Is Chris Masse a spammer?

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In response to the remark posted by the charming Bo Cowgill, I am not the author of the spamming comment referred to by David Pennock. Being a smart and investigative researcher, David Pennock understood that already, and aimed at analyzing that strange spamming process. (Others prefer wasting their time analyzing the &#8220-flow of information&#8221-.)

UPDATE: David Pennock has just said in a comment on his blog that the spamming comment was made from an IP address from &#8220-New Dehli, India&#8221- &#8212-which is obviously not my location. So, I can now sue Bo Cowgill for defamation and collect a good bundle of $$$. :-D

PS: If the charming Bo Cowgill refers to my very occasional sending of mass e-mails to the registered members of my group blog, Midas Oracle .ORG, I don&#8217-t think it should be qualified as spamming, but I am ready to listen to contrarian opinions from veteran Internet users.

Prediction markets feed on facts and expertise.

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Via Yahoo! research scientist David Pennock of Odd Head and YooPick, the dear honorable Duncan Watts:

In part because of disappointing findings such as this, an increasingly popular substitute for expert opinions are so-called &#8220-prediction markets,&#8221- in which individuals buy and sell contracts on various outcomes, such as football game point spreads or presidential elections. The market prices for these contracts then effectively aggregate the knowledge and judgment of the many into a single prediction, which often turns out to be more accurate than all but the best individual guesses.

But even if these markets do perform better than experts, they don&#8217-t necessarily do a good enough job to rely on. Recently, my colleagues have started tracking the performance of one popular prediction market, at forecasting the outcome of weekly NFL games. So far, what they&#8217-re finding is that the market predictions are better than the simple rule of always betting on the home team, but only slightly so &#8212- which, oddly, is very similar to what Tetlock found regarding his experts. Some outcomes, in other words, and possibly the outcomes we care about the most, simply aren&#8217-t &#8220-predictable&#8221- in the way we would like.

  1. Prediction markets are not &#8220-a substitute for expert opinions&#8221-. They are a substitute for the averaged probabilistic predictions of a large group of experts polled the traditional way (by phone or by e-mail). In prediction markets, traders (who are not experts, most of the times) collect and aggregate facts and expertise at a lower cost than a poll or survey of experts.
  2. In the research cited by Ducan Watts, the prediction markets are slightly more accurate than the competitive forecasting mechanism. Well, that&#8217-s something we are used to.
  3. What Ducan Watts doesn&#8217-t say is that prediction markets integrate facts and expertise faster than the group of experts polled by his researching colleagues &#8212-for the very crude reason that it takes a certain time to survey a group of experts (be it by e-mail or by phone).

If I can count, that&#8217-s 3 reasons why prediction markets can bring in business value:

  1. lower cost-
  2. better accuracy (relatively, and, overall)-
  3. velocity.

That said, it should be repeated that prediction markets feed on facts and expertise &#8212-so the experts remain indispensable in the general forecasting process.

No facts (e.g., political polls) &#8211-&gt- No prediction markets.

No experts (e.g., NFL prognosticators) &#8211-&gt- No prediction markets.

The San Francisco conference on prediction markets

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I previously wrote that that San Francisco vendor conference is not worth the $400 they are asking. However, in all honesty to my readers, I shall notify that they have just made one (small) change that goes in the right direction. World&#8217-s #1 prediction market researcher Robin Hanson is now scheduled to talk about combinatorial prediction markets (a very hot topic these days) &#8212-instead of stuff about how to quantify prediction market value (a too much theoretical issue for business people).

A vendor conference with no editorial line is unlikely to be the receptacle of the truth about enterprise prediction markets. Vendors (4 will be present) do oversell.

A FRIEND OF THE PREDICTION MARKETS IN THE WHITE HOUSE – Part 3

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Previously: Part One – Part Two

Ezra Klein:

CASS SUNSTEIN PREPARES TO NUDGE.

There&#8217-s some confusion over a celebrity thinker like Cass Sunstein being appointed to head an office as obscure and bureaucratic as the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. But OIRA is important! It&#8217-s just also boring.

OIRA was birthed in the 1980 Paperwork Reduction Act as part of the effort to streamline the federal government&#8217-s regulatory processes. If Carter had won reelection, the department probably wouldn&#8217-t matter. But he didn&#8217-t. Tucked deep within the Office of Management and Budget, OIRA received relatively little notice until David Stockman, Reagan&#8217-s young turk of a budget director, realized that, properly applied, OIRA could be used to shut down the government&#8217-s regulatory functions by tying new regulations up in endless rounds of analysis and bureaucratic justification.

The key event here, and this gets a bit dull, was Executive Order 12291. Books have been written about this order. Academics still study it. It profoundly changed the nation&#8217-s regulatory machinery. 12291 required that cost-benefit analysis be conducted for “promulgating new regulations, reviewing existing regulations and developing legislative proposals concerning regulations” This meant the OMB was now in charge of reviewing all bureaucratic proposals, thus subjecting the entire federal bureaucracy to tight, centralized, executive control. Where individual regulations used to pass through the relevant agency, they were now subject to a central review by a presidential appointee. It was the agency the president used to fight his own government. OIRA began &#8220-reviewing&#8221- 2,000 to 3,000 regulations a year. This made the OMB so powerful that a non-profit watchdog, OMB Watch, sprang into existence to publicize its role.

Clinton partially repealed 12291 with Executive Order 12866. I&#8217-m not going to explain it because, frankly, you all will stop visiting this blog if I do, but suffice to say it pulled many of Reagan&#8217-s changes back. Regulatory review dropped to about 500 a year. Then came George W. Bush, who appointed the noxious John Graham to OIRA. Graham was famous for his cost-benefit risk analysis techniques, which had spurred him to declare regulations against PCBs, saccharine, and nuclear power evidence of society’s “flustered hypochondria.” In his first year at OIRA, he halted more regulations than the Clinton administration stopped in eight. His finest moment came nine days after 9/11, when he released an extraordinary memo advising government agencies that the administration was no longer evaluating regulations based on health, safety, and other public good metrics. From here on out, they’d also be judged on how they affected business. Nine days after 9/11. Oh, and Bush tried to again strengthen OIRA&#8217-s ability to block regulation, this time with Executive order 13422, which would&#8217-ve required impossibly detailed reports on every regulation. Congress found it objectionable enough that they passed stopping OMB from spending any money implementing 13422, thus defanging it.

The point of all this is that OIRA is quiet, but important. It&#8217-s the chokepoint of the entire federal regulatory apparatus. If used wisely, it facilitates the flow, provides welcome analysis and judgment, and aids in implementation. If used as an anti-government weapon, it can do a lot of damage. Sunstein can do real good there. But why would he want it? He&#8217-s shown a taste for celebrity, and OIRA very much does not provide that.

It&#8217-s worth remembering that Sunstein has recently achieved great fame for Nudge, a book which basically argues that we need to apply the insights of behavioral economics to the construction of regulation. And Director of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs is the ultimate staging ground for those ideas. Reagan understood that OIRA was the central clearinghouse where you could affect the whole of the regulatory state all at once. He wanted to virtually shut it down. Sunstein wants to &#8220-nudge&#8221- it.

The Oracle, with Max Keiser – BBC World News

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The Oracle (&#8220-a satirical look into the future&#8221-), with Max Keiser, on BBC World News.

I have just watched the first edition of this TV show.

  1. There is no mention of collective intelligence and prediction markets, alas.
  2. The format of the show is very well thought out. It is a winner. There is an intro with videos or charts, some cheap talks with the guests, and then &#8220-The Oracle&#8221- (a semi sphere at the center of the TV studio) beams out wildly and delivers a prediction, which the guests are invited to comment on.
  3. Max Keiser is almost awesome and Stacy Herbert (the co-host) is authoritative enough.
  4. It is infotainment &#8212-think of Max Keiser as the Michael Moore of Wall Street.
  5. It is leftist &#8212-that, you already knew.
  6. It is funny. The segment where Max Keiser impersonates Colin Powell at the United Nations is hilarious &#8212-in the new UN speech, Saddam Hussein is replaced by the bankers, and the WMDs are the financial derivatives. A must see.
  7. The guests for the first edition were Jacques Attali, who is a French fraud (along with Bernard-Henri Levy and Alain Minc) in my view, and a British actress known only to her family and friends. They were not stellar, but good enough.
  8. Next week, Nigel Eccles of HubDub will be a guest, I have been told.
  9. Max Keiser has a future in the televised infotainment industry. :-D

UPDATE: Episode One