Predictocracy = Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making

[...] The main problem with using [Michael] Abramowicz’s book as a “technical manual”, however, is that he’s never actually seen, much less touched, most of the blocks he describes. His conclusions are not supported or tested by math models, computer simulations, lab experiments, field trials, nor a track record of successful past proposals – it is all based on his untested intuitions. And he doesn’t seem inclined to do any such testing himself – he hopes his book will inspire others to do that. There is of course a spectrum of rigor in how solidly one can support a claim. Most business decisions are based on far less rigor that elite academics often demand, and there is surely a place for “brainstorming” speculation. Compared with most academics, I admit I have often been more than toward the speculation end of the spectrum, though I have tried to test my speculations via math models, lab experiments, field trials, and have arguably collected a modest track record of success. [...]

Michael Abramowicz’s response:

[...] The incentives provided by two of my technical proposals (the decentralized subsidy approach and the nobody-loses prediction market) are sufficiently straightforward to me that math seems superfluous to me, though I agree that field tests comparing these with alternatives would be useful. Two of the proposals (the text-authoring market and the market web) could certainly benefit from experimentation, but the software needed to implement them would be considerably more complicated than what is needed for existing prediction markets. [...]

Robin Hanson’s second take.

Michael Abramowicz’s post.

Robin Hanson on futarchy vs. predictocracy.

Michael Abramowicz.

Robin Hanson.

I will blog about this book, once I have read it, in the near future.

Predictocracy = Market Mechanisms for Public and Private Decision Making

All the book is online, at the web address above. You can also buy it at bookshops, or at Amazon.