Why the Hollywood Stock Exchange was sold to Cantor Fitzerald. – An insiders account.

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From the Horse&#8217-s mouth (Max Keiser):

Max Keiser is a financial engineer who likes to turn things into markets. After working on Wall Street during the eighties, Keiser turned his hand to Hollywood, where, rather than chase starlets as every other man in Hollywood was doing, he began commoditising those same starlets by trading them on the Hollywood Stock Exchange, a virtual market in celebrities that he created long before the BBC ripped his idea off with Celebdaq. The starlets loved him for turning them into the commodities they always wanted to be and Keiser was awarded three U.S. patents for the virtual specialist technology on which HSX runs. During his weekly NBC appearances on &#8216-Access Hollywood,&#8217- Keiser became the first person since the days of McCarthy to be boycotted by every major Hollywood studio at the same time. When Keiser accurately predicted weekend box office gross for nine weeks running on his HSX segment of NBC&#8217-s &#8216-Access Hollywood,&#8217- the major studios decided that free markets were not so great after all and called for NBC to remove the heretic in their monopolistic midst or lose access to Hollywood &#8216-talent.&#8217- HSX was sold to Cantor Fitzgerald and Keiser moved to Europe where he created Karmabanque, a virtual market in monetising dissent.

Addendum (November 16, 2006): I received this disambiguation note from someone who knows the HSX history&#8230-

Max Keiser was not involved with HSX at the time of the acquisition nor was he part of the process.

Addendum (February 23, 2007): Max Keiser replies&#8230-

To say that I was not involved with the sale of HSX to Cantor is incorrect. I did not endorse the sale of HSX to Cantor – I voted against it – because the deal with Cantor was not, in my opinion, above board.

TradeSports-InTrade: United Nations > John Bolton as US Ambassador to United Nations

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I&#8217-m curious to see who&#8217-s going to be on the &#8220-yes&#8221- side of this brand-new contract. From what I heard yesterday on NBC Nightly News, this neo-con is toasted. But maybe I don&#8217-t know the full story.

Addendum (November 15): Sacha Peter posted a comment&#8230-

Well, at least one person out there is currently willing to lay you 999:1 odds that he will get confirmed and he’s willing to stick his neck out to the tune of $10 against your $9,990 for it. It’s too bad even if you win you’ll still have to shell out $30 in commissions and $100 in expiration fees to collect your $10 in winnings. What a deal!

No change: Mispricing is greater in illiquid markets.

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Paul Tetlock’s latest paper on the subject of prediction markets “Does Liquidity Affect Securities Markets Efficiency?” follows the lines of the other authors whose model starts with the concept of first generation prediction markets, designed in such a way that their prices express probabilities.

First: We should not be surprised that those markets “underprice high probability events and overprice low probability events”. This is a consequence of continuous information arrival. Any binary option MUST show this behaviour, mathematically, depending on its In-the-money or Out-of-the money state.

In the framework of Price Information Theory, with continuous information arrival, you “lose” probability until the prediction horizon sigma sqrt T of the price differential. No “irrationality” there. (Remember: “Austrians” start on the premise that man is rational.)

Second: The immediate analogy from such binary contracts to behaviour of securities markets is not permissible. Securities markets price discounted future cash-flows in consideration of the two risks (ex-ante volatility and noise) affecting them. Applying the problematic binary framework to securities prices does not make binary options a security, they stay what they are. (Price predictions on rice in China does not make them edible.)

Third: Based on this, it is easy to explain why the conclusions of the paper appear overdrawn: The better the probability of a binary follows the information decay, the more mispricing the presented model would detect. Mr. Tetlock final thoughts appear to run in a similar vein by stating in the end that “…, liquidity may only appear to be a priced risk factor because it captures some systematic element of mispricing.”

So: On this one, let’s stay with the cited conventional models (Kyle) plus some empirical evidence from “real” securities markets: Mispricing is greater in illiquid markets.

Hubertus Hofkirchner