sponsored 10 public, industry-level prediction markets in April 2003 (on the NewsFutures prediction exchange).

d) Eli Lilly began using internal prediction markets in February 2004 (powered by NewsFutures).

e) Google&#8216-s Bo Cowgill published about their use of internal prediction markets in October 2005.

f) Since then, many companies selling software services for enterprise prediction markets have been created.

#9. Disputes Between Traders And Exchanges

a) The scandal of the North Korean Missile prediction market that erupted in July 2006 is, as of today, the biggest scandal that rocked the field of prediction markets.

Faulty polls screw up the political prediction markets.

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In today&#8217-s soapbox:

Yet it turns out that in 2002, IEM markets indicated that Republicans would lose the house. Which we now know is wrong. They were pretty consistent in their 2004 presidential prediction, however. I recall that Surowiecki discussed the fact that the predictive markets for congressional elections tended to be less accurate than the presidential ones&#8211-because fewer people got involved in the betting.

Wrong. Volumes are OK. If I remember well, the polls were wrong in 2002, so don&#8217-t look any further for the cause of failure of those IEM prediction markets.

Paper That Documents This 2002 IEM Debacle: Iowa Electronic Markets – (PDF) – by Paul Gomme – 2003-04-15

Until September, Republican control of the House was seen as a 50–50 proposition, while their control of the Senate received a probability of around 20 percent. In October, the likelihood of a Republican-controlled House fluctuated between 65 percent and 90 percent while the likelihood of a Republican Senate fluctuated around 40 percent. It was not until election day results came in that market participants locked in on the eventual outcome: Republican control of both the House and Senate. Of course, this outcome was generally a surprise: Neither pollsters nor political commentators called the Republican win in the Senate.

I Disagree With This Paragraph Of The Same Paper:

Better than Gallup? The IEM political markets have a couple of advantages over their closest “competitor,” the public opinion poll. One advantage is that data from the IEM are available virtually instantaneously and almost continuously. Results from polls are typically several days old when they are reported and are taken at discrete intervals. Consequently, data from the IEM are more amenable to studying events like the untimely death of a Senate candidate. A further advantage of the IEM is that contracts can be written based on intrinsically interesting events, such as who controls the House or Senate. Poll results require more massaging to answer such questions.

My Take: Give the polls a break, and quit saying that our predictive market-generated technology is a &#8220-competitor&#8221- to the polls. Without polls, the political prediction markets could return to the locker room. Plus, prediction markets aggregate probably [see comment] more than just the polls.

Hint: A public roasting of David Perry over his impersonating of George Gallup is in the tube and will be published soon on this blog.

Odds of GOP Retaining Congressional Control

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A recent comment to yesterday&#8217-s Citibank Panic/Euphoria discussion led to this post being inserted in the weekend linkfest:

According to Tradesports, the odds of the Republican Party retaining control of each Congressional House in the 2006 Mid Term Election is mixed.

In the Senate, only one third of the 100 seats are up for re-election. Votes are staggered, so every 2 years a different third of the 6-year term seats come up. The odds strongly favor GOP retention of the Senate. The Democrats would need to capture 6 seats, something previously viewed as rather unlikely &#8212- not impossible, but unlikely.

Although several races have tightened, this remains a long shot for the minority party. The MSM is, as always, focused on the horse races but not the issues. See Race for Senate control tightens for example.

When we go to the most recent betting on the outcomes, the senate appears to be rather safe. Using trend or technical analysis, we see the GOP retention of Senate has been consistently above 70%- It has recently dipped as Tennessee and Virginia &#8212- formerly &#8220-safe seats&#8221- &#8212- have become competitive. But it would take a significant break of 70 to suggest this was anything but a long-shot.

Senate Trading

Ts_senate

via Tradesports

When it comes control of the House, however, the prediction markets present a very different picture. All 435 seats are up for grabs.

Its also one that lends itself even more to TA:

Ts_house

via Tradesports

From last November til today, we see a fairly well maintained down trend. Recently, that was almost reversed on an increase in volume since hitting lows of 40% in September. That was most likely the result of a 30% drop ingasoline prices, a 20+% in Crude Oil prices, and a strong post summer rally in the stock markets.

However, the Foley/Page scandal has now reversed that. On even bigger volume, the downtrend has been maintained, and the House odds are once again near low 40s.

If the election were held today, the Senate would stay GOP, while the House would shift to the Democrats.

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There is one additional note: I have long complained that the relative thinness of these markets &#8212- the number of traders and the dollar amounts at issue &#8212- can make their results somewhat suspect. For more on this, see our 2004 critique, Iowa and Prediction Markets.