VP conditional probabilities

Posted on June 26, 2008 by admin

BetFair is running markets on both who will be the next vice president and who will be nominated by the two parties.

As we&#8217-ve discussed before in other contexts, one can divide two probabilities like these to obtain a conditional probability: e.g., if the Democrats put X on the ticket, they will win the general election Y% of the time (where Y = odds of X becoming VP/odds of X being nominated).

These markets are thin, so the conditional probabilities should be taken with a grain of salt. But they are interesting nonetheless:

The pattern I see here is that conditional probabilities are higher for fresh faces (Webb, Sebelius- and arguably Bayh and Richardson despite their longer tenure) than for the old guard (Clinton, Nunn, Biden).

Of course, these should be viewed as correlations, not necessarily causal effects. For example, two possible explanations are: 1) putting a fresh face on the ticket helps Obama, either because there is less baggage or less of a contrast in national-politics resume length, or 2) Obama will only pick an old guard candidate in the state of the world in which he needs to shore up a weakness (i.e., picking Clinton to end a civil war, or Nunn to add foreign policy experience).
On the GOP side:

Huckabee has the highest conditional probability, and Pawlenty and Jindal are noticeably lower. Interpreting this one is harder: it depends on what aspect of Huckabee one thinks the market is expecting to be appealing (religion, likeability, Southernness, selective economic populism).

Technical note: the bids and asks reported above are actual quotes scrapped this AM- the mids are (bid+ask)/2, rescaled to add to 100 across all candidates.

COMMENTS TO THE CFTC: What to expect from Tom W. Bell and Jason Ruspini

Posted on June 25, 2008 by admin

For those who are just surfacing from an Afghan cave: Tom W. Bell is a law professor at Chapman University (in California) and Jason Ruspini is a Wall Street professional (in New York).

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It seems that both will, independently of each other, write to the CFTC about the legalization of the &#8220-event markets&#8221- (here are the comments to the CFTC) &#8212-a bad term for the &#8220-non-hedgeable event derivative markets&#8221- (which is also, probably, a term that is quite awful to your ears ). What to expect from them? (WARNING: This is highly speculative.)

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TOM W. BELL

He will state the libertarian point of view &#8212-laissez faire, laissez aller. – [DISCLOSURE: I am a mid-core libertarian myself, so I like that.]
Overall, he will try to put up a basket of legal hacks &#8212-to establish that the real-money prediction markets should be as free as possible.
In particular, he will try to make the point that &#8220-event markets&#8221- should be covered by the laws governing &#8220-notes&#8221- &#8212-not by the laws governing &#8220-contracts&#8221-.
By doing so, he will tell the CFTC to go fugging themselves &#8212-since the CFTC is allegedly about &#8220-contracts&#8221-, not about &#8220-notes&#8221-.

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JASON RUSPINI

He will state that all the real-money prediction markets should be covered by the CFTC.
He will navigate within the legal framework that the CFTC has established in their &#8220-concept release&#8221-. – [See this document from the Arnold &amp- Porter lawyers, if you wanna know what’s a “concept release”, in the mind of the CFTC regulators. – PDF file.]
He will be very careful not to offense those bureaucrats.

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TOM W. BELL vs JASON RUSPINI

It&#8217-s great that the libertarian point of view is elaborated and disseminated to these bureaucrats. However, the CFTC is an agency, not the US Supreme Court Of Justice &#8212-and the fact that Tom W. Bell is right does not mean that he will prevail.
Jason Ruspini&#8217-s approach is extremely reasonable: he adopts the enemy&#8217-s point of view, and, from within, tries to maneuver the regulatory barriers to create as much room as possible. Also, Jason Ruspini will address only the CFTC questions which he grasps well. (Contrast that with some who spread themselves too thin, and answer all the CFTC questions, even those where they have no expertise or experience. Their answers are, and, will be totally ignored. It&#8217-s not what you say that is important- it&#8217-s what you say in relation with who you are to say that.) I&#8217-m pulling for Jason Ruspini&#8217-s approach.

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TAKEAWAY

If Jason Ruspini does not fuck it up, he has the potentiality to influence positively the CFTC, and to become one of the great leaders of the field of prediction markets. Let&#8217-s wish for that. Our field needs courageous men (and women) with the right political compass and the sense of pragmatism.

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THE MIDAS ORACLE TAKES:

– CALL TO ACTION: Let&#8217-s fight so that the CFTC allows the FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with &#8220-event markets&#8221-.

– In the for-profit vs not-for-profit debate, our prediction market luminaries, doctored by Bob, are on the wrong side of the issue.

– A young economist rebuts the American Enterprise Institute.

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BACKGROUND INFO:

– CFTC’s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts&#8230- notably how they define &#8220-event markets&#8221-, how they are going to extend their &#8220-exemption&#8221- to other IEM-like prediction exchanges, and how they framed their questions to the public. Here are the comments sent to the CFTC.

– The Arnold &amp- Porter lawyers explain the meaning of the CFTC&#8217-s concept release on &#8220-event markets&#8221-. &#8212- (PDF file)

– The Schulte &amp- Roth &amp- Zabel lawyers&#8217- takes. &#8212- (PDF file)

– The Sullivan &amp- Cromwell lawyers&#8217- takes. &#8212- (PDF file)

– What Vernon Smith told the CFTC.

– The American Enterprise Institute’s proposals to legalize the real-money prediction markets in the United States of America

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APPENDIX:

Paul Wolfowitz&#8217-s profile at the American Enterprise Institute

– How the neo-cons drove the United States of America into the unecessary Iraq war

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2 MILLION TRADES LATER: Inklings play-money prediction markets are accurate -too.

Posted on June 25, 2008 by admin

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So, just like flipping a coin, if Inkling told you something has a 15% probability of coming true, you can&#8217-t just look at one outcome (i.e. one coin flip). You need to look at multiple scenarios where Inkling said something would happen 15% of the time. If those things actually come true, 15% of the time, Inkling is doing well at this.

PREDICTION MARKETS: Robin Hanson & Justin Wolfers

Posted on June 24, 2008 by admin

I have been chatting with a prediction market practitioner (I won&#8217-t tell you who, and no, it&#8217-s not whom you think of) &#8212-shooting the breeze, and talking about the current state of the prediction market industry&#8230- taking about things and people&#8230- talking up some people&#8230- and badmouthing others ( ).

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At the end, the conversation barged on the issue of &#8220-advisory boards&#8220-. And he told me that Robin Hanson and Justin Wolfers have helped him TREMENDOUSLY &#8212-in terms of solving problems with new software features, case studies, applied research, etc.

Wow.

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Let Prediction Markets Fight Terrorism.

Posted on June 23, 2008 by admin

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)&#8217-s recent request for comments about the regulation of prediction markets includes a number of specific questions. I am not sure whether I will manage to write up answers to all of them before the July 7 deadline, but question in particular—question 14—has attracted my attention. The CFTC there asks, &#8220-Should certain underlying events or measures&#8211-such as those based on assassinations or terrorist activities—be prohibited altogether due to the social perception and impact of such events? What statutory or other legal basis would support this treatment?&#8221-

I answer the first part of question 14, &#8220-No,&#8221- (and thus need not answer the second part). I doubt that the CFTC wants to hear that sort of reply, frankly- I instead suspect that it wants a legal excuse to avoid the sort of political firestorm that followed the Pentagon&#8217-s proposal to create a Policy Analysis Market that included claims about assassinations and terrorist events. My draft answer to question 14 explains why I&#8217-m willing to risk disappointing the CFTC:

The CFTC should not forbid trading in claims based on assassinations, terrorist activities, or other criminal acts. Because event markets would offer only relatively thin and traceable trading, they would not offer an attractive investment option to anybody planning to profit from wrongdoing. A would-be terrorist would risk revealing both his plans and his identity if, for instance, he invested in a contract predicting another 9/11. He would instead find it more safe and profitable to simply short certain publicly traded stocks.
Furthermore, event markets in terrorist or criminal acts might benefit the public by revealing life-saving information. Suppose, for instance, that an anthropologist&#8217-s study of corrido culture convinced her that narcoterrorists had begun planning military raids on border checkpoints in Arizona and California. If she had the opportunity to buy terrorist event claims, she might both profit from her research and tip us all off about looming trouble. Sound public policy suggests that we should encourage that sort of trading—not forbid it.
To judge from their reactions to the Policy Analysis Market proposed by the Pentagon in 2003, politicians might need to learn more about the benefits of using trading to help predict assassinations or other terrorist events. That poses a public relations problem, however—not a legal one. The CFTC thus has no sound reason to presumptively forbid trading in contracts related to such events.

Notably, my answer to question 14 differs sharply from the answer offered by Jed Christiansen. He said, &#8220-There should never be any incentive to break a law, so there should never be any contracts that would pay someone if a law was broken.&#8221- I disagree, of course, but I thank him for stimulating me to offer an alternative take.

[Crossposted at Agoraphilia and Midas Oracle.]

How the CFTC try to define our prediction markets

Posted on June 18, 2008 by admin

CFTC – (PDF file):

CFTC&#8217-s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts

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II. Commodity Options and Futures and the Attributes of Event Contracts

The Commission, with some exceptions, has exclusive jurisdiction over two relevant types of derivative instruments &#8212-commodity options and commodity futures contracts.

Section 4c(b) of the Act gives the Commission plenary jurisdiction over commodity options, and provides that &#8220-[n]o person shall * * * enter into * * * any transaction involving any commodity regulated under this Act which is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an option * * * contrary to any rule, regulation or order of the Commission[.]&#8221-

Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the Act provides that the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts, agreements, and transactions (including options) involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery.

Event contracts, depending on their underlying interests, can be designed to exhibit the attributes of either options or futures contracts.

A significant number of event contracts are structured as all-or-nothing binary transactions commonly described as binary options. 8 Binary event contracts typically pay out a fixed amount when an outcome either occurs or does not occur. The trading of such contracts can facilitate the discovery of information by assigning probabilities, through market-derived prices, to discrete eventualities. For example, a binary contract based on whether a particular person will run for the presidency in 2012, can pay a fixed $100 to its buyer if and only if that individual runs for the presidency in 2012. If the contract&#8217-s traders believe that the likelihood of the individual&#8217-s candidacy in 2012 is around 17 percent, the price of the contract will be around $17, and will approximate the market&#8217-s consensus expectation of the individual&#8217-s candidacy.

8 See, e.g., Intrade Prediction Markets, Current Events Contracts

In addition to binary event transactions, the term event contract has also been used to identify transactions, based on interests other than market prices, which resemble futures contracts. For instance, these types of event contracts can price consensus estimates of moving values, such as the number of hours the average U.S. resident spends in traffic or the share of votes that a particular candidate for political office may receive. Unlike binary transactions, and similar to any commodity futures contract, this type of contract creates continuous and ongoing obligations that are linked to moving measures or levels, as opposed to being dependent on the outcome of a single discrete occurrence.

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III. The Commission&#8217-s Regulatory Purview

[…]

For the purpose of discussion and analysis, the types of event contracts that Commission staff has reviewed can be categorized, albeit imperfectly, as contracts that are based on narrow commercial measures and events, contracts based on certain environmental measures and events, and contracts based upon general measures and events.

Narrow commercial measures quantify and reflect the rate, value, or level of particularized commercial activity, such as a specific farmer&#8217-s crop yield.

Narrow commercial events, on the other hand, are events that might, in and of themselves, have commercial implications, such as changes in corporate officers or corporate asset purchases.

Environmental measures can be characterized as quantifications of weather phenomena, such as the volatility of precipitation or temperature levels, that do not predictably correlate to commodity market prices or other measures of broad economic or commercial activity.

By comparison, environmental events can include the formation of a specific type of storm, within an identifiable geographic region, the likelihood of which will not predictably correlate to commodity market prices or measures of broad economic or commercial activity.

General measures can be described as measures that are not commercial or environmental measures. As such, general measures do not quantify the rate, value, or level of any commercial or environmental activity and can, for example, include the number of hours that U.S. residents spend in traffic annually or the vote-share of a particular presidential candidate.

Similarly, general events, such as whether a Constitutional amendment will be adopted or whether two celebrities will decide to marry, can be described as events that do not reflect the occurrence of any commercial or environmental event. The category of general measures and events can be further divided into a multitude of subcategories, such as political or entertainment measures or events.

Since 1992, Commission-regulated exchanges have listed for trading a variety of commodity futures and options contracts with payout terms based on interests other than price-based interests. These contracts involve interests as diverse as regional insured property losses, the count of bankruptcies, temperature volatilities, corporate mergers, and corporate credit events. 12

While not strictly price-based, the interests underlying these contracts have been viewed by Commission staff as having generally-accepted and predictable financial, commercial or economic consequences.

In other words, unlike the interests that event contracts cover, these underlying interests have been viewed as measures and occurrences that reasonably could be expected to correlate to market prices or other broad-based commercial or economic measures or activities.

12 For example, the Chicago Board of Trade&#8217-s catastrophe single event insurance option contracts (which are no longer listed) paid out a fixed amount if and only if insured property damage exceeded $10 billion for a specific region during a specified interval of time.

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The American Enterprise Institutes proposals to legalize real-money prediction markets in the United States of America

Posted on June 17, 2008 by admin

The Promise of Prediction Markets – by Kenneth J. Arrow, Robert Forsythe, Michael Gorham, Robert Hahn, Robin Hanson, John O. Ledyard, Saul Levmore, Robert Litan, Paul Milgrom, Forrest D. Nelson, George R. Neumann, Marco Ottaviani, Thomas C. Schelling, Robert J. Shiller, Vernon L. Smith, Erik Snowberg, Cass R. Sunstein, Paul C. Tetlock, Philip E. Tetlock, Hal R. Varian, Justin Wolfers, and Eric Zitzewitz – 2008-05-XX

#1. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the federal regulatory agency that oversees futures market activity, should establish safe-harbor rules for selected small-stakes markets. One limited safe harbor is the no-action letter, in which the CFTC market oversight staff confirms in writing that it will not recommend enforcement action if the recipient acts in specified ways. The only prediction market to receive a no-action letter (in 1992) is the Iowa Electronic Markets, which is run by professors at the University of Iowa and which initially focused on presidential elections. Although such no-action letters reduce the chances of legal action under other state and federal laws, they may not be adequate. We would therefore urge the CFTC to explore other approaches to ensuring safe harbors, for example, formal rules or guidance approved by the commission. We suggest that three types of entities be eligible for safe harbor treatment. The first would be not-for-profit research institutions, including universities, colleges and think tanks wishing to operate exchanges similar to the Iowa Electronic Markets. The second would be government agencies seeking to do research similar to that of nongovernmental research institutions. The third group would consist of private businesses and not-for-profits that are not primarily engaged in research, which would only be allowed to operate internal prediction markets with their employees or contractors. In all cases, markets would be limited to small-stakes contracts. Although the definition of small stakes is somewhat arbitrary, we use the term to mean an exchange in which the total amount of capital deposited by any one participant may not exceed some modest sum, perhaps something like $2,000 per year. The exchanges themselves would be not-for-profit but would be allowed to charge modest fees to recoup administrative and regulatory costs. Brokers and paid advisers would be barred, reducing the risks that contracts would be sold to inappropriate or vulnerable customers or that customers would be charged fees above the amounts needed to maintain the markets. Exchanges would be self-regulated, leaving them with the responsibility to make reasonable efforts to keep markets free from fraud and manipulation. For its part, the CFTC should allow contracts that price any economically meaningful event. This definition could allow for contracts on political events, environmental risks, or economic indicators, such as those offered by the Iowa Electronic Markets, but would presumably not include contracts on the outcomes of sports events.

The contracts qualifying under this safe harbor would also create opportunities for more efficient risk allocation. Although the small-stakes nature of these markets would necessarily limit their usefulness for hedging risk, they could serve as proofs of concept for larger-scale markets that could be developed under alternative regulatory arrangements. The CFTC should allow researchers to experiment with several aspects of prediction markets – fee structures, incentives against manipulation, liquidity requirements and the like – with the goal of improving their design. Prediction markets are in an early stage, and if their promise is to be realized, researchers should be given flexibility to learn what kinds of design are most likely to produce accurate predictions. Of course, exchanges would need to inform their customers so that they are aware of the risks and benefits of participating in these markets.

#2. Congress should support the CFTC’s efforts to develop prediction markets. To the extent that the CFTC incurs costs in promoting innovation, Congress should provide the necessary funding. More fundamentally, Congress should explore alternative ways of securing a legal framework for prediction markets if the CFTC’s existing authority proves inadequate. In particular, Congress should specify that a no-action letter, or similar mechanism, preempts overlapping state and federal anti-gambling laws. Because Congress did not intend the CFTC to regulate gambling, it is important to design new regulations so that socially valuable prediction markets easily qualify for the safe harbor but gambling markets do not.

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UPDATE: A great rebuttal here&#8230-

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THE MIDAS ORACLE TAKES:

– CALL TO ACTION: Let&#8217-s fight so that the CFTC allows the FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with &#8220-event markets&#8221-.

– In the for-profit vs not-for-profit debate, our prediction market luminaries, doctored by Bob, are on the wrong side of the issue.

– COMMENTS TO THE CFTC: What to expect from Tom W. Bell and Jason Ruspini

– A young economist rebuts the American Enterprise Institute.

–

BACKGROUND INFO:

– The Arnold &amp- Porter lawyers explain the meaning of the CFTC&#8217-s concept release on &#8220-event markets&#8221-. &#8212- (PDF file)

– The Schulte &amp- Roth &amp- Zabel lawyers&#8217- takes. &#8212- (PDF file)

– The Sullivan &amp- Cromwell lawyers&#8217- takes. &#8212- (PDF file)

– What Vernon Smith told the CFTC.

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APPENDIX:

Paul Wolfowitz&#8217-s profile at the American Enterprise Institute

– How the neo-cons drove the United States of America into the unecessary Iraq war

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Deep Throat on the idle Prediction Market Industry Association (PMIA)

Posted on June 12, 2008 by admin

I agree that the Prediction Market Industry Association (PMIA) (in its present form) is highly suspicious.

The purpose of the PMIA was to provide resume and marketing fodder for Jed, Emile and John. It&#8217-s like being president of a high school club: You don&#8217-t have to accomplish anything, but you can list your &#8220-officer&#8221- status on college applications.

As we saw, Emile has already started using it in his NewsFutures marketing. So, the project has actually been a great success for its true purposes!

Its our responsibility to call bullshit on this, and we failed. The PMIA is a fake organization, and nobody deserves any extra street-cred for &#8220-leading&#8221- or &#8220-founding&#8221- it.

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The best research papers on prediction markets

Posted on June 11, 2008 by admin

As seen by Andreas Graefe&#8230-

IIF’s SIG on Prediction Markets

Research Papers

Basics

Several studies explain the concept of prediction markets and provide useful summaries of the method, e.g.

– Spann, M. &amp- Skiera, B. (2003). Internet-based Virtual Stock Markets for Business Forecasting, Management Science, 49, 1310-1326. [Full text]
– Wolfers, J. &amp- Zitzewitz, E. (2006). Prediction Markets in Theory and Practice, New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (in press). [Full text]
– Wolfers, J. &amp- Zitzewitz, E. (2004). Prediction Markets, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, 107-126. [Full text]
– An overview and classification of 152 studies on prediction markets, published between 1991 and 2006, is provided by
Tziralis, G. &amp- Tatsiopoulos (2007). Prediction Markets: An Extended Literature Review, Journal of Prediction Markets, 1, 75-91. [Full text]

Evidence on the accuracy of prediction markets

This section summarizes research that analyzes the relative performance of prediction markets and other forecasting methods.

Markets vs. polls (election forecasting)

– Berg, J., Nelson, F. &amp- Rietz, T. (2008). Prediction Market Accuracy in the Long Run, International Journal of Forecasting, 24, 283-298. [full text]
– Erikson R. S. &amp- Wlezien C. (2007). Are Political Markets Really Superior to Polls as Election Predictors? Public Opinion Quarterly, forthcoming. [full text]
– Stix, G. (2008): When Markets Beat the Polls, Scientific American Magazine, March 2008. [Abstract]

Markets vs. unaided experts and groups

– Pennock, D. M., Lawrence, S., Giles, C.L. &amp- Nielsen, F.A. (2000). The Power of Play: Efficiency and Forecast Accuracy in Web Market Games, Technical Report 2000-168, NEC Research Institute. [full text]
– For predicting Oscar Award winners, Pennock et al. (2000) compared prices of the Hollywood Stock exchange to expert judgments of five movie columnists. On the day the experts revealed their forecasts, only one of them was better than the market predictions. From the day after, the market outperformed all experts as well as the expert consensus.
– Servan-Schreiber, E. J., Wolfers, J., Pennock, D. M. &amp- Galebach, B. (2004). Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter? Electronic Markets, 14, 243-251. [full text]
– For predicting the results of NFL games, Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) compared the forecasts of two markets to those of 1,947 self-selected individuals. At the end of the season, the markets ranked 6th and 8th compared to the individuals. The human average – which would be the outcome of a classical survey – ranked 39th.

Markets vs. other forecasting methods

– Chen, K. Y., Plott, C. R. (2002). Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Concept, Design and Implementation for a Sales Forecasting Problem, Social Science Working Paper No.1131, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena. [full text]
– For forecasting sales figures, Chen and Plott (2002) reported on an internal market at Hewlett-Packard that beat the official forecasts of the company in 6 out of 8 events.
– Jones Jr., R. J. (2008). The state of presidential election forecasting – The 2004 experience, International Journal of Forecasting, 24, 308-319. [Abstract]
– Jones (2008) analyzed the forecasts of IEM&#8217-s vote-share market for the 2004 election and compared them to traditional polls, a Delphi expert survey, regression models and a combination of all four approaches, the Pollyvote. He concludes that in comparison with most methods of forecasting the popular vote, the IEM was the superior performer.Spann, M. &amp- Skiera, B. (2003). Internet-based Virtual Stock Markets for Business Forecasting, Management Science, 49, 1310-1326. [Full text]
– Spann and Skiera (2003) compared forecast accuracy of an internal market at a large German mobile phone operator. They found that the market forecasts outperformed were more accurate than four extrapolation models (arithmetic mean, geometric mean, linear trend and exponential trend).

Corporate Markets

– Chen, K.-Y. &amp- Plott, C. R. (2002). Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Concept, Design and Implementation for a Sales Forecasting Problem. Social Science Working Paper No.1131, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena. [Full text]
– Cowgill, B., Wolfers, J. &amp- Zitzewitz, E. (2008). Using prediction markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Google, working paper. [Full text]
– Ortner, G. (1997). Forecasting Markets – An Industrial Application: Part I, working paper, TU Vienna. [Full text]
– Spann, M. &amp- Skiera, B. (2003). Internet-based Virtual Stock Markets for Business Forecasting, Management Science, 49, 1310-1326. [Full text]

Decision Markets

– Hanson, R. (1999). Decision Markets, IEEE Intelligent Systems, 14, 16-19.

Manipulation

– [Except] Hansen et al. (1998), most empirical studies report that manipulative attacks on result accuracy have not been successful historically (Rhode and Strumpf 2006), in the laboratory (Hanson et al. 2006), and in the field (Camerer 1998).
– Camerer, C. (1998): Can Asset Markets Be Manipulated? A Field Experiment with Racetrack Betting, Journal of Political Economy, 106(3), 457-482. [Abstract]
– Hansen, J., Schmidt, C. &amp- Strobel, M. (2004). Manipulation in Political Stock Markets – Preconditions and Evidence, Applied Economics Letters, 11, 459-463. [Abstract]
– Hanson, R., Oprea, R. &amp- Porter, D. (2006). Information Aggregation and Manipulation in an Experimental Market, Journal of Economic Behavior &amp- Organization, 60, 449-459. [full text]
– Rhode, P. W., and Strumpf, K. S. (2006). Manipulating Political Stock Markets: A Field Experiment and a Century of Observational Data, Working Paper, University of North Carolina(2006). [full text]

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More research papers on prediction markets

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How to run enterprise prediction markets… legally

Posted on June 10, 2008 by admin

Private Prediction Markets and the Law – (PDF file) – by Tom W. Bell – 2008-05-18

Abstract

This paper analyses the legality of private prediction markets under U.S. law, describing both the legal risks they raise and how to manage those risks. As the label &#8220-private&#8221- suggests, such markets offer trading not to the public but rather only to members of a particular firm. The use of private prediction markets has grown in recent years because they can efficiently collect and quantify information that firms find useful in making management decisions. Along with that considerable benefit, however, comes a particularly worrisome cost: the risk that running a private prediction market might violate U.S. state or federal laws. The ends and means of private prediction markets differ materially from those of futures, securities, or gambling markets. Laws written for those latter three institutions nonetheless threaten to limit or even outlaw private prediction markets, as the paper details. The paper also details, however, how certain legal strategies can protect private prediction markets from violating U.S. laws or suffering crushing regulatory burdens. The paper concludes with a legal forecast, describing the likely form of potential CFTC regulations and a strategy designed to ensure the success of private prediction markets under U.S. law.

Conclusion

This paper has described the legal risks facing private prediction markets under U.S. law and how firms that want to runs such markets should respond. To minimize the risk of CFTC regulation, firms should institute mechanisms to ensure that their private prediction markets do not support significant hedging functions and make clear, both in the documentation supporting their markets and in their markets&#8217- structures, that they offer trading not in binary option contracts but rather in conditional negotiable notes. Publicly-traded firms subject to U.S. law can minimize the risks of illegal insider trading by either making public all prices and claims traded on their prediction market or by:
• Keeping trading by traditional insiders separate from trading by others-
• Broadening safeguards against illegal insider trading to cover all traders-
• Treating the market&#8217-s claims and prices as trade secrets- and
• Seeding the market with decoy claims and prices.

Although the skill-based trading emphasized on private prediction markets should in theory remove them from the scope of gambling regulations, a prudent firm could help to ensure that result by:
• Forbidding traders from investing their own funds in the market- and
• Requiring its agents to participate in its market.

As should perhaps go without saying (but as hereby will not), any firm implementing these legal strategies should back them up with ample record-keeping. Each person who trades on a firm&#8217-s market should, for instance, receive clear notification that the market does not deal in CFTC- or SEC-regulated instruments, and that it does not offering services subject to oversight by any state gambling commission. Better yet, traders should be required to access the market only through a click-through agreement in which, among other things, they consent to that stipulation. So go only a few of the provisions that ought to appear in such an agreement- any reasonably competent attorney will think of many worthwhile provisions to add.

Private prediction markets will almost certainly escape the legal uncertainty that now clouds their prospects in the U.S. Even if no legislator, judge, or regulator ever notices them, private prediction markets will come to win de facto legality simply by merit of their widespread use and acceptance. With reflection —perhaps aided by papers such as this one— and practical experience, attorneys will learn how to structure private prediction markets to accommodate the laws that rightfully apply to them and to dodge the effect of laws written for other, materially different markets. There remains some risk, granted, that the CFTC will crush private prediction markets under new regulations. With luck though —and perhaps also with some persuasion— the CFTC will instead allow prediction markets to choose from among several different tiers of regulations. And even in the worse-case scenario, private prediction markets will not disappear- they will simply flee the U.S. for other, freer homes.

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