Midas Oracle .ORG » Trader

How BetFair stole Bastille Day from the French —and how Ed Murray became BetFair’s best friend (NOT A HOAX).

Chris F. Masse — Tue, 15 Jul 2008 10:32:23 +0000

Michael Giberson (professor of economics and chairman of our scientific advisory board):

Actually, I would expect the change to improve liquidity, but the real surprise for Ed Murray is that other than his liquidity argument, I pretty much agree with him this time.

It is a better scheme than before, as the exchange will match tradersâ€™ bets more efficiently and offer price improvement when available.

As Betfair observes (and Murray notes) the downside is for traders who make a bet in error, and now find the more efficient market has matched the bet before it could be withdrawn. If this is a frequent problem for a trader, perhaps they need to exercise a little more care at the keyboard. But as the Befair announcement indicates â€” and this time Ed Murray is repeating the Betfair company line! â€” at least there is the possibility that the trader will be matched at a better price than he would have otherwise.

What Robin Hanson told the CFTC about “event markets” (prediction markets)

Chris F. Masse — Mon, 07 Jul 2008 19:44:17 +0000

Robin Hanson:

Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2008 10:12:46 -0400
To: secretary@cftc.gov
From: Robin Hanson
Subject: Comment on “Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts”
—————————————————————-
I am an event market innovator, having published the first detailed discussions envisioning their widespread application, having designed a widely used trading mechanism (the market scoring rule), and having co-developed the first internal corporate markets (at Xanadu), the first public web markets (the Foresight Exchange), and the aborted-but-influential Policy Analysis Market.

As I am less well trained in law than social science, I will not comment on what the C.F.T.C. is legally authorized to do, but only on how various policies correspond to public interest and public opinion. I speak here only for myself and not for any organization with which I may be affiliated.

The degree and type of regulation appropriate for a financial market depends on traders’ motives. Long ago most everything beyond direct physical exchange was widely discouraged or prohibited as “gambling” or “speculation.” The motives imputed to traders seemed to be some combination of mistakes, overconfidence, thrill of action, love of risk, and showing off one’s confidence and risk tolerance.

While public opinion on gambling has changed little, eventually legal exceptions were carved out for markets where, though speculation was still possible, enough participants had more sympathetic motives to garner public support. Securities markets allowed business managers to hedge ownership, insurance markets allowed hedging of various idiosyncratic risks, and commodities futures markets allowed hedging of various common risks.

It has long been noted approvingly that such speculative markets often had the desirable side effect of inducing people to collect info and aggregate it into prices. But until recently such info was not considered or accepted as a primary explanation or justification for a market’s existence. Given the myriad ways our society now suffers, often dramatically, from failures to aggregate info, I am very optimistic about the long term potential for such markets to offer substantial social value. However, the question remains of how such info-motivated markets should be regulated today.

Ideally an entire new regulatory regime would be carved out, on par with regimes for securities, insurance, and commodities futures regulation. But who would bother with such an effort before such markets had proven themselves able to realize substantial social value? And how could such markets prove themselves without at least tentative legal spaces in which to experiment? I know of no good reason why the C.F.T.C. should not provide one of the first such spaces.

Two key issues face a new regulatory regime for info-motivated event markets, especially one carved out of a common-risk-hedging commodities-future regulatory regime:

How does optimal regulation of info-motivated event markets differ from that of common-risk-hedging markets?
How can regulators ensure that this new regime is not used as a back door to escape prohibitions on other commodity futures trading, or to escape general prohibitions against gambling?

How Does Optimal Regulation Differ Here?

On the first question, the largest difference I see, by far, is the appropriate scale. When hedging risks it makes sense to focus first on risks, and hence trades, which are a large fraction of the wealth of the individuals or organizations involved. If risks are common there should be many who trade if any trade, and so market volume should be many times individual wealth levels. It also makes sense to devote a small fraction of this volume to efforts to avoid foul play. I have heard that it costs on the order of a million dollars to jump the regulatory hoops to gain approval for such markets, and I cannot say that this is not roughly the right cost magnitude.

For markets whose main function is to collect info, however, the appropriate scale seems far smaller. To collect info on a topic, those who know or could find out need only be offered a sufficient incentive to bother. In the lab, experimental economists see substantial effort and price info aggregation when only a few tens of dollars are at stake, and field data seems consistent with this estimate. If most of the social value from info-motivated event markets were concentrated in a few very important topics, it would not matter much if regulatory barriers prevented markets on topics with small info values. But if, as seems more plausible, much of the value is found in a long thick tail of smaller topics, then to realize this social value it is essential that regulatory barriers to creating such markets be reduced to the lowest feasible level.

For example, consider a topic where a social value of one thousand dollars could be realized, if only people were allowed to trade in a market on that topic. It is hard to see how this value could actually be realized if the regulatory cost to create this market were more than a few hundred dollars. If there were a million such topics, the total social value such markets could create would be one billion dollars.

A related difference is when it makes sense to limit participation. If most of a certain kind of risk is held by wealthy individuals or large organizations, then it can make sense to limit participation to such traders. But for info collection it is crucial to allow participation by the sorts of people who could plausibly obtain that info. For a great many topics these people will be spread out in the population, and not easily distinguished from most other people. A broad permission to participate will thus be desired in such cases.

How Can We Distinguish When This Regime Should Apply?

On the second question, we seek a reliable way to distinguish markets where the info collected is a strong rationale for its existence, a rationale strong enough to justify overturning the usual public presumption against generic speculation, and strong enough relative to hedging rationales to justify using this new regulatory regime, rather than other hedging regulatory regimes.

One proposed distinguishing criteria includes the size of an individual trader’s stake, and the number of traders. The Iowa Electronic Markets are limited on both of these parameters. Such limits do succeed in preventing large hedging markets from masquerading as info-motivated event markets. But they do little to prevent generic gambling markets from masquerading as info-motivated event markets.

Another proposed distinguishing criteria is the form of the organization that hosts the market. Some have proposed that tax-exempt, research, and government organizations be given wider latitude than for-profit businesses. I understand that this matches a common public perception, but honestly it seems mostly wishful thinking to believe that such organizations are substantially more likely to create markets with a strong info rationale, or to avoid whatever problems one fears with for-profit businesses.

Some have suggested that topics could be used to distinguish the strength of info rationale. Markets on sporting events might be presumed to have low info rationale, while markets on public policy might be presumed to have high info rationale. This approach seems to open a proverbial “can of worms,” however, requiring a great and continuing effort to categorize topics.

To ease this effort, one could inherit some other topic categorization. For example, regulation of speech distinguishes topics where free speech is presumed to perform very valuable social functions, and so has strong legal protection, from topics where such functions are less clear, allowing speech to be more easily regulated. Event markets might be permitted on topics where free speech has a strong legal protection.

In contrast to such weak indicators let me propose a stronger indicator of when a speculative market has a strong info rationale. I am not proposing that only markets which sport this indicator be allowed, but rather that at least such markets be allowed. My proposal is to permit markets where a sponsor pays to ensure that traders on average do not lose financially from participation, as this payment creates a strong presumption that this sponsor expected to gain substantial value from that info.

It is hard to see many of the benefits that traders may gain from trading, but we can more easily see the average financial costs that traders suffer. Traders may have to pay for permission to trade, to deposit into a system, to check prices and trading history, for each trade, and to withdraw their winnings. In addition, trader deposits may not earn competitive risk-adjusted rates of return. Payment is sometimes in the form of seeing ads. Such fees are essential to the profitability of “gambling” businesses today that rely primarily on traders’ speculative motives.

If for a particular topic, a sponsor were willing to ensure that traders paid none of these common trading fees, that sponsor would have credibly suggested that his or her market would not exist if that sponsor did not expect related info to have substantial value. If this sponsor furthermore subsidized this market, allowing traders to gain on average by trading against ignorant automated market makers, this would show even more clearly that this sponsor valued the resulting info. Such measures would ensure that traders suffered no average financial loss from their participation, though traders could still lose on average, such as by wasting too much time dealing with these markets.

Of course we do not expect sponsors to arise to support all topics where info collected by trading would have substantial social value. We expect businesses to sponsor markets on topics where they can profit from info, and charities to collect donations to support markets on topics they consider more broadly valuable. But we also expect many coordination failures, where each party prefers that others pay for commonly valuable info. So the case for prohibiting markets that fail my proposed criteria is much weaker than the case for permitting markets that meet this criteria.

It also remains possible that even when a sponsor finds info to be valuable enough to pay for, the social value of that info could be much less than the private value to this sponsor. If we could identify classes of such cases, these classes might form the basis of exceptions to this general permission I propose.

I have many other opinions about how such markets might be defined and regulated, but I’ve already gone one for quite a bit here – if you like what you see here and want more, you know where to find me.

In Summary

In addition to existing regulatory regimes for ownership-hedging securities, idiosyncratic-risk-hedging insurance, and common-risk-hedging futures, it could make sense to have a distinct regulatory regime for markets whose main reason to exist is the info that they collect. Compared with existing commodities futures regulation, such a regime should set a much lower barrier to creating such markets, as much of the social value may be distributed in millions of small markets. And while it is hard to determine in general which markets would create high social info value, relative to cost, we should presume such high value when a sponsor is willing to pay to ensure that traders suffer no average financial cost from their participation.
—————————————————————————

Robin Hanson rhanson@gmu.edu http://hanson.gmu.edu
Research Associate, Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University
Associate Professor of Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323

Robin Hanson

My response to the CFTC on event contracts

Jason Ruspini — Sat, 05 Jul 2008 16:28:36 +0000

Here is my response to the CFTC’s “Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts.” I appreciate this opportunity to help in working towards regulated prediction markets in the US, and I thank the Commissioners for it.

Given the political implications of the rise in commodity prices, this is not the best environment in which to begin regulating markets like election contracts, but the consensus that seems to be building on the relevant questions is rather auspicious. Hedgestreet and I have presented similar legal and regulatory frameworks to allow for at least the types of election contracts we are familiar with through sites like Intrade. Given Hedgestreet’s vigorous and incisive comments, I regret not having argued more for the desirability of non-intermediated exchanges.

In their focus, however, Hedgestreet steered clear of the gaming pre-emption questions and did not present a comprehensive and general framework for event markets. In that respect, their broaching of the CFTC’s plenary option authority opens more questions than it answers, but several interesting and important markets could perhaps be traded without answering all such questions.

I encourage Hedgestreet to begin working with the NFA to develop the infrastructure necessary for the types of trading prohibitions that we each described in our comments. I encourage the CFTC to act decisively in light of the self-evident and massive value of certain event markets â€” even with the current political pressures, which are mainly relevant to event markets on a superficial level. Perhaps if the CFTC deems that an exercise of emergency powers is necessary at some point, that would be an appropriate day to also make a decision on event contracts public.

We are at a specific point where a little bit of additional regulation might cause an explosion in legal prediction markets, and possibly soon. As a libertarian, I generally dislike regulation, and of course itâ€™s true, pretty much by definition, that over-regulation is bad, but I don’t believe that to be the most effective message for this comment process and the unique opportunity it presents.

June 30th, 2008

Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st St. N.W.
Washington DC 20581
Attention: Office of the Secretariat

Re: Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts

JURISDICTION AND EVENT MARKETS IN GENERAL

Given the explicit statutory definitions of â€œexcludedâ€ and â€œexemptâ€ commodities, it is reasonable to conclude that the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (â€œCFTCâ€) has jurisdiction over all exchange-traded event markets. That is, if an “occurrence, extent of occurrence or contingency” does not meet the additional “beyond the control” and “economic consequence” criteria, then contracts on such events should be considered exempt commodities. While currently all exempt commodities are associated with a deliverable other than cash, the open-ended definition of â€œexempt commodityâ€ considered alongside the definitions of â€œcommodityâ€ and â€œexcluded commodityâ€ in 7 U.S.C. Â§ 1a imply that contracts on events that are not beyond the control of participants or do not involve an outcome of economic consequence are exempt commodities.

This conclusion presents enforcement issues that the CFTC may wish to avoid, such as being obligated to pursue actions against exchanges offering contracts based on the outcome of sporting events. Unfortunately, without further statutory clarification, this conclusion seems like the most defensible one, based on the letter, if not the intent, of the law.

That said, until statutory clarification is attained, given the purposes and history of the Commodity Exchange Act (â€œCEAâ€), it would be appropriate for the CFTC to only assert jurisdiction over those event contracts satisfying “economic consequence” criteria, which would include the price discovery aspect of the former economic purpose test. An interpretation to this effect by the CFTC would not be inconsistent with the text of the CEA, and would best serve to minimize the burden on interstate commerce. This policy decision would effectively reconstitute the pre-Commodity Futures Modernization Act economic purpose test for event contracts in a way that avoids unwanted enforcement issues. Such a decision would be unlikely to meet significant resistance until such time that further statutory certainty is forthcoming.

The CFTC would be free to classify such contracts as either excluded or exempt commodities depending on their susceptibility to manipulation, before or after special trading prohibitions are in place. Although the anti-manipulation requirements that apply to exempt commodities are directed towards price manipulation, a fortiori they must also apply to outcome manipulation.¹

The CFTC is free to determine what qualifies as “economic consequence.” As with the economic purpose test, significant hedging and price discovery functions would comprise the principal criteria.² Regarding the latter, since event derivatives have no corresponding â€œcashâ€ markets, the origination of prices that may improve economic decisions is all the more desirable in these cases. Furthermore, events that may only directly affect a group of private individuals may also have a strong bearing on commercial decision-making. Note that some general events and measures, as categorized and listed by the CFTC in its Concept Release, do in fact correspond to economic measures.³ Even if these events do not predictably correlate with asset prices, they may have predictable effects on market volatility. For example, from 1980 through present, the annualized weekly volatility of the S&P 500 in weeks in which a presidential or mid-term election took place was 19.97%, vs. 15.34% for all other weeks.⁴ It is difficult and ultimately undesirable to provide a quantitative recommendation for a bright-line demarcation between those markets that would satisfy an economic consequence criterion and those that would not. However, if a significant statistical test can easily be found that includes the price series of a more familiar asset, and has a logical basis, we can reasonably say that such events are associated with an economic consequence. In many cases the relevant time series may be unavailable, but in those cases the applicability of a proposed event market to other assets may be obvious. For example, consider a market predicting the likelihood of: (1) ethanol-related legislation, and its relationship to corn prices, or (2) offshore drilling legislation, and its relationship to oil prices, or (3) an attack on Iran, and its relationship to oil prices, or (4) future tax rates, and its relationship to municipal bond prices. In such cases, no quantitative test is necessary. In other cases, we may have moderately strong reasons to suspect that a given event or measure has an impact on asset prices, as we do with demographic trends, but those effects may be difficult to measure empirically.

Many potential markets may improve decision-making for a particular business, but have little bearing on the broader economy and asset prices in general. Examples of these markets include those predicting: (1) the revenue of a particular product, published title, film or performance series, (2) the launch or completion date of a particular product or project, and (3) the success of a particular approach applied to certain problem. The CFTC may find that only broad-based events or measures affecting an entire population, industry or significant percentage thereof would satisfy the economic consequence criteria. This would be nothing new, as commodity derivatives were not intended to be specialized insurance contracts. Such narrow questions also present issues from a manipulation and insider-trading perspective. In aggregate, these sorts of questions are quite relevant to the economy and will at times reflect broad trends, but may be more appropriately served by over-the-counter arrangements or riskless information aggregation, despite the obvious advantages of market incentives.

Contracts satisfying economic consequence criteria need not be approved for listing by the CFTC, though it is hoped that guidelines will be made public and remain flexible. At the limit, the CFTC will recognize that even a purely speculative market might serve an economic purpose in reducing portfolio variance.

Additionally:

The CFTC might levy a special fee on regulated event contracts to recoup expenditures related to a trading prohibition facility and other special demands on resources.

It may be required that exchanges pay interest on binary event contract collateral in order to reduce price distortions near extreme prices (100% and 0%). In illiquid markets, such distortions could be used to disguise transfers of money between anonymous participants.

The CFTC should welcome Securities and Exchange Commission opinion on contracts based on events like earnings and dividend announcements, a group of which might begin to replicate a security. Whenever a market is proposed that reflects the cash flow of a particular business or property, this opinion may be relevant.

To the extent that they subsequently conform to the CEA and CFTC policy, amnesty for any past violations should be considered with respect to Intrade and similar exchanges that have operated legally in their domestic jurisdictions.

ELECTION AND POLICY EVENT CONTRACTS

Election and policy event markets are within the jurisdiction of the CFTC based on the letter and spirit of the CEA. These markets represent the largest reasonably predictable yet unhedgeable risk facing businesses and the public. The regulation of such markets follows from the history of enlightened, flexible innovation exemplified by the CFTC. Because of their importance, election and policy event contracts naturally involve special consideration, although only in the course of satisfying the CEA.

Considering election contracts:

Trading prohibitions should be established such that candidates and proxies cannot participate due to their ability to determine the outcome of the contract. In addition to adhering to the “beyond the control” requirement of excluded commodities and general anti-manipulation precepts, the CFTC will want to consider to what extent such prohibitions might be expanded to act as insider trading restrictions similar in form to those of 7 U.S.C. Â§ 13(f) or the proposed H.R. 2341.⁵ Especially given the all-or-nothing nature of many event contracts, this might be desirable in order to provide for fair and equitable trading.⁶

Upon the death of a candidate, the candidate’s contracts and those of all competitors must settle on the last known price before the event. A new set of contracts reflecting the new set of candidates could subsequently be offered.⁷

Analogous rules could be applied to policy and legislative contracts where appropriate. These rules, either directly administered by the CFTC and related associations, and/or required of exchanges, would firmly address outcome manipulation.

Because of their importance and sensitivity, these contracts also require special measures to ensure against price manipulation. However, it is important to note that election and policy markets have typically been traded as binary event options. Such contracts expire at a specific time according to a well-defined objective event and in that way are more resistant to manipulation than futures and perpetuities, the prices of which are unbound in one direction and always open to interpretation based on unobservable factors and developments in related markets. At the same time, the relative detachment of event contracts from the web of more familiar asset prices may make manipulation more difficult to prove.

As would be expected, large trader lists could be maintained and closely followed. A more powerful option is the enforcement of extraordinarily low position limits, which would greatly reduce the potential of price manipulation. At the same time, position limits should respect outstanding risks participants may have and be otherwise unable to hedge, as with traditional hedging and speculative limits. Low position limits also address trader protection concerns if such contracts were to be offered in a non-intermediated fashion. Leverage might likewise be limited. Several tiers of opt-out protection could be available to traders of various capitalization and expertise. Contracts might also be restricted to limit orders in order to curb short-term feedback trading.

Election and policy contracts ought to be restricted to domestic accounts only. This will avoid possible extradition problems where disciplinary action is required. In the case of event contracts that may reflect tax rates, this restriction will also determine that the Department of the Treasury will not lose revenue on a net basis.⁸

FLEXIBLE LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION

Instead of, or in addition to, claiming jurisdiction over some event markets, the CFTC has at its disposal a range of public interest exemptions, including some that interpret the 7 U.S.C. Â§ 6(c)3(K)⁹ qualification clause liberally in order to include participants who might not normally trade in traditional futures and options markets. From my perspective, such exemptions may allow for a more flexible development of event markets in a less heavily-regulated environment. For example, it might allow for a contract in research science claims where trader-researchers capable of determining the outcome are not readily identifiable, or provide for trading in the sorts of narrow, business-specific questions previously mentioned. From the CFTC’s perspective, a public interest exemption may be desirable in order to avoid making a firm jurisdictional claim. However, the outcome of this comment process should be a decisive policy statement from the CFTC, not a sequence of ad-hoc actions. It is hoped that any future public interest exemptions would be offered alongside a substantial list of requirements and guidelines that would at least signal jurisdiction over a class of event markets possessing certain characteristics. Legal certainty is perhaps the most important outcome in this process, and it is not desirable for the CFTC to extend exemptions in a manner that leaves its jurisdiction completely ambiguous with respect to the markets so exempted.

This leaves aside the question of who may operate such markets. If exempted exchanges are to operate for profit, a jurisdictional statement from the CFTC is all the more necessary in order to ensure their legal standing. Exemptions directed at non-profits may be superfluous from a perspective of legal certainty, especially if such exchanges only offer trading in States where the predominant factor test holds.

The CEA allows that public interest exemptions may be issued for specified time periods. The CFTC may wish to consider to what extent exemptive or no-action letters with renew-by dates attached might be a useful tool in light of evolving legal conditions and technologies.

Note that theoretically the CFTC could also assert jurisdiction over all event markets and then direct no-action letters to the finite list of sports and gaming exchanges as a facility to repudiate jurisdiction over such markets. Typically, exempting markets formed principally for speculation would be considered against the public interest. However, if the CFTC finds no satisfactory way under the CEA to take jurisdiction over only those event markets that are associated with economic consequences, no-actioning sports and gaming exchanges would be in the public interest on a net basis, and would best promote interstate commerce. Furthermore, in some cases such exchanges operate under their own regulatory bodies and protections. It is also seldom that such exchanges allow for leveraged trading by beginner participants. In general, most gaming takes place via over-the-counter transactions.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST

I have neglected to argue for event markets in terms of the public interests they promote as these facts have been covered by others and have no doubt been obvious to the CFTC for a long time. I will only note some cases that are more subtle:

Information and estimates can be revealed in conditional form, as in the “decision markets” hosted on Intrade.¹⁰ One such market pays 100% if a Democrat is elected President in 2008 and the national debt rises in the calendar year preceding October 2011. Since the probability of the former event is also available on Intrade, by P(A | B) = P(A & B) / P(B), we can say that the probability of a Democratic president leading to a rise in the national debt is the decision market price divided by the election market price. This type of market is thus able to predict the result of electoral or legislative decisions, and different decisions can be so compared. With this in mind, consider that while prediction markets are usually described as ways to aggregate information, they are likely also useful in terms of collective problem-solving, even in cases where all information is transparent.

In terms of risk-sharing, eventually the utility of political event markets might begin to address some well-known problems with representative government. Consider the typical special interest problem in which a few relatively well-funded individuals would gain heavily by a particular piece of legislation such as an industry subsidy, and so will lobby heavily for it. Even if the legislation is not in the public interest, the costs will be distributed over so many tax payers that they will not care to argue against it, and most will not even realize whatâ€™s happening. When mature legislative and public policy markets are in place: (1) the dispersed interests will have the recourse of hedging against policy they dislike, (2) special interests will also have the option of hedging their legislative fortunes, which might lead to an overall reduction in lobbying, and (3) legislators may find compromises to be easier, since interests would be able to voluntarily “meet each other half way,” with price being the arbitrator. This could ease political log-jams, making law-making itself more flexible and efficient. Sensible yet otherwise politically infeasible measures such as unwinding entrenched subsidies could be made viable.

Even if iterations are required, the outcome of this comment process should be a clear statutory interpretation and policy statement from the CFTC regarding event markets. The CFTC should also publish self-certification guidelines for those markets that it determines are within its jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction and/or a public interest exemption framework is determined, it should not be ambiguous whether, for example, a contract based on a presidential election would be approved by the CFTC in principle.

There is good deal of apprehension among those who study prediction markets that regulation will stifle innovation. In truth, exchange requirements may not be as onerous as they are often portrayed, and in most cases are perfectly appropriate. A related, implied fear is that the CFTC may not approve certain contracts such as those on election and legislative events that undeniably possess economic purpose due only to their political sensitivity and considerations of the CFTCâ€™s source of authorization and funding. I hope that this process will assuage such fears. I encourage the CFTC to act decisively and comprehensively in accordance with its purposes.

Sincerely,
Jason Ruspini

Footnotes:

¹ For example, a market on infrequent terrorist attacks would not be approved for the simple reason that outcome manipulators could not reliably be identified beforehand.
² cf. Robert Hahn and Paul Tetlock, â€œA New Approach for Regulating Information Markets,â€ AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper (December 2004).
³ Justin Wolfers and Eriz Zitzewitz, â€œUsing Markets to Inform Policy: The Case of the Iraq War,â€ NBER Working Paper (June 2004).
Justin Wolfers, Erik Snowberg and Eric Zitzewitz. â€œPartisan Impacts on the Economy: Evidence from Prediction Markets and Close Elections,â€ NBER Working Paper (March 2006).
Erik Snowberg, Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz, â€œParty Influence in Congress and the Economy,â€ Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 2: No 3, pp 277-286 (2007).
⁴ F-test (Î± = 0.1126). If we instead only consider the Wednesdays following election day compared to all other days over this same period, Î± = 0.0246.
⁵ The “Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act”.
⁶ Trading prohibitions on insiders will also avoid a situation in which candidates are able to enjoy a multiplier effect on their campaign funds by shorting themselves. For example, Candidate A has a campaign fund of $2, and candidate B has $1. By hedging, candidate A can maintain a $2 risk while spending $4 on campaigning while candidate B can only spend $2 to maintain a $1 risk.
⁷ cf. Intrade rules. A more challenging possible scenario involves manipulation preceding the event such that the forced settlement locks-in profits, presumably just as market power is exhausted. See note below on restricting market access to US-based accounts.
⁸ Such restrictions would however tend to limit the growth of such markets and/or result in risk premia accruing to short tax-rate positions.
⁹ â€œSuch other persons that the Commission determines to be appropriate in light of their financial or other qualifications, or the applicability of appropriate regulatory protections.â€
¹⁰ For background, see: Robin Hanson, â€œDecision Markets for Policy Advice,â€ Promoting the General Welfare: New Perspectives on Government Performance, pp 151-173, Brookings Institution Press (November 2006).

[Cross-posted from Risk Markets and Politics]

Let’s Tell the CFTC Where to Go.

Tom W. Bell — Thu, 03 Jul 2008 18:53:41 +0000

Update: I’ve extended the deadline for signing up until 7 p.m. Pacific, Sunday, July 6. Also, I fixed a typo in paragraph 3, changing “denying” to “giving.” (Thanks, Gil!)>

The deadline looms for interested parties to respond to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s request for comments about regulating prediction markets (“event markets” in the CFTC’s usage). I may or may not get around to a detailed, point-by-point response to the CFTC’s many questions. In the meantime, though, I’ve drafted a general statement that many of you might agree with. I invite you to sign it with me, so that together we might tell the CFTC where to go. Please see below for details on how to sign on. Here is the draft statement:

What regulatory treatment should the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) apply to event markets? We the undersigned, who represent a wide range of viewpoints, agree on three general observations. First and foremost, the CFTC should do no harm. Second, at a minimum, the CFTC should make more general the sort of “no action” status enjoyed by the Iowa Electronic Markets (“IEM”). Third, if the CFTC decides to regulate event markets more substantively, it should adopt clear and limited jurisdictional boundaries and allow affected parties to step outside of them.

First, do no harm: Many sorts of event marketsâ€”including public ones, private ones, ones that offer only play-money trading, and ones that offer real-money tradingâ€”already thrive in the U.S. They have provided a rich array of benefits without evidently harming anyone. The CFTC could help event markets achieve still greater success by clarifying their legality. Instituting the wrong sort of regulations could suffocate event markets in their cradle, however. The CFTC should exercise a light hand, taking care to do no more than offer qualifying event markets the shelter of federal preemption and freeing them to continue operating under the extant legal regime.

Second, open up the “no action” option: Thanks in part to the “no action” letters that the CFTC has issued to it, the IEM has for many years benefited the public by offering real-money event markets. No sound reason precludes the CFTC from giving similar treatment to other institutions that, like the IEM, offer event markets solely for academic and experimental purposes and without imposing trading commissions.

Although the CFTC’s “no action” letters do not specify the exact criteria the IEM had to satisfy, they took favorable note of the IEM’s account limits. Those account limits effectively prevent the IEM from supporting significant hedging functions. If the CFTC builds a similar requirement into any general “no action” guidelines, it should adopt limits considerably more generous than the meager $500/trader limit adopted decades ago by the IEM. Even a limit ten times that amount would still effectively preclude hedging.

The CFTC should not limit “no action” status to markets run by tax-exempt organizations. The no-action letters that the CFTC issued to the IEM emphasized not the nature of the hosting institution, the University of Iowa, but rather the business model adopted by the IEM itself. Profitability could not have mattered, as tax-exempt organizations can and do earn profits (indeed, as their burgeoning endowments demonstrate, many universities earn immense profits). The CFTC apparently cared only that the IEM did not plan to profit from charging traders commissions. A tax-paying organization could satisfy that condition just as easily as a tax-exempt organization could. In either event, price discovery would flourish and consumers would win a safeguard against getting fleeced.

Third, preserve regulatory exit options: If the CFTC decides to write substantive regulations for event markets, it should recognize and guard against the risk of overregulation. Even well-intentioned and well-informed regulators remain human and, thus, all too apt to make mistakes. They run an especially large risk of making mistakes when they first attempt to regulate new institutions, such as event markets. To make matters worse, regulators typically lack reliable signals to determine when they have gone too far. Industries wither away for many reasons, after all.

The CFTC’s approach to regulating event markets should accommodate these policy considerations by establishing clear jurisdictional boundaries and opening exit options. Thus, for instance, the CFTC might specify that it has no jurisdiction over event markets that offer trading only to members of a particular firm, over markets that offer only spot trading in negotiable conditional notes, or over markets that do not support significant hedging functions. Then, if the CFTC enacts unduly burdensome regulations, an event market could opt out of them by changing its business model. So long as markets publicly announce that they operate outside the CFTC’s purview, allowing them that freedom of exit would harm nobody. To the contrary, it would help the CFTC gauge the suitability of its regulations and serve the public by protecting the continued viability of event markets.

Interested in signing on? Please drop me a private email (tbell at chapman dot edu) with your name, institutional affiliation, and snailmail address. I welcome your commentsâ€”I’m sure a typo or two persists in my draftâ€”but I of course cannot revamp the entire statement without mucking up the entire process. To leave me time to get everything together and out the door before the July 7 deadline, you’ll have to contact me before noon Pacific time on Sunday, July 6.

[Crossposted at Agoraphilia and Midas Oracle.]

Jason Ruspini will answer SOME of these CFTC questions. — 12 days left, Jason.

Chris F. Masse — Wed, 25 Jun 2008 13:29:54 +0000

CFTC – (PDF file):

CFTC’s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts

V. Issues for Comment

A. Request for Comment

The following questions consider the Commission’s regulatory purview over event contracts, the interests that may appropriately underlie Commission-regulated transactions, and the appropriate regulatory treatment of event contracts. The Commission encourages comments on the specific questions posed, as well as the broad range of issues raised in this concept release. In providing comments, please describe your relevant experience and discuss in detail the facts and legal provisions that support your conclusions. Furthermore, please consider the Commission’s mandate to protect commodity futures and options markets and customers, and ensure the integrity of the commodity derivatives marketplace, as well as the expected effects of any Commission action on competition, efficiency, innovation and the financial integrity of transactions. Any recommendation with respect to the regulatory treatment of event contracts and markets should be consistent with and supported by the Act, practical, and amenable to effective and efficient implementation.

B. Public Interest

1. What public interests are served by event contracts that are designed and will principally be traded for information aggregation purposes and not for commercial risk management or pricing purposes?

2. How are these interests consistent with the public interest goals embodied in the Act?

3. What calculations, analyses, variables, and factors could be used to objectively determine the social value of information to the general public that may be discovered through trading in event contracts? Should this be a factor in determining whether the Commission plays a role in regulating these markets?

C. Jurisdictional Determinations

4. What characteristics or traits are common to or should be used to identify event contracts and event markets?

5. How do these characteristics and traits differ from those of commodity futures and options contracts that customarily have been regulated by the Commission? How are they similar?

6. Are there criteria based on the provisions of the Act that could be used to make jurisdictional determinations with respect to event contracts and markets?

7. Given the purposes and history of the Act, would it be appropriate for the Commission to apply a test premised on commercial risk management or pricing functions to demarcate the Commission’s jurisdiction over particular contracts? If so, what factors could be used to make such a determination?

8. Given the purposes and history of the Act, would it be appropriate for the Commission to apply any test premised on the economic purpose of certain types of transactions to demarcate the Commission’s jurisdiction over particular contracts? If so, what factors could be used to make such a determination?

9. What calculations, analyses, variables and factors would be appropriate in determining whether the impact of an occurrence or contingency will result in a financial, commercial or economic consequence that is identified in Section 1a(13) of the Act?

10. What calculations, analyses, variables, and factors would be appropriate in determining whether an economic or commercial index that is based on prices, rates, values, or levels should or should not qualify as an excluded commodity under Section 1a(13) of the Act?

11. What identifiable factors, statutorily based or otherwise, limit the events and measures that may underlie event contracts when such contracts are treated as Commission-regulated transactions?

12. What objective and readily identifiable factors, statutorily based or otherwise, could be used to distinguish event contracts that could appropriately be traded under Commission oversight from transactions that may be viewed as the functional equivalent of gambling?

13. The Commission notes that Section 12(e) of the Act generally provides that the CEA supersedes and preempts other laws, including state and local gaming and bucket shop laws, with respect to transactions executed on or subject to the rules of a Commission-regulated market, or with respect to transactions exempted from the Act pursuant to the Commission’s exemptive authority under Section 4(c) of the Act. What are the implications of possibly preempting state gaming laws with respect to event contracts and markets that are treated as Commission-regulated or exempted transactions?

14. Should certain underlying events or measures –such as those based on assassinations or terrorist activities– be prohibited altogether due to the social perception and impact of such events? What statutory or other legal basis would support this treatment?

15. Are there event contracts, such as political event contracts, that should be prohibited from trading under the Act, or that deserve separate treatment or consideration, due to the nature and importance of their outcomes? What statutory or other legal basis would support this treatment?

D. Legal Implementation

16. Is it appropriate for the Commission to direct certain or all event contracts onto markets that are regulated differently from and perhaps less stringently than DCMs? For example, it may be warranted or necessary to treat event markets that aggregate information solely for academic or research purposes, event markets set-up for internal corporate purposes, or event markets that offer exceedingly low notional value contracts to traders differently than markets that possess the attributes of traditional DCMs.

17. Is it appropriate for the Commission to use the Section 4(c) exemptive authority of the Act for implementing a regulatory scheme for event contracts and markets? In this regard, the Commission notes that it has the discretion to grant an exemption under Section 4(c) to certain classes of transactions without having to make a determination as to whether such transactions are subject to the Act in the first instance.

18. Is the issuance of staff no-action relief, such as the relief issued to the IEM, an appropriate or preferable means for establishing regulatory certainty for event contracts and markets? Is a policy statement appropriate or preferable?

19. What are the benefits and drawbacks of permitting certain event markets to operate pursuant to Commission established conditions that are similar to the conditions under which the IEM operates?

E. Market Participants

20. Would it be appropriate to allow market participants, and in particular, retail customers, to trade on Commission-regulated event markets with the knowledge that the Commission may not be able to effectively monitor the measures or events that underlie certain event contracts?

21. What unique protections and prophylactic measures are appropriate or necessary for the protection of retail users of event contracts and markets?

22. What are the implications of permitting the intermediation of event contracts, including intermediation on behalf of retail market participants, both with respect to trade execution and clearing?

23. Are there any types of trader or intermediary conduct, peculiar to event contracts and markets, that should be prohibited or monitored closely by regulators?

24. What other factors could impact the Commission’s ability, given its limited resources, to properly oversee or monitor trading in event contracts?

THE MIDAS ORACLE TAKES:

- CALL TO ACTION: Let’s fight so that the CFTC allows the FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with “event markets”.

- In the for-profit vs not-for-profit debate, our prediction market luminaries, doctored by Bob, are on the wrong side of the issue.

- COMMENTS TO THE CFTC: What to expect from Tom W. Bell and Jason Ruspini

BACKGROUND INFO:

- CFTCâ€™s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts… notably how they define “event markets”, how they are going to extend their “exemption” to other IEM-like prediction exchanges, and how they framed their questions to the public. Here are the comments to the CFTC.

- The Arnold & Porter lawyers explain the meaning of the CFTC’s concept release on “event markets”. — (PDF file)

- What Vernon Smith told the CFTC.

- American Enterprise Instituteâ€™s proposals to legalize the real-money prediction markets in the United States of America

Adam Siegel of Inkling Markets has computed that blogging is important to a small business.

Chris F. Masse — Tue, 24 Jun 2008 16:42:01 +0000

Inkling Markets:

Here are the jobs we’re currently looking to fill:

Director of Business Development
Take the reigns to plan and direct Inkling’s ongoing business development efforts. This includes everything from identifying and evaluating new market opportunities, working on public relations initiatives, forging strategic partnerships, initiating proposals, negotiating contracts with our enterprise clients, and helping to manage existing accounts. Our ideal candidate will have demonstrated the ability to sell software as a service to large enterprise clients or has proven to be effective at launching new product lines and developing new strategic initiatives for at least 5+ years.

Customer Support
Inkling provides technical support to all its clients. From the trader who has a question about their balance to a marketplace administrator who has questions about how to run a market properly, we’re looking for someone to be our interface for these types of questions. It’s ok if you don’t have an intimate understanding of prediction markets now, but our ideal applicant will have shown excellent communication skills, both verbal and written, will have effectively managed multiple work threads at once, and will not be afraid of venturing in to other activities going on in the company, i.e. supporting business development efforts, doing customer outreach and blogging, performing research, and even doing application testing when necessary. We’re particularly interested in recent college graduates [*] for this position.

But you’ll notice that he would assign the junior employee (not the business development executive) to blogging.

[*] Yeah, fresh people are cheaper and more flexible.

The lawyerly questions that the CFTC are asking to Tom W. Bell

Chris F. Masse — Wed, 18 Jun 2008 21:49:10 +0000

CFTC – (PDF file):

CFTC’s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts

V. Issues for Comment

A. Request for Comment

B. Public Interest

2. How are these interests consistent with the public interest goals embodied in the Act?

C. Jurisdictional Determinations

4. What characteristics or traits are common to or should be used to identify event contracts and event markets?

5. How do these characteristics and traits differ from those of commodity futures and options contracts that customarily have been regulated by the Commission? How are they similar?

6. Are there criteria based on the provisions of the Act that could be used to make jurisdictional determinations with respect to event contracts and markets?

11. What identifiable factors, statutorily based or otherwise, limit the events and measures that may underlie event contracts when such contracts are treated as Commission-regulated transactions?

D. Legal Implementation

19. What are the benefits and drawbacks of permitting certain event markets to operate pursuant to Commission established conditions that are similar to the conditions under which the IEM operates?

E. Market Participants

21. What unique protections and prophylactic measures are appropriate or necessary for the protection of retail users of event contracts and markets?

22. What are the implications of permitting the intermediation of event contracts, including intermediation on behalf of retail market participants, both with respect to trade execution and clearing?

23. Are there any types of trader or intermediary conduct, peculiar to event contracts and markets, that should be prohibited or monitored closely by regulators?

24. What other factors could impact the Commission’s ability, given its limited resources, to properly oversee or monitor trading in event contracts?

CFTC’s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts

Chris F. Masse — Tue, 17 Jun 2008 21:55:15 +0000

CFTC – (PDF file):

CFTC’s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts

SUMMARY:

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission or CFTC) is soliciting comment on the appropriate regulatory treatment of financial agreements offered by markets commonly referred to as event, prediction, or information markets. \1\ For ease of reference and to avoid classification issues, these financial agreements are referred to herein as event contracts. In general, event contracts are neither dependent on, nor do they necessarily relate to, market prices or broad-based measures of economic or commercial activity. \2\ Rather, event contracts may be based on eventualities and measures as varied as the world’s population in the year 2050, the results of political elections, or the outcome of particular entertainment events. \3\ The Commission’s staff has received a substantial number of requests for guidance on the propriety of trading various event contracts under the regulatory rubric of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA or Act). Given the substantive and practical concerns that may arise from applying federal regulation to event contracts and markets, the Commission believes that it is appropriate to solicit and consider the public’s comments in advance of issuing any definitive guidance.

\1\ See Michael Gorham, Event Markets Campaign for Respect, Futures Industry Magazine (Jan./Feb. 2004); Justin Wolfers and Eric W. Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18 J. Econ. Persp. 107 (Spring 2004); Robert W. Hahn and Paul C. Tetlock, Using Information Markets to Improve Public Decision Making, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 04-18 (March 2005); Hal R. Varian, Can Markets Be Used to Help People Make Nonmarket Decisions?, The New York Times (May 8, 2003).

\2\ The term event contract is not intended to encompass contracts that generate trading prices that predictably correlate with market prices or broad-based measures of economic or commercial activity, or contracts which substantially replicate other commodity derivatives contracts, such as binary options on exchange rates or the price of crude oil. The aforementioned contracts are unambiguously subject to CFTC regulation.

\3\ See, e.g., Retired claims list at the Foresight Exchange

DATES: Comments must be received by July 7, 2008.

ADDRESSES: Comments should be sent to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW., Washington, DC 20581, Attention: Office of the Secretariat. Comments may be sent by facsimile to 202.418.5521, or by e-mail to secretary@cftc.gov.

Reference should be made to the “Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts.” Comments may also be submitted through the Federal eRuleMaking Portal at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/leaving.cgi?from=leavingFR.html&log=linklog&to=http://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bruce Fekrat, Special Counsel, Office of the Director (telephone 202.418.5578, e-mail bfekrat@cftc.gov), Division of Market Oversight, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW., Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

A. Purpose of the Release

Since 2005, the Commission’s staff has received a substantial number of requests for guidance on the propriety of offering and trading financial agreements that may primarily function as information aggregation vehicles. These event contracts generally take the form of financial agreements linked to eventualities or measures that neither derive from, nor correlate with, market prices or broad economic or commercial measures. Event contracts have been based on a wide variety of interests including the results of presidential elections, the accomplishment of certain scientific advances, world population levels, the adoption of particular pieces of legislation, the outcome of corporate product sales, the declaration of war and the length of celebrity marriages. In response to the various requests for guidance, and to promote regulatory certainty, the Commission has commenced a comprehensive review of the Act’s applicability to event contracts and markets. To further its review, the Commission is issuing this release to solicit the expertise of interested persons, including CFTC-registered markets, exempt markets, over-the-counter derivatives dealers, capital market participants, legal practitioners, state and federal regulatory authorities, academicians and research institutions with respect to the practical and regulatory issues relevant to regulating event contracts and markets.

Broadly speaking, the Commission must determine:

1. Whether event contracts are within the Commission’s jurisdiction and if so, why (or why not)?

2. If event contracts are within the Commission’s jurisdiction, should there be exemptions or exclusions applied to them and if so, why (or why not)?

3. How should the Commission address the potential gaming aspects of some event contracts and the possible pre-emption of state gaming laws?

The Commission urges interested persons to provide detailed and comprehensive comments that will assist the Commission in conducting its review and analysis of the Commission’s regulatory purview over event contracts, the interests that may appropriately underlie Commission-regulated transactions, and the appropriate regulatory treatment of markets that may offer event contracts.

B. CFTC Experience With Event Contracts

The Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM), an electronic trading facility that functions as an experimental and academic program, is one of the better known and oft discussed real-money event markets currently in operation. \4\

The IEM operates in part pursuant to a 1993 no-action letter issued by Commission staff which, without asserting jurisdiction or describing the potential parameters of the Commission’s regulatory purview over the market, allows the IEM to list various event contracts subject to certain conditions and limitations for covered contracts. \5\

\4\ The IEM is run by the University of Iowa Departments of Accounting and Economics and the University’s College of Business Administration.

\5\ CFTC Staff Letter No. 93-66 [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ] 25,785 (June 18, 1993). This no-action letter superseded the operative terms of a more limited letter issued to the IEM in 1992. The 1993 letter’s relief extends to IEM contracts based on political elections, economic indicators, and certain currency exchange rates. The letter requires that the IEM limit access to any one submarket to between 1,000 and 2,000 traders. The letter also sets the maximum amount that any single participant can risk in any one submarket at five hundred dollars. The letter makes clear that relief is premised on, among other factors, the IEM’s representations concerning the market’s specific manner of operation and academic purpose, and the assurance that the IEM will not receive any profit or other form of compensation from its activities.

The IEM continues to be most recognized for its presidential election contracts. The IEM offers a vote share contract and a winner-take-all contract for the 2008 U.S. presidential election cycle.

Its vote share contract is ultimately associated with the candidates that will be nominated by each party. Each vote share contract has a maximum value of $1 and a contract payout that is directly based on the percentage of the popular vote received by each of the two major party candidates. For instance, a contract for a candidate who receives 40% of the popular votes cast for both candidates will be worth $.40 at settlement.

In contrast, the IEM’s 2008 presidential election winner-take-all contract will have a value of either $1 or $0 at settlement. The IEM’s winner-take-all-contract is also associated with a specific candidate, but instead of having a payout that is tied to a particular percentage of the popular vote received by each candidate, the contract will distribute a fixed payout of $1 to its holder if and only if the candidate referenced by the contract receives a greater percentage of the popular vote cast.

Although the IEM’s presidential election contracts are imperfect vehicles for the discovery of information, there is some consensus on the question of whether the IEM’s contracts can function capably as predictive tools. \6\ Indeed, trading data generated by some IEM presidential election contracts arguably have produced better predictive indicators than data obtained from professional polling organizations. \7\

\6\ See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decision Making, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 933, 950 (2004).

\7\ See Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 1029-31 (June 2005).

II. Commodity Options and Futures and the Attributes of Event Contracts

The Commission, with some exceptions, has exclusive jurisdiction over two relevant types of derivative instruments —commodity options and commodity futures contracts.

Section 4c(b) of the Act gives the Commission plenary jurisdiction over commodity options, and provides that “[n]o person shall * * * enter into * * * any transaction involving any commodity regulated under this Act which is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an option * * * contrary to any rule, regulation or order of the Commission[.]”

Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the Act provides that the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to accounts, agreements, and transactions (including options) involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery.

Event contracts, depending on their underlying interests, can be designed to exhibit the attributes of either options or futures contracts.

A significant number of event contracts are structured as all-or-nothing binary transactions commonly described as binary options. \8\ Binary event contracts typically pay out a fixed amount when an outcome either occurs or does not occur. The trading of such contracts can facilitate the discovery of information by assigning probabilities, through market-derived prices, to discrete eventualities. For example, a binary contract based on whether a particular person will run for the presidency in 2012, can pay a fixed $100 to its buyer if and only if that individual runs for the presidency in 2012. If the contract’s traders believe that the likelihood of the individual’s candidacy in 2012 is around 17 percent, the price of the contract will be around $17, and will approximate the market’s consensus expectation of the individual’s candidacy.

\8\ See, e.g., Intrade Prediction Markets, Current Events Contracts

In addition to binary event transactions, the term event contract has also been used to identify transactions, based on interests other than market prices, which resemble futures contracts. For instance, these types of event contracts can price consensus estimates of moving values, such as the number of hours the average U.S. resident spends in traffic or the share of votes that a particular candidate for political office may receive. Unlike binary transactions, and similar to any commodity futures contract, this type of contract creates continuous and ongoing obligations that are linked to moving measures or levels, as opposed to being dependent on the outcome of a single discrete occurrence.

III. The Commission’s Regulatory Purview

As discussed above, with some limited exceptions, the regulatory purview of the Act extends to and includes transactions that are either structured as options or futures when such transactions involve interests that constitute commodities under the Act.

Section 1a(4) of the Act defines commodity in two distinct ways. First, Section 1a(4) specifically enumerates certain articles or goods as commodities. \9\

Second, Section 1a(4) defines the term commodity as including those articles or goods, and services, rights or interests, “in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.” Therefore, an underlying interest that is not enumerated in Section 1a(4) may be a statutory commodity under the Act if it reasonably can underlie a futures contract on a forward looking basis. \10\

\9\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(4). Section 1a(4) of the Act enumerates the following commodities: wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other fats and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice.

\10\ See United States v. Valencia, No. H-03-024, 2003 WL 23174749 at *8 (S.D. Tex Aug. 25, 2003) (noting that the determination of whether West Coast natural gas is “a commodity in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in,” is a fact question, and that “there is no evidence that West Coast gas could not in the future be traded on a futures exchange.”).

In addition to Section 1a(4), Section 1a(13) of the Act identifies certain interests as excluded commodities and thereby gives further shape to the statutory definition of commodity. \11\ The Section 1a(13) definition of excluded commodity is composed of four subsections. The third subsection defines the term to include any economic or commercial index that is based on prices, rates, values, or levels not within the control of any party to the relevant contract. The fourth subsection of Section 1a(13) provides that an excluded commodity includes an occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency associated with a financial or economic consequence that is not within the control of the parties to the relevant transaction.

\11\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(13). Section 1a(13) of the Act provides that:

The term “excluded commodity” means–

(i) an interest rate, exchange rate, currency, security, security index, credit risk or measure, debt or equity instrument, index or measure of inflation, or other macroeconomic index or measure;

(ii) any other rate, differential, index, or measure of economic or commercial risk, return, or value that is–

(I) not based in substantial part on the value of a narrow group of commodities not described in clause (i); or

(II) based solely on one or more commodities that have no cash market;

(iii) any economic or commercial index based on prices, rates, values, or levels that are not within the control of any party to the relevant contract, agreement, or transaction; or

(iv) an occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency (other than a change in the price, rate, value, or level of a commodity not described in clause (i)) that is–

(I) beyond the control of the parties to the relevant contract, agreement, or transaction; and

(II) associated with a financial, commercial, or economic consequence.

For the purpose of discussion and analysis, the types of event contracts that Commission staff has reviewed can be categorized, albeit imperfectly, as contracts that are based on narrow commercial measures and events, contracts based on certain environmental measures and events, and contracts based upon general measures and events.

Narrow commercial measures quantify and reflect the rate, value, or level of particularized commercial activity, such as a specific farmer’s crop yield.

Narrow commercial events, on the other hand, are events that might, in and of themselves, have commercial implications, such as changes in corporate officers or corporate asset purchases.

Environmental measures can be characterized as quantifications of weather phenomena, such as the volatility of precipitation or temperature levels, that do not predictably correlate to commodity market prices or other measures of broad economic or commercial activity.

By comparison, environmental events can include the formation of a specific type of storm, within an identifiable geographic region, the likelihood of which will not predictably correlate to commodity market prices or measures of broad economic or commercial activity.

General measures can be described as measures that are not commercial or environmental measures. As such, general measures do not quantify the rate, value, or level of any commercial or environmental activity and can, for example, include the number of hours that U.S. residents spend in traffic annually or the vote-share of a particular presidential candidate.

Similarly, general events, such as whether a Constitutional amendment will be adopted or whether two celebrities will decide to marry, can be described as events that do not reflect the occurrence of any commercial or environmental event. The category of general measures and events can be further divided into a multitude of subcategories, such as political or entertainment measures or events.

Since 1992, Commission-regulated exchanges have listed for trading a variety of commodity futures and options contracts with payout terms based on interests other than price-based interests. These contracts involve interests as diverse as regional insured property losses, the count of bankruptcies, temperature volatilities, corporate mergers, and corporate credit events. \12\

While not strictly price-based, the interests underlying these contracts have been viewed by Commission staff as having generally-accepted and predictable financial, commercial or economic consequences.

In other words, unlike the interests that event contracts cover, these underlying interests have been viewed as measures and occurrences that reasonably could be expected to correlate to market prices or other broad-based commercial or economic measures or activities.

\12\ For example, the Chicago Board of Trade’s catastrophe single event insurance option contracts (which are no longer listed) paid out a fixed amount if and only if insured property damage exceeded $10 billion for a specific region during a specified interval of time.

IV. Further Statutory Background

Federal regulations were initially applied to commodity derivatives trading in 1921. \13\ At that time, Congress acknowledged that commodity futures markets could benefit commerce by facilitating the hedging of commercial risks and the discovery of reliable commodity prices. \14\ The Grain Futures Act of 1922, the forerunner to the CEA, consequently was enacted to promote the financial vitality of futures trading by limiting price manipulations and other disturbances that were prevalent at the time and widely perceived to result from excessive speculation. \15\

\13\ See, e.g., Hearing on Futures Trading Before the House Committee on Agriculture, 66th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1043 (1921); Hearings on H.R. 5676 Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 452 (1921); Hearings on Futures Trading Before the House Committee on Agriculture, 67th Cong. 1st Sess. 7-9 (1921); 61 Cong. Rec. 4761 (1921) (remarks of Senator Capper, the sponsor of the Senate bill which became the Futures Trading Act of 1921 (later restyled as the Grain Futures Act of 1922 when found to be unconstitutional for its use of taxation to penalize off-exchange futures trading)).

\14\ See S. Rep. No. 871 (August 23, 1922). The Congressional record is replete with discussion of the commercial importance of commodity futures trading. The record suggests that commercial interests must be able to look to properly functioning commodity futures markets for market information and products that facilitate the making of marketing, financing, and distribution decisions. S. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 12 (1974). The Congressional record also indicates that an initial purpose behind regulating commodity futures trading was to secure fair and orderly markets for producers and other commercial participants who used the markets for price basing and hedging. Hearings on S. 2485, S. 2578, S. 2837 and H.R. 1311 before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 234 (1974); see also 80 Cong. Rec. 10739 (April 11, 1974).

\15\ E.g., 61 Cong. Rec. 4761-4763 (1921) (remarks of Senator Capper); 61 Cong. Rec. 1379 (1921) (remarks of Rep. Bland); 61 Cong. Rec. 1313-1314 (remarks of Rep. Tincher, the sponsor of the House bill which became the 1921 Act); 61 Cong. Rec. 1376 (1921) (remarks of Rep. Gensman).

In identifying the national public interests that render federal regulation necessary, the Act focuses on the commercial benefits that well-functioning derivatives markets can provide by broadly expressing their critical functions. Customarily, hedging and price basing have been identified as two critical functions of the commodity derivatives markets. \16\ For instance, Section 3 of the Act, as amended by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), \17\ finds that transactions subject to the CEA are affected with the national public interest because they provide a means for “managing and assuming price risks.” Section 3 of the Act also identifies price discovery and price dissemination as separate public interests warranting Federal regulation. \18\

\16\ Hedging occurs when positions acquired are economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and management of a commercial enterprise. See, e.g., 17 CFR 1.3(z) (definition of bona fide hedging). Price basing, a function of price discovery and dissemination, can occur when commercial entities enter into transactions in a particular commodity based upon commodity futures prices for that or a related commodity, oftentimes at a differential.

\17\ Appendix E, section 108, Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.

\18\ The hedging and price basing purposes of commodity futures trading are emphasized in other provisions of the Act as well. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. 6a, 6b, and 6c. As a matter of background, the provision in the Grain Futures Act that was the forerunner of current CEA Section 3 provided that:

Transactions in grain involving the sale thereof for future delivery as commonly conducted on boards of trade and known as “futures” are affected with a national public interest; that such transactions are carried on in large volume by the public generally and by persons engaged in the business of buying and selling grain and the products and by-products thereof in interstate commerce; that the prices involved in such transactions are generally quoted and disseminated throughout the United States and in foreign countries as a basis for determining the prices to the producer and the consumer of grain and the products and by-products thereof and to facilitate the movements thereof in interstate commerce; that such transactions are utilized by shippers, dealers, millers, and others engaged in handling grain and the products and by-products thereof in interstate commerce as a means of hedging themselves against possible loss through fluctuations in price; that the transactions and prices of grain on such boards of trade are susceptible to speculation, manipulation, or control, which are detrimental to the producer or the consumer and the persons handling grain and products and by-products thereof in interstate commerce, and that such fluctuations in prices are an obstruction to and a burden upon interstate commerce in grain and the products and by-products thereof and render regulation imperative for the protection of such commerce and the national public interest therein.

Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (Sept. 21, 1922). In 1936, Congress restyled the Grain Futures Act as the Commodity Exchange Act and amended this provision to substitute the word “commodity” for “grain.” Pub. L. 74-675, section 2, 49 Stat. 1491 (June 15, 1936).

Although repealed by the CFMA, former Section 5(g) \19\ of the Act may be relevant to analyzing the findings and purposes discussed in Section 3 of the Act. Former Section 5(g) provided that the Commission could not designate a board of trade as a contract market unless the board of trade demonstrated that transactions for future delivery in the commodity for which designation as a contract market was sought “will not be contrary to the public interest.” \20\ The public interest test of Section 5(g) included an “economic purpose” test, subject to a final test of the public interest. \21\ The economic purpose test applied under former Section 5(g) was used to prohibit the trading of certain contracts. Notably, the economic purpose test regarding contracts appropriate for trading on a futures exchange was not necessarily congruent with the scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, while futures contracts that failed the economic purpose test were prohibited from trading on futures exchanges and thus illegal because of the on-exchange trading requirement, they (and any instrument with identical terms) remained futures contracts, fully subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction.

\19\ 7 U.S.C. 7(g), as amended by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974). In 1992, Section 5(g) was redesignated Section 5(7) of the Act. See Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992). The CFMA repealed all of former Section 5 of the Act, including Section 5(g) (redesignated as Section 5(7)), and replaced it with current Section 5. Section 5 was radically restructured by the CFMA to provide for designation criteria and core principles with which a DCM must comply. Appendix E of Pub. L. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).

\20\ The House Committee on Agriculture stressed that contracts that could be expected to be used almost entirely for speculation would be against the public interest. H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1974).

\21\ See H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1974).

By enacting the CFMA, Congress sought “to promote innovation for futures and derivatives and to reduce systemic risk by enhancing legal certainty in the markets for certain futures and derivatives transactions[.]” \22\ As demonstrated by the IEM, innovative event markets have the capacity to facilitate the discovery of information, and thereby provide potential benefits to the public. Subject to certain exceptions, Section 4(c)(1) of the Act gives the Commission the authority to “promote responsible economic or financial innovation and fair competition” by exempting any transaction or class of transactions from any of the provisions of the Act, including the requirement that they trade on Commission-regulated markets, where the Commission determines that such action would be consistent with the public interest. Pursuant to Section 4(c), Congress gave to “the Commission a means of providing certainty and stability to existing and emerging markets so that financial innovation and market development can proceed in an effective and competitive manner.” \23\ Under Section 4(c), the Commission has the discretion to grant an exemption to certain classes of transactions without having to make a determination that such transactions are subject to the Act in the first instance. \24\ Notably, the Commission can use its Section 4(c) exemptive authority not only on a case-by-case, or product-by-product basis, but may also use the authority to establish a set of regulatory provisions applicable to a defined class of products.

\22\ House Report No. 106-711(III) September 6, 2000.

\23\ House Conference Report 102-978, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3179, 3213.

\24\ With respect to the exercise of this discretion, the House-Senate Conference Committee responsible for the review of Section 4(c) stated that:

The Conferees do not intend that the exercise of exemptive authority by the Commission would require any determination beforehand that the agreement, instrument, or transaction for which an exemption is sought is subject to the Act. Rather, this provision provides flexibility for the Commission to provide legal certainty to novel instruments where the determination as to jurisdiction is not straightforward. Rather than making a finding as to whether a product is or is not a futures contract, the Commission in appropriate cases may proceed directly to issuing an exemption.

Conf. Report at 3214-3215. Although Section 4(c) only speaks to futures contracts, Section 4c(b) of the Act, the Commission’s plenary authority to regulate transactions that involve commodity options, provides the Commission with comparable exemptive authority for options.

V. Issues for Comment

A. Request for Comment

B. Public Interest

2. How are these interests consistent with the public interest goals embodied in the Act?

C. Jurisdictional Determinations

4. What characteristics or traits are common to or should be used to identify event contracts and event markets?

5. How do these characteristics and traits differ from those of commodity futures and options contracts that customarily have been regulated by the Commission? How are they similar?

6. Are there criteria based on the provisions of the Act that could be used to make jurisdictional determinations with respect to event contracts and markets?

11. What identifiable factors, statutorily based or otherwise, limit the events and measures that may underlie event contracts when such contracts are treated as Commission-regulated transactions?

D. Legal Implementation

19. What are the benefits and drawbacks of permitting certain event markets to operate pursuant to Commission established conditions that are similar to the conditions under which the IEM operates?

E. Market Participants

21. What unique protections and prophylactic measures are appropriate or necessary for the protection of retail users of event contracts and markets?

22. What are the implications of permitting the intermediation of event contracts, including intermediation on behalf of retail market participants, both with respect to trade execution and clearing?

23. Are there any types of trader or intermediary conduct, peculiar to event contracts and markets, that should be prohibited or monitored closely by regulators?

24. What other factors could impact the Commission’s ability, given its limited resources, to properly oversee or monitor trading in event contracts?

Issued in Washington, DC, on May 1, 2008 by the Commission.

David A. Stawick,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. E8-9981 Filed 5-6-08; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
Last Updated: May 7, 2008

THE MIDAS ORACLE TAKES:

- CALL TO ACTION: Let’s fight so that the CFTC allows the FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with “event markets”.

- In the for-profit vs not-for-profit debate, our prediction market luminaries, doctored by Bob, are on the wrong side of the issue.

- COMMENTS TO THE CFTC: What to expect from Tom W. Bell and Jason Ruspini

- A young economist rebuts the American Enterprise Institute.

BACKGROUND INFO:

- How the CFTC define “event markets”, how they are going to extend their “exemption” to other IEM-like prediction exchanges, and how they framed their questions to the public. Here are the comments sent to the CFTC.

- The Arnold & Porter lawyers explain the meaning of the CFTC’s concept release on “event markets”. — (PDF file)

- The Schulte & Roth & Zabel lawyers’ takes. — (PDF file)

- The Sullivan & Cromwell lawyers’ takes. — (PDF file)

- What Vernon Smith told the CFTC.

- The American Enterprise Instituteâ€™s proposals to legalize the real-money prediction markets in the United States of America

APPENDIX:

Paul Wolfowitz’s profile at the American Enterprise Institute

- How the neo-cons drove the United States of America into the unecessary Iraq war

Robin Hanson fanboy and InTrade trader Patri Freidman’s outing —as one of the “sexiest geeks alive”

Chris F. Masse — Tue, 17 Jun 2008 09:13:38 +0000

Via ValleyWag

His latest venture — His “sexy geek” profile

Patri Firedman’s website

As you all know, Patri Friedman set up Google’s internal prediction exchange —with Bo Cowgill.

Based on market data from a tiny prediction exchange (IEM, which is much smaller than InTrade-TradeSports or BetFair), a couple of researchers claim that prediction markets do not have superior predictive power. — And, adding salt to injury, they call our prediction market luminaries (Robin Hanson, Justin Wolfers, etc.)… “naive”.

Chris F. Masse — Mon, 09 Jun 2008 16:29:57 +0000

Via Adam Siegel…

…of Inkling Markets fame….

Are Political Markets Really Superior to Polls as Election Predictors? – (draft: PDF file) – by Robert S. Erikson and Christopher Wlezien – 2008-05-02

Abstract

Election markets have been praised for their ability to forecast election outcomes, and to forecast better than trial-heat polls. This paper challenges that optimistic assessment of election markets, based on an analysis of Iowa Electronic Market (IEM) data from presidential elections between 1988 and 2004.We argue that it is inappropriate to naively compare market forecasts of an election outcome with exact poll results on the day prices are recorded, that is, market prices reflect forecasts of what will happen on Election Day whereas trial-heat polls register preferences on the day of the poll. We then show that when poll leads are properly discounted, poll-based forecasts outperform vote-share market prices. Moreover, we show that win projections based on the polls dominate prices from winner-take-all markets. Traders in these markets generally see more uncertainty ahead in the campaign than the polling numbers warrantâ€”in effect, they overestimate the role of election campaigns. Reasons for the performance of the IEM election markets are considered in concluding sections.

Conclusion

This paper has tested the claim that the Iowa Electronic Market offers superior predictions of election outcomes than the snapshots from public opinion polls. By our tests, the IEM election markets are not better than trial-heat polls for predicting elections. In fact, by a reasonable as opposed to naive reading of the polls, the polls dominate the markets as an election forecaster. This is true in the sense that a trader in the market can readily profit by â€œbuyingâ€ candidates who, according to informed readings of the polls, are undervalued. Moreover, we find that market prices contain little information of value for forecasting beyond the information already available in the polls. Where then do the markets go wrong? To begin with, consider the vote-share market. The histories of market prices show that traders tend to hold persistent beliefs about the vote division that contradict the polls and that these persistent beliefs are often wrong. Incorrect beliefs get corrected only in the last days before the election, when the polls are difficult to ignore. The winner-take-all market tracks the vote-share market but compounds its errors by overvaluing longshot candidatesâ€™ chances of victory, as if the market expects more campaign surprises than those that occur in reality. The existence of persistent mistakes in the vote-share market compounded by the degree of uncertainty about the vote share estimates makes the winner-take-all market a particularly poor forecasting tool. Based on the experience of the IEM, if the polls show a candidate to hold a decisive lead but the market is unconvinced, bet on the polls. It should be noted that our daily poll projections are themselves rather crude instruments. Our robotic trading programs are informed by a flat prior, relying solely on the current polls and the days until the election but nothing more. Even when we compare market prices to the weekly average of poll-based forecasts, our instrument is primitive in that the weekâ€™s polls are not weighted for relative recency. But further perfection of our forecasting model from the polls would only advance our central argument. If we were to apply more rigorous modeling to obtain a properly weighted average of current polls and earlier polls, the victory of poll forecasts over the market forecast presumably would be more secure. One could argue that the results are drawn from a limited number of election years from a toy market with thin volume and limits on trader spending. With time, the IEM record could improve, and there is some suggestion that it has. Full-blown markets like Tradesports.com might in the end achieve an efficiency that so far has eluded the IEM. Additionally, studies like the present one can suggest improved strategies to traders, which in turn improve the efficiency of election markets.

Since our results are confined to a few runs of the toy Iowa market, some might claim a â€œso whatâ€ reaction. To such claimants, an important reminder is that the allegedly uncanny performance of the Iowa market has been touted as the primary evidence for the supposed superiority of election markets over the polls as an information source. The Iowa election marketâ€™s performance has not been so special after all. For now, our results suggest the need for much more caution and less naive cheerleading about election markets on the part of prediction market advocates.

NEXT: Justin Wolfers retorts to Bob Erikson.