Here&#8217-s what Robin Hanson meant&#8230- when he wrote:

[…] markets that give the consequences of electing any particular candidate.

This:

Let U = the unemployment rate, D = Democrats win, and R = Republicans win. An exchange rate between “Pays $U if D” and “Pays $1 if D” gives an estimate of E[U|D]. Similarly, an exchange rate between “Pays $U if R” and “Pays $1 if R” gives an estimate of E[U|R]. We can compare E[U|D] and E[U|R] to see which candidate is expected to have a lower unemployment rate. And we know how to pay off all of these assets, no matter what happens.

More:

Since we can pay off all the assets objectively, predictions of their relative value are also predictions about objective things, not just about opinion. Any information about what employment policies a candidate would choose, and about the consequences of those policies, could be relevant.

More in Robin Hanson&#8217-s paper on &#8220-decision markets&#8221- &#8212-PDF file.

And read Mike Giberson&#8217-s comments on the Patri Friedman blog post. (He likes it and thinks I was too harsh on it.)