Chris Masses first comment to the CFTC on event markets (prediction markets)

Posted on July 9, 2008 by admin

Chris F. Masse
Midas Oracle
cfm &#8212-&#8211- midasoracle &#8212-&#8211- com
chrisfmasse &#8212-&#8211- gmail &#8212-&#8211- com

July 6th, 2008

Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st St. NW
Washington D.C. 20581

Attention:
Office of the Secretariat- [email protected]

Reference:
Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts
73 FR 25669

–

My name is Chris F. Masse, and I&#8217-m the publisher of CFM (a vertical portal to prediction markets, which is the only one I know of that lists extensively the URLs of all the world&#8217-s play-money and real-money prediction exchanges)

http://www.chrisfmasse.com/

and Midas Oracle (a group blog on prediction markets, which is the most popular resource on this topic).

http://www.midasoracle.org/

I&#8217-ve been covering the prediction market industry since 2003 (when the brouhaha caused by the Policy Analysis Market attracted the attention of many). I would like to give my input to the CFTC on the subject of real-money prediction exchanges.

First of all, let me say that I welcomed:

#1. The CFTC&#8217-s decision to investigate and approve HedgeStreet&#8217-s application as a DCM in 2003 and 2004 (in spite of the opposition of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange)-

http://www.hedgestreet.com/abouthedgestreet/pressreleases/pressrelease_1.html
http://www.hedgestreet.com/faq/
http://www.financial-spread-betting.com/hedgestreet-application.pdf
http://www.cftc.gov/files/submissions/comments/comdcm038cme.pdf

#2. The CFTC&#8217-s decision to publish a concept release on &#8220-event markets&#8221- in May 2008 (73 FR 25669).

http://www.cftc.gov/lawandregulation/federalregister/proposedrules/2008/e8-9981.html

Just a technical note, before I give you my thoughts. In the following, I call &#8220-prediction market&#8221- the specific market where one particular event derivative is traded. (For instance, the &#8220-Barack Obama will be elected US President in November 2008&#8243- prediction market.) And I call &#8220-prediction exchange&#8221- the general marketplace where many prediction markets (on political elections and other events) are traded. (Hence, I call HedgeStreet a &#8220-prediction exchange&#8221-).

Please, allow me to give you my thoughts on the subject of real-money prediction exchanges:

–

ABOUT DISPERSED INFORMATION PRICED IN EVENT DERIVATIVE MARKETS, EXCLUDED COMMODITIES, DCMs, AND EXTENDING THE COMMENTING PERIOD ON THE CFTC&#8217-s CONCEPT RELEASE ON &#8220-EVENT MARKETS&#8221-.

–

#1. I fully agree with the point #2 made by professor Vernon Smith in his comment (CL01) to the CFTC.

http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/frcomment/08-004c001.pdf

The information aggregation mechanism that constitutes the essence of each prediction market (for instance, the &#8220-Barack Obama will be elected US President in November 2008&#8243- prediction market), and the objective probabilistic predictions generated by all these information aggregation mechanisms, are of high social utility.

–

#2. I fully agree with HedgeStreet in their comment to the CFTC (CL12) that political elections qualify as &#8220-excluded commodities&#8221-.

http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/frcomment/08-004c012.pdf

The point made by HedgeStreet about economic consequences, risk management and hedging is extremely important with regards to:
– the future revenues of the for-profit, commercial companies who would be operating the real-money prediction exchanges on political elections (since hedging-oriented derivative markets experience much more volumes than speculative-only betting markets)-
– the financial innovations, which would be created by this process, and whose benefits will, on the long term, spread throughout society (just like what has happened with the traditional derivatives).

However, I notice that HedgeStreet does not state specifically whether the topics other than political elections (mentioned in the CFTC&#8217-s concept release on &#8220-event markets&#8221-) qualify, too, as &#8220-excluded commodities&#8221-.

This issue is the cornerstone of the discussion on &#8220-event markets&#8221-. In the concept release, the CFTC mention many other prediction markets than those about political elections. I saw only one comment (from Jason Ruspini, CL11) that elaborates in detail about non-political &#8220-event markets&#8221- &#8212-as of Sunday, Juy 6th, 2008, one day before the deadline for the commenting period.

http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/frcomment/08-004c011.pdf

Hence, I believe that the CFTC do not (as of this Sunday) have enough pieces of external opinions about this important issue to make their determination about the regulatory status of &#8220-event markets&#8221-.

I am asking the CFTC to extend the deadline to September 7th, 2008.

I believe that since the most interesting comments (other than Vernon Smith&#8217-s one, which appeared the first in May 2008) were made the last week preceding the July 7th deadline, there wasn&#8217-t enough time for the previous commenters or some other commenters to agree or disagree with those recent comments.

On top of all that, I understand that some people and organizations might well submit their comment on Sunday, July 6th, 2008 &#8212-the day before the deadline for the closure for the comments. I know that law professor Tom W. Bell will do so. It is rumored that 2 prediction exchanges will do so, too. It will be impossible for other commenters to assess those last comments, and give their opinion about those to the CFTC.

I believe that more people and organizations would come forward in the coming 2 months with interesting opinions about the &#8220-excluded commodities versus exempt commodities&#8221- debate (or some say, the &#8220-jurisdiction vs. exemption&#8221- debate), which is, as I understand it, the cornerstone of the CFTC&#8217-s concept release on &#8220-event markets&#8221-. Indeed, some business media organizations I know of will publish news articles about this debate, after the July 7th deadline. Hence, many more people will be drawn in the conversation about &#8220-event markets&#8221-, and we will all benefit from their input.

As I said, one one hand, the debate needs more external comments from people arguing that non-political events are &#8220-excluded commodities&#8221-.

On the other hand, the debate needs more external comments from people arguing that about the &#8220-exempt commodities&#8221-, &#8220-ECMs&#8221-, or &#8220-no-action letter&#8221- points of view. The American Enterprise Institute&#8217-s public petition of May 2008, the concept release of May 2008, and the comments sent to the CFTC published on the CFTC website as this Sunday, do not give many legal details about this side of the argument.

Pushing the deadline to September 7th, 2008 will allow another round of informal and formal discussions between the two sides of this important issue.

Already, one commenter (Jason Ruspini) is on the record publicly saying that, had he read the HedgeStreet&#8217-s comment to the CFTC, he would have put more emphasis on some of his arguments.

http://www.midasoracle.org/2008/07/05/my-response-to-the-cftc-on-event-contracts/

It&#8217-s for all those reasons that I am asking the CFTC to extend the deadline to September 7th, 2008.

–

#3. I fully agree with HedgeStreet in their comment to the CFTC (CL12) that the DCMs (and especially a non-intermediated DCM like HedgeStreet
) should be allowed to operate prediction markets on political elections, as discussed by the CFTC&#8217-s concept release of May 2008.

As I said above, not enough commenters have addressed the specific issue of how the non-political &#8220-event markets&#8221- should be regulated (or semi regulated, thru the &#8220-exemption&#8221- way). Hence, I can&#8217-t see how the CFTC can&#8217-t reach a wise decision on the issue of which type of &#8220-event markets&#8221- should be offered by which type of derivative exchanges (DCMs, ECMs, or exchanges that are granted a &#8220-no-action&#8221- letter).

Again, I am asking the CFTC to extend the deadline to September 7th, 2008.

–

Thanks for listening,

Chris F. Masse
Panorama B, Green Side
305, avenue Saint Philippe
Les Templiers, Sophia–Antipolis
06410 Biot, Alpes-Maritimes
France, European Union

&#8211-
&#8211-

–

– Chris Masse&#8217-s second comment to the CFTC on &#8220-event markets&#8221- (prediction markets)

– What the CFTC is asking.

–

Robin Hansons purity test is based on an absurd principle.

Posted on July 8, 2008 by admin

It&#8217-s not the motivation that is important to assess &#8212-it&#8217-s the liquidity that counts. The more trades, the better. Liquidity leads to statistically accurate probabilities predictions. Liquidity, liquidity, liquidity, doc.

–

Robin Hanson:

One proposed distinguishing criteria includes the size of an individual trader&#8217-s stake, and the number of traders. The Iowa Electronic Markets are limited on both of these parameters. Such limits do succeed in preventing large hedging markets from masquerading as info-motivated event markets. But they do little to prevent generic gambling markets from masquerading as info-motivated event markets.

–

Total absurdity.

–

UPDATE: Robin Hanson comments&#8230-

Again, important for what purpose? The CFTC was clear that they are concerned about how to keep generic gambling from slipping in via whatever they might approve. I was addressing that concern. I don’t see how you can read anything I said as arguing against liquidity.

–

Are US-based real-money prediction exchanges to become federally regulated (as DCMs)? Or semi-regulated (as ECMs, or as exchanges covered by no-action letters)?

Posted on July 7, 2008 by admin

BusinessWeek:

In its request for comment, the CFTC reminded the public that the commission should &#8220-promote innovation for futures and derivatives.&#8221- It also added that —hint, hint— the Iowa markets have been valuable sources of public information and have predicted Presidential outcomes better than polls. The 2000 act gave the CFTC the authority &#8220-to promote responsible economic or financial innovation&#8221- by creating an exemption for certain types of contracts (such as one in a prediction market). […]

&#8220-Basically I think they&#8217-re going to expand the IEM no-action letter and take legal measures to make sure that legal contracts aren&#8217-t subject to antigambling laws,&#8221- says Chapman law professor Bell. […]

–

BusinessWeek gets it right about where the CFTC is going. (Go reading the 2 pages.)

However, I still believe that HedgeStreet has a strong argument (about the political elections being &#8220-excluded commodities&#8221-) and I wonder what the CFTC will do about it.

–

What Robin Hanson told the CFTC about event markets (prediction markets)

Posted on July 7, 2008 by admin

Robin Hanson:

Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2008 10:12:46 -0400
To: [email protected]
From: Robin Hanson &[email protected]&gt-
Subject: Comment on &#8220-Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts&#8221-
&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212–
I am an event market innovator, having published the first detailed discussions envisioning their widespread application, having designed a widely used trading mechanism (the market scoring rule), and having co-developed the first internal corporate markets (at Xanadu), the first public web markets (the Foresight Exchange), and the aborted-but-influential Policy Analysis Market.

As I am less well trained in law than social science, I will not comment on what the C.F.T.C. is legally authorized to do, but only on how various policies correspond to public interest and public opinion. I speak here only for myself and not for any organization with which I may be affiliated.

The degree and type of regulation appropriate for a financial market depends on traders&#8217- motives. Long ago most everything beyond direct physical exchange was widely discouraged or prohibited as &#8220-gambling&#8221- or &#8220-speculation.&#8221- The motives imputed to traders seemed to be some combination of mistakes, overconfidence, thrill of action, love of risk, and showing off one&#8217-s confidence and risk tolerance.

While public opinion on gambling has changed little, eventually legal exceptions were carved out for markets where, though speculation was still possible, enough participants had more sympathetic motives to garner public support. Securities markets allowed business managers to hedge ownership, insurance markets allowed hedging of various idiosyncratic risks, and commodities futures markets allowed hedging of various common risks.

It has long been noted approvingly that such speculative markets often had the desirable side effect of inducing people to collect info and aggregate it into prices. But until recently such info was not considered or accepted as a primary explanation or justification for a market&#8217-s existence. Given the myriad ways our society now suffers, often dramatically, from failures to aggregate info, I am very optimistic about the long term potential for such markets to offer substantial social value. However, the question remains of how such info-motivated markets should be regulated today.

Ideally an entire new regulatory regime would be carved out, on par with regimes for securities, insurance, and commodities futures regulation. But who would bother with such an effort before such markets had proven themselves able to realize substantial social value? And how could such markets prove themselves without at least tentative legal spaces in which to experiment? I know of no good reason why the C.F.T.C. should not provide one of the first such spaces.

Two key issues face a new regulatory regime for info-motivated event markets, especially one carved out of a common-risk-hedging commodities-future regulatory regime:

How does optimal regulation of info-motivated event markets differ from that of common-risk-hedging markets?
How can regulators ensure that this new regime is not used as a back door to escape prohibitions on other commodity futures trading, or to escape general prohibitions against gambling?

How Does Optimal Regulation Differ Here?

On the first question, the largest difference I see, by far, is the appropriate scale. When hedging risks it makes sense to focus first on risks, and hence trades, which are a large fraction of the wealth of the individuals or organizations involved. If risks are common there should be many who trade if any trade, and so market volume should be many times individual wealth levels. It also makes sense to devote a small fraction of this volume to efforts to avoid foul play. I have heard that it costs on the order of a million dollars to jump the regulatory hoops to gain approval for such markets, and I cannot say that this is not roughly the right cost magnitude.

For markets whose main function is to collect info, however, the appropriate scale seems far smaller. To collect info on a topic, those who know or could find out need only be offered a sufficient incentive to bother. In the lab, experimental economists see substantial effort and price info aggregation when only a few tens of dollars are at stake, and field data seems consistent with this estimate. If most of the social value from info-motivated event markets were concentrated in a few very important topics, it would not matter much if regulatory barriers prevented markets on topics with small info values. But if, as seems more plausible, much of the value is found in a long thick tail of smaller topics, then to realize this social value it is essential that regulatory barriers to creating such markets be reduced to the lowest feasible level.

For example, consider a topic where a social value of one thousand dollars could be realized, if only people were allowed to trade in a market on that topic. It is hard to see how this value could actually be realized if the regulatory cost to create this market were more than a few hundred dollars. If there were a million such topics, the total social value such markets could create would be one billion dollars.

A related difference is when it makes sense to limit participation. If most of a certain kind of risk is held by wealthy individuals or large organizations, then it can make sense to limit participation to such traders. But for info collection it is crucial to allow participation by the sorts of people who could plausibly obtain that info. For a great many topics these people will be spread out in the population, and not easily distinguished from most other people. A broad permission to participate will thus be desired in such cases.

How Can We Distinguish When This Regime Should Apply?

On the second question, we seek a reliable way to distinguish markets where the info collected is a strong rationale for its existence, a rationale strong enough to justify overturning the usual public presumption against generic speculation, and strong enough relative to hedging rationales to justify using this new regulatory regime, rather than other hedging regulatory regimes.

One proposed distinguishing criteria includes the size of an individual trader&#8217-s stake, and the number of traders. The Iowa Electronic Markets are limited on both of these parameters. Such limits do succeed in preventing large hedging markets from masquerading as info-motivated event markets. But they do little to prevent generic gambling markets from masquerading as info-motivated event markets.

Another proposed distinguishing criteria is the form of the organization that hosts the market. Some have proposed that tax-exempt, research, and government organizations be given wider latitude than for-profit businesses. I understand that this matches a common public perception, but honestly it seems mostly wishful thinking to believe that such organizations are substantially more likely to create markets with a strong info rationale, or to avoid whatever problems one fears with
for-profit businesses.

Some have suggested that topics could be used to distinguish the strength of info rationale. Markets on sporting events might be presumed to have low info rationale, while markets on public policy might be presumed to have high info rationale. This approach seems to open a proverbial &#8220-can of worms,&#8221- however, requiring a great and continuing effort to categorize topics.

To ease this effort, one could inherit some other topic categorization. For example, regulation of speech distinguishes topics where free speech is presumed to perform very valuable social functions, and so has strong legal protection, from topics where such functions are less clear, allowing speech to be more easily regulated. Event markets might be permitted on topics where free speech has a strong legal protection.

In contrast to such weak indicators let me propose a stronger indicator of when a speculative market has a strong info rationale. I am not proposing that only markets which sport this indicator be allowed, but rather that at least such markets be allowed. My proposal is to permit markets where a sponsor pays to ensure that traders on average do not lose financially from participation, as this payment creates a strong presumption that this sponsor expected to gain substantial value from that info.

It is hard to see many of the benefits that traders may gain from trading, but we can more easily see the average financial costs that traders suffer. Traders may have to pay for permission to trade, to deposit into a system, to check prices and trading history, for each trade, and to withdraw their winnings. In addition, trader deposits may not earn competitive risk-adjusted rates of return. Payment is sometimes in the form of seeing ads. Such fees are essential to the profitability of &#8220-gambling&#8221- businesses today that rely primarily on traders&#8217- speculative motives.

If for a particular topic, a sponsor were willing to ensure that traders paid none of these common trading fees, that sponsor would have credibly suggested that his or her market would not exist if that sponsor did not expect related info to have substantial value. If this sponsor furthermore subsidized this market, allowing traders to gain on average by trading against ignorant automated market makers, this would show even more clearly that this sponsor valued the resulting info. Such measures would ensure that traders suffered no average financial loss from their participation, though traders could still lose on average, such as by wasting too much time dealing with these markets.

Of course we do not expect sponsors to arise to support all topics where info collected by trading would have substantial social value. We expect businesses to sponsor markets on topics where they can profit from info, and charities to collect donations to support markets on topics they consider more broadly valuable. But we also expect many coordination failures, where each party prefers that others pay for commonly valuable info. So the case for prohibiting markets that fail my proposed criteria is much weaker than the case for permitting markets that meet this criteria.

It also remains possible that even when a sponsor finds info to be valuable enough to pay for, the social value of that info could be much less than the private value to this sponsor. If we could identify classes of such cases, these classes might form the basis of exceptions to this general permission I propose.

I have many other opinions about how such markets might be defined and regulated, but I&#8217-ve already gone one for quite a bit here – if you like what you see here and want more, you know where to find me.

In Summary

In addition to existing regulatory regimes for ownership-hedging securities, idiosyncratic-risk-hedging insurance, and common-risk-hedging futures, it could make sense to have a distinct regulatory regime for markets whose main reason to exist is the info that they collect. Compared with existing commodities futures regulation, such a regime should set a much lower barrier to creating such markets, as much of the social value may be distributed in millions of small markets. And while it is hard to determine in general which markets would create high social info value, relative to cost, we should presume such high value when a sponsor is willing to pay to ensure that traders suffer no average financial cost from their participation.
&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-&#8212-

Robin Hanson [email protected] http://hanson.gmu.edu
Research Associate, Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University
Associate Professor of Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323

Robin Hanson

–

The CFTC is going to close the comments in 3 days. We have 3 days left to convince the CFTC to accept FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges (e.g., InTrade USA or BetFair USA), and counter the puritan and sterile petition organized by the American Enterprise Institute (which has on its payroll Paul Wolfowi

Posted on July 4, 2008 by admin

–

ADDRESSES: Comments should be sent to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW., Washington, DC 20581, Attention: Office of the Secretariat. Comments may be sent by facsimile to 202.418.5521, or by e-mail to [email protected].

Reference should be made to the &#8220-Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts.&#8221- Comments may also be submitted through the Federal eRuleMaking Portal at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&amp-log=linklog&amp-to=http://web.archive.org/web/20080930170145/http://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bruce Fekrat, Special Counsel, Office of the Director (telephone 202.418.5578, e-mail [email protected]), Division of Market Oversight, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW., Washington, DC 20581.

–

THE MIDAS ORACLE TAKES:

– CALL TO ACTION: Let&#8217-s fight so that the CFTC allows the FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with &#8220-event markets&#8221-.

– In the for-profit vs not-for-profit debate, our prediction market luminaries, doctored by Bob, are on the wrong side of the issue.

– The definitive proof that FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges (like BetFair and InTrade) are the best organizers of socially valuable prediction markets (like those on global warming and climate change).

– Analysis of the HedgeStreet&#8217-s comment sent to the CFTC.

–

BACKGROUND INFO:

– CFTC’s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts&#8230- notably how they define &#8220-event markets&#8221-, how they are going to extend their &#8220-exemption&#8221- to other IEM-like prediction exchanges, and how they framed their questions to the public. Here are the comments sent to the CFTC.

– The BusinessWeek news article about the CFTC&#8217-s concept release.

– The Arnold &amp- Porter lawyer&#8217-s take. &#8212- (PDF file)

– The Schulte, Roth &amp- Zabel lawyers&#8217- take. &#8212- (PDF file)

– The Sullivan &amp- Cromwell lawyers&#8217- take. &#8212- (PDF file)

– Michael Giberson&#8217-s economic take.

– Chris Hibbert&#8217-s libertarian take.

– Tom W. Bell&#8217-s libertarian take.

– The American Enterprise Institute’s proposals to legalize the real-money prediction markets in the United States of America

–

COMMENTS TO THE CFTC

– Very soon, two prediction market organizations and one VIP will submit their comment to the CFTC.

– What Vernon Smith told the CFTC. &#8212- (PDF file)

– Jed Christiansen&#8217-s pragmatic take. &#8212- Final draft – (PDF file) – His comment to the CFTC – (PDF file)

– The International Swaps and Derivatives Association&#8217-s comment to the CFTC – (ISDA) &#8212- (PDF file)

– Jason Ruspini&#8217-s comment to the CFTC &#8212- (PDF file)

– Tom W. Bell&#8217-s petition, which will be sent to the CFTC. &#8212- (Jonathan Gewirtz is in.)

– HedgeStreet&#8217-s comment to the CFTC. &#8212- (PDF file)

– A young economist rebuts the American Enterprise Institute. &#8212- (MO mirror) &#8212- Comment to the CFTC – (PDF file)

– Tom W. Bell rebuts the American Enterprise Institute.

– Robin Hanson&#8217-s comment to the CFTC. &#8212- (MO mirror)

–

APPENDIX:

Paul Wolfowitz&#8217-s profile at the American Enterprise Institute

– How the neo-cons drove the United States of America into the unecessary Iraq war

–

The Case for Decrimininalization of Prediction Markets

Posted on June 26, 2008 by admin

[This article is cross-posted from Major Wager.]

–

A recent article in the prestigious academic journal Science (May 16, 2008, Vol 320, p. 877-8) once again makes the case for regulated prediction markets, more commonly known as &#8220-betting exchanges&#8221- to online gamblers. The authors make the case that such markets are useful in forecasting future events with less error than traditional measures such as polling. This argument is hard to ignore, with the authors including 21 top economists from such esteemed institutions as Yale, Stanford, Berkeley, and the University of Pennsylvania. Notable among the authors is Justin Wolfers from the Wharton School of business at UPenn, an economist who has gained notoriety in gambling circles due to his work on such topics as NBA referee bias (highlighted in a May 2008 article from MajorWager: http://www.majorwager.com/index.cfm?page=27&amp-show_column=660).

The concept behind using prediction markets as a decision-making tool is simple. &#8220-Shares&#8221- are made available on an open market, and the participants use their capital (and the promise of profits) to make predictions on future events, which is incorporated into the share price. In general, information tends to be widely dispersed, and a market allows wide-ranging opinions to be gathered and consolidated into a market-wide prediction. In other words, an infinite amount of opinions can be aggregated, and an open market with potential for profit provides an incentive for individuals to make their opinions publicly known.

Prediction markets always get more than their fair share of press near the end of the 4-year U.S. Presidential election cycle. The Iowa Electronics Market, housed at the University of Iowa, is perhaps the most well-known. The authors of the Science paper show that, in the week immediately preceding the Presidential elections from 1988 through 2000, the Iowa Electronic Markets erred by an average of only 1.5 percentage points from the actual vote results, while the traditional Gallup poll was off by 2.1%. Numerous other studies have shown the superiority of markets compared to other forecasting tools.

Of course, there have been some dust-ups regarding prediction markets in the past, most notably the &#8220-terrorist strike market&#8221-, unveiled a little too close to 9/11 to be palatable to the general public. The official name was the &#8220-Policy Analysis Market&#8220-, and it was established by the Pentagon to act as a prediction market for Middle East political events. It was quickly scuttled after heated comments from U.S. Senators, calling it &#8220-grotesque&#8221- and &#8220-stupid&#8221-, due to the perception of using catastrophic events such as assassinations as profit-making tools. Regardless of its political correctness (and the misinformed opinions of a few politicians), such a prediction market still holds value as a glimpse into the collective mindset of everyone with an understanding of political currents in the region. Utilizing such a prediction market as a component of foreign policy decisions may have ultimately spared the U.S. much grief in Iraq.

In recent years, prediction markets have grown beyond academic and government roles. Dublin-based InTrade is rapidly growing and provides many more options than the Iowa Electronic Markets. Others such as MatchBook have focused more on sporting contests, but provide coverage of other events as demand calls. Of course, those outside the U.S. have access to the largest betting exchange of them all, the massive European markets of BetFair. The success of these exchanges speaks to the public interest and feasibility of prediction markets.

One factor holding back the growth of online prediction markets is their close association with the quasi-legal world of sports betting and internet casinos. InTrade has been fairly proactive in this regard, spinning off from Tradesports to clean up its corporate slate, but it is still knee-deep in the legal sludge surrounding offshore &#8220-gambling&#8221-. All have to deal with the legal and financial hurdles of operating offshore.

The authors of the Science paper propose that clarification of internet gambling laws is needed to exploit the benefits of prediction markets within the United States. Clearly, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) of 2006 is one such mechanism restricting the widespread use of prediction markets. Another is the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the regulatory agency which oversees futures markets in the U.S. The CFTC has provided a &#8220-no-action letter&#8221- to the Iowa Electronic Markets, an assurance that they will not seek any enforcement action against the exchange. However, this protection is not absolute and may not trump state and federal law if challenged. The Science authors propose a number of legal reforms which will allow prediction markets to begin to gain acceptance within the U.S. financial regulatory structure.

By no means does the Science article condone large-scale public markets, at least not initially. They take a (typically academic) conservative approach, recommending new legal framework to allow for the establishment of small markets with limited scope so as to evaluate the promise and use of prediction markets. But baby steps are going to be a necessity in the growth and acceptance of regulated public markets.

Clearly, there are negative aspects to financial markets, and regulation certainly has its place. Bear Sterns, Enron, the S&amp-L scandal of the 80s, and the current housing bubble all caused tremendous loss of wealth resulting from missteps in the financial markets. The current oil crisis is due at least in part to speculation, leading to the introduction of no less than 9 separate bills in the U.S. Congress seeking tougher regulation over the trading of commodities. However, the existence of problems in the financial markets does not necessitate their dissolution. Likewise, prediction markets are sure to encounter bumps in the road, but their utility should far outweigh the risks.

Should prediction markets be legalized in the U.S.? Almost certainly. They would have benefit across numerous industries, from business decisions to political policies to financial forecasting. Unfortunately, this would require building an unlikely bridge over the Puritanical moral moat placed around gambling in the U.S. But there is no inherent difference in betting on who will win in an election than what the price of oil will be in 6 months, or what the S&amp-P 500 will close at on a particular date. Distancing prediction markets from &#8220-illegal&#8221- gambling, and instead likening them to regulated financial markets, will be a necessary first step towards broader acceptance.

The academic groundwork on prediction markets has already been laid, and offshore exchanges have begun to turn these concepts into functioning businesses. As these markets grow and begin incorporating more diverse opinions, we can expect their success rate at predicting the future to only grow. To restrict such a promising tool simply due to its perception that it is a gambling outlet is silly indeed.

6-25-08
Jay Graziani
MajorWager.com
[email protected]

–

[This article is cross-posted from Major Wager.]

–

Jason Ruspini will answer SOME of these CFTC questions. – 12 days left, Jason.

Posted on June 25, 2008 by admin

CFTC – (PDF file):

CFTC&#8217-s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts

–

V. Issues for Comment

A. Request for Comment

The following questions consider the Commission&#8217-s regulatory purview over event contracts, the interests that may appropriately underlie Commission-regulated transactions, and the appropriate regulatory treatment of event contracts. The Commission encourages comments on the specific questions posed, as well as the broad range of issues raised in this concept release. In providing comments, please describe your relevant experience and discuss in detail the facts and legal provisions that support your conclusions. Furthermore, please consider the Commission&#8217-s mandate to protect commodity futures and options markets and customers, and ensure the integrity of the commodity derivatives marketplace, as well as the expected effects of any Commission action on competition, efficiency, innovation and the financial integrity of transactions. Any recommendation with respect to the regulatory treatment of event contracts and markets should be consistent with and supported by the Act, practical, and amenable to effective and efficient implementation.

B. Public Interest

1. What public interests are served by event contracts that are designed and will principally be traded for information aggregation purposes and not for commercial risk management or pricing purposes?

2. How are these interests consistent with the public interest goals embodied in the Act?

3. What calculations, analyses, variables, and factors could be used to objectively determine the social value of information to the general public that may be discovered through trading in event contracts? Should this be a factor in determining whether the Commission plays a role in regulating these markets?

C. Jurisdictional Determinations

4. What characteristics or traits are common to or should be used to identify event contracts and event markets?

5. How do these characteristics and traits differ from those of commodity futures and options contracts that customarily have been regulated by the Commission? How are they similar?

6. Are there criteria based on the provisions of the Act that could be used to make jurisdictional determinations with respect to event contracts and markets?

7. Given the purposes and history of the Act, would it be appropriate for the Commission to apply a test premised on commercial risk management or pricing functions to demarcate the Commission&#8217-s jurisdiction over particular contracts? If so, what factors could be used to make such a determination?

8. Given the purposes and history of the Act, would it be appropriate for the Commission to apply any test premised on the economic purpose of certain types of transactions to demarcate the Commission&#8217-s jurisdiction over particular contracts? If so, what factors could be used to make such a determination?

9. What calculations, analyses, variables and factors would be appropriate in determining whether the impact of an occurrence or contingency will result in a financial, commercial or economic consequence that is identified in Section 1a(13) of the Act?

10. What calculations, analyses, variables, and factors would be appropriate in determining whether an economic or commercial index that is based on prices, rates, values, or levels should or should not qualify as an excluded commodity under Section 1a(13) of the Act?

11. What identifiable factors, statutorily based or otherwise, limit the events and measures that may underlie event contracts when such contracts are treated as Commission-regulated transactions?

12. What objective and readily identifiable factors, statutorily based or otherwise, could be used to distinguish event contracts that could appropriately be traded under Commission oversight from transactions that may be viewed as the functional equivalent of gambling?

13. The Commission notes that Section 12(e) of the Act generally provides that the CEA supersedes and preempts other laws, including state and local gaming and bucket shop laws, with respect to transactions executed on or subject to the rules of a Commission-regulated market, or with respect to transactions exempted from the Act pursuant to the Commission&#8217-s exemptive authority under Section 4(c) of the Act. What are the implications of possibly preempting state gaming laws with respect to event contracts and markets that are treated as Commission-regulated or exempted transactions?

14. Should certain underlying events or measures &#8211-such as those based on assassinations or terrorist activities&#8211- be prohibited altogether due to the social perception and impact of such events? What statutory or other legal basis would support this treatment?

15. Are there event contracts, such as political event contracts, that should be prohibited from trading under the Act, or that deserve separate treatment or consideration, due to the nature and importance of their outcomes? What statutory or other legal basis would support this treatment?

D. Legal Implementation

16. Is it appropriate for the Commission to direct certain or all event contracts onto markets that are regulated differently from and perhaps less stringently than DCMs? For example, it may be warranted or necessary to treat event markets that aggregate information solely for academic or research purposes, event markets set-up for internal corporate purposes, or event markets that offer exceedingly low notional value contracts to traders differently than markets that possess the attributes of traditional DCMs.

17. Is it appropriate for the Commission to use the Section 4(c) exemptive authority of the Act for implementing a regulatory scheme for event contracts and markets? In this regard, the Commission notes that it has the discretion to grant an exemption under Section 4(c) to certain classes of transactions without having to make a determination as to whether such transactions are subject to the Act in the first instance.

18. Is the issuance of staff no-action relief, such as the relief issued to the IEM, an appropriate or preferable means for establishing regulatory certainty for event contracts and markets? Is a policy statement appropriate or preferable?

19. What are the benefits and drawbacks of permitting certain event markets to operate pursuant to Commission established conditions that are similar to the conditions under which the IEM operates?

E. Market Participants

20. Would it be appropriate to allow market participants, and in particular, retail customers, to trade on Commission-regulated event markets with the knowledge that the Commission may not be able to effectively monitor the measures or events that underlie certain event contracts?

21. What unique protections and prophylactic measures are appropriate or necessary for the protection of retail users of event contracts and markets?

22. What are the implications of permitting the intermediation of event contracts, including intermediation on behalf of retail market participants, both with respect to trade execution and clearing?

23. Are there any types of trader or intermediary conduct, peculiar to event contracts and markets, that should be prohibited or monitored closely by regulators?

24. What other factors could impact the Commission&#8217-s ability, given its limited resources, to properly oversee or monitor trading in event contracts?

–

THE MIDAS ORACLE TAKES:

– CALL TO ACTION: Let&#8217-s fight so that the CFTC allows the FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with &#8220-event markets&#8221-.

– In the for-profit vs not-for-profit debate, our prediction market luminaries, doctored by Bob, are on the wrong side of the issue.

– COMMENTS TO THE CFTC: What to expect from Tom W. Bell and Jason Ruspini

–

BACKGROUND INFO:

– The Arnold &amp- Porter lawyers explain the meaning of the CFTC&#8217-s concept release on &#8220-event markets&#8221-. &#8212- (PDF file)

– What Vernon Smith told the CFTC.

– American Enterprise Institute’s proposals to legalize the real-money prediction markets in the United States of America

–

Let Prediction Markets Fight Terrorism.

Posted on June 23, 2008 by admin

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)&#8217-s recent request for comments about the regulation of prediction markets includes a number of specific questions. I am not sure whether I will manage to write up answers to all of them before the July 7 deadline, but question in particular—question 14—has attracted my attention. The CFTC there asks, &#8220-Should certain underlying events or measures&#8211-such as those based on assassinations or terrorist activities—be prohibited altogether due to the social perception and impact of such events? What statutory or other legal basis would support this treatment?&#8221-

I answer the first part of question 14, &#8220-No,&#8221- (and thus need not answer the second part). I doubt that the CFTC wants to hear that sort of reply, frankly- I instead suspect that it wants a legal excuse to avoid the sort of political firestorm that followed the Pentagon&#8217-s proposal to create a Policy Analysis Market that included claims about assassinations and terrorist events. My draft answer to question 14 explains why I&#8217-m willing to risk disappointing the CFTC:

The CFTC should not forbid trading in claims based on assassinations, terrorist activities, or other criminal acts. Because event markets would offer only relatively thin and traceable trading, they would not offer an attractive investment option to anybody planning to profit from wrongdoing. A would-be terrorist would risk revealing both his plans and his identity if, for instance, he invested in a contract predicting another 9/11. He would instead find it more safe and profitable to simply short certain publicly traded stocks.
Furthermore, event markets in terrorist or criminal acts might benefit the public by revealing life-saving information. Suppose, for instance, that an anthropologist&#8217-s study of corrido culture convinced her that narcoterrorists had begun planning military raids on border checkpoints in Arizona and California. If she had the opportunity to buy terrorist event claims, she might both profit from her research and tip us all off about looming trouble. Sound public policy suggests that we should encourage that sort of trading—not forbid it.
To judge from their reactions to the Policy Analysis Market proposed by the Pentagon in 2003, politicians might need to learn more about the benefits of using trading to help predict assassinations or other terrorist events. That poses a public relations problem, however—not a legal one. The CFTC thus has no sound reason to presumptively forbid trading in contracts related to such events.

Notably, my answer to question 14 differs sharply from the answer offered by Jed Christiansen. He said, &#8220-There should never be any incentive to break a law, so there should never be any contracts that would pay someone if a law was broken.&#8221- I disagree, of course, but I thank him for stimulating me to offer an alternative take.

[Crossposted at Agoraphilia and Midas Oracle.]

In the for-profit vs not-for-profit debate, our prediction market luminaries, doctored by Bob, are on the wrong side of the issue.

Posted on June 20, 2008 by admin

In the American Enterprise Institute’s proposals to legalize the real-money prediction markets in the United States of America, they advise the CFTC not to allow for-profit prediction market companies (like InTrade, TradeSports and BetFair) to operate socially valuable prediction markets &#8212-in a legal way, in the US.

–

It&#8217-s a shame that our prediction market luminaries signed that piece of ****.

–

Previously: CALL TO ACTION: Let’s fight so that the CFTC allows the FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with “event markets”.

–

Will the CFTC allow FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with event markets?

Posted on June 19, 2008 by admin

The feedback I have received about my speculative post is that I put too much weight into the CFTC requesting that the prediction exchanges organizing &#8220-event markets&#8221- (event derivative markets that can&#8217-t be used for hedging risks) be not for profit &#8212-as the Iowa Electronic Markets is.

–

Just below, in bold, are the phrase and the word I&#8217-m told I have mis-read.

–

CFTC – (PDF file):

CFTC&#8217-s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts

–

D. Legal Implementation

16. Is it appropriate for the Commission to direct certain or all event contracts onto markets that are regulated differently from and perhaps less stringently than DCMs? For example, it may be warranted or necessary to treat event markets that aggregate information solely for academic or research purposes, event markets set-up for internal corporate purposes, or event markets that offer exceedingly low notional value contracts to traders differently than markets that possess the attributes of traditional DCMs.

19. What are the benefits and drawbacks of permitting certain event markets to operate pursuant to Commission established conditions that are similar to the conditions under which the IEM operates?

–

UPDATE: CALL TO ACTION: Let&#8217-s fight so that the CFTC allows the FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with &#8220-event markets&#8221-.

–

UPDATE: NOT-FOR-PROFIT&#8230- or&#8230- FOR-PROFIT&#8230- That is the question.

–

UPDATE: In the for-profit vs not-for-profit debate, our prediction market luminaries, doctored by Bob, are on the wrong side of the issue.

–

Midas Oracle.ORG – Predictions & Innovation

Prediction Markets, Collective Intelligence, Innovation and Growth

Tag Archives: real-money prediction markets