#1. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the federal regulatory agency that oversees futures market activity, should establish safe-harbor rules for selected small-stakes markets. One limited safe harbor is the no-action letter, in which the CFTC market oversight staff confirms in writing that it will not recommend enforcement action if the recipient acts in specified ways. The only prediction market to receive a no-action letter (in 1992) is the Iowa Electronic Markets, which is run by professors at the University of Iowa and which initially focused on presidential elections. Although such no-action letters reduce the chances of legal action under other state and federal laws, they may not be adequate. We would therefore urge the CFTC to explore other approaches to ensuring safe harbors, for example, formal rules or guidance approved by the commission. We suggest that three types of entities be eligible for safe harbor treatment. The first would be not-for-profit research institutions, including universities, colleges and think tanks wishing to operate exchanges similar to the Iowa Electronic Markets. The second would be government agencies seeking to do research similar to that of nongovernmental research institutions. The third group would consist of private businesses and not-for-profits that are not primarily engaged in research, which would only be allowed to operate internal prediction markets with their employees or contractors. In all cases, markets would be limited to small-stakes contracts. Although the definition of small stakes is somewhat arbitrary, we use the term to mean an exchange in which the total amount of capital deposited by any one participant may not exceed some modest sum, perhaps something like $2,000 per year. The exchanges themselves would be not-for-profit but would be allowed to charge modest fees to recoup administrative and regulatory costs. Brokers and paid advisers would be barred, reducing the risks that contracts would be sold to inappropriate or vulnerable customers or that customers would be charged fees above the amounts needed to maintain the markets. Exchanges would be self-regulated, leaving them with the responsibility to make reasonable efforts to keep markets free from fraud and manipulation. For its part, the CFTC should allow contracts that price any economically meaningful event. This definition could allow for contracts on political events, environmental risks, or economic indicators, such as those offered by the Iowa Electronic Markets, but would presumably not include contracts on the outcomes of sports events.

The contracts qualifying under this safe harbor would also create opportunities for more efficient risk allocation. Although the small-stakes nature of these markets would necessarily limit their usefulness for hedging risk, they could serve as proofs of concept for larger-scale markets that could be developed under alternative regulatory arrangements. The CFTC should allow researchers to experiment with several aspects of prediction markets – fee structures, incentives against manipulation, liquidity requirements and the like – with the goal of improving their design. Prediction markets are in an early stage, and if their promise is to be realized, researchers should be given flexibility to learn what kinds of design are most likely to produce accurate predictions. Of course, exchanges would need to inform their customers so that they are aware of the risks and benefits of participating in these markets.

#2. Congress should support the CFTC’s efforts to develop prediction markets. To the extent that the CFTC incurs costs in promoting innovation, Congress should provide the necessary funding. More fundamentally, Congress should explore alternative ways of securing a legal framework for prediction markets if the CFTC’s existing authority proves inadequate. In particular, Congress should specify that a no-action letter, or similar mechanism, preempts overlapping state and federal anti-gambling laws. Because Congress did not intend the CFTC to regulate gambling, it is important to design new regulations so that socially valuable prediction markets easily qualify for the safe harbor but gambling markets do not.

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UPDATE: A great rebuttal here…

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THE MIDAS ORACLE TAKES:

- CALL TO ACTION: Let’s fight so that the CFTC allows the FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with “event markets”.

- In the for-profit vs not-for-profit debate, our prediction market luminaries, doctored by Bob, are on the wrong side of the issue.

- COMMENTS TO THE CFTC: What to expect from Tom W. Bell and Jason Ruspini

- A young economist rebuts the American Enterprise Institute.

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BACKGROUND INFO:

- CFTC’s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts… notably how they define “event markets”, how they are going to extend their “exemption” to other IEM-like prediction exchanges, and how they framed their questions to the public. Here are the comments sent to the CFTC.

- The Arnold & Porter lawyers explain the meaning of the CFTC’s concept release on “event markets”. — (PDF file)

- The Schulte & Roth & Zabel lawyers’ takes. — (PDF file)

- The Sullivan & Cromwell lawyers’ takes. — (PDF file)

- What Vernon Smith told the CFTC.

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APPENDIX:

Paul Wolfowitz’s profile at the American Enterprise Institute

- How the neo-cons drove the United States of America into the unecessary Iraq war

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Check that CFM page for updates. And contact me so I can make additions to the list. (I’ll then re-publish that updated list on Midas Oracle.)

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• Michael Abramowicz – Michael B. Abramowicz – (Law School, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Bernd H. Ankenbrand – Bernd Ankenbrand – (Lecturer, Witten/Herdecke University, Germany, E.U.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• James Annan – (Global Environment Modelling Research Program, Frontier Research Center for Global Change, Japan)
• Werner Antweiler – (UBC Election Stock Market, Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada)
• Kenneth J. Arrow – Kenneth Arrow – (Economics Department, Stanford University, California, U.S.A.)
• Tom W. Bell – Tom Bell – (Law School, Chapman University, California, U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Joyce E. Berg – Joyce Berg – Profile – (Iowa Electronic Markets, Accounting, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa, Iowa, U.S.A.)
• Richard Borghesi – (Finance, Texas State University at San Marcos, Texas, U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Kay-Yut Chen – (Information Services & Process Innovation Lab, HP Labs, HP, California, U.S.A.)
• Yiling Chen – (Micro-Economic and Social Systems, Yahoo! Research Labs, New York, U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Eric Crampton – (Department of Economics, University of Canterbury, New Zealand) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Ely Dahan – (Marketing, Anderson School, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.)
• Anita Elberse – (Marketing, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Massachusetts, U.S.A.)
• Leslie R. Fine – Leslie Fine – (Information Dynamics Lab, HP Labs, California, U.S.A.)
• Gary William Flake – Gary W. Flake – Gary Flake – (MicroSoft, U.S.A.)
• Robert Forsythe – (Dean, College of Business Administration, University of South Florida, Florida, U.S.A.) — Previously: (Economics, Iowa Electronic Markets, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa, Iowa, U.S.A.)
• Lance Fortnow – Lance J. Fortnow – (Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, McCormick School of Engineering, Northwestern University, Illinois, U.S.A.)
• Keith Jacks Gamble – Keith Gamble – (Economics (University of California at Berkeley) – California, U.S.A. — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Michael Gorham – (IIT Center for Financial Markets, Stuart School of Business, Illinois Institute of Technology, Illinois, U.S.A.) — Previously: (CFTC)
• Thomas S. Gruca – Thomas Gruca – Profile – (Iowa Electronic Markets, Marketing, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa, Iowa, U.S.A.)
• Refet Gurkaynak – (Department of Economics, Bilkent University, Turkey)
• Friedrich August Von Hayek — R.I.P. — The market as an information aggregation tool: The Use of Knowledge in Society —
• Robert W. Hahn – Robert Hahn – (Executive Director, Reg-Markets Center, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• James D. Hamilton – James Hamilton – (Department of Economics, University of California at San Diego – California, U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Robin Hanson – Robin D. Hanson – (Economics, James M. Buchanan Center, George Mason University, Virginia, U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• M. Todd Henderson – (Law School, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.)
• Chris Hibbert – (Software Architect, Zocalo Project Manager, California, U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Charles Holt – Charles A. Holt – (Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Virginia, U.S.A.)
• Bernardo A. Huberman – Bernardo Huberman – (Social Computing Lab, HP Labs, California, U.S.A.)
• Frédéric Koessler – (Economics, Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, France, E.U.)
• Anthony M. Kwasnica – Anthony Kwasnica – (Business Economics, Department of Insurance and Real Estate, Smeal College of Business Administration, Penn State University, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.)
• Nicolas Lambert – (Department of Computer Science, Stanford University, California, U.S.A.)
• John O. Ledyard – John Ledyard – (Economics and and Social Sciences, Division of Humanity and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, California, U.S.A.)
• Andrew Leigh – (Economics, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Australia)
• Steven Levitt – Steve Levitt – Steven D. Levitt – (Economics, Director of the Becker Center on Chicago Price Theory, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.)
• Saul Levmore – (Law School, University of Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.)
• Robert E. Litan – Robert Litan – (Vice President for Research and Policy, Kauffman Foundation, Kansas City, Missouri, U.S.A.)
• Thomas W. Malone – Thomas Malone – Tom Malone – (MIT Center for Collective Intelligence, Management, MIT Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts, U.S.A.)
• Charles F. Manski – Charles Manski – (College of Arts and Sciences, Norwestern University, Illinois, U.S.A.)
• Adam Meirowitz – (Department of Politics, Princeton University, New Jersey, U.S.A.)
• Paul Milgrom – (Department of Economics, Stanford University, California, U.S.A.)
• Tracy Mullen – (Information Sciences and Technology, Penn State University, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.)
• Forrest Nelson – Profile – (Iowa Electronic Markets, Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa, Iowa, U.S.A.)
• George R. Neumann – George Neumann – Profile – (Iowa Electronic Markets, Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa, Iowa, U.S.A.)
• Ryan Oprea – Profile – (Director of the LEEPS laboratory, Economics, University of California at Santa Cruz, California, U.S.A.)
• Gerhard Ortner – (University of Applied Sciences, Austria, E.U.)
• Marco Ottaviani – (Management and Strategy, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Illinois, U.S.A.) – Formerly: (Economics Department, London Business School, United Kingdom, E.U.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• David Paton – (Industrial Economics, Business School, Nottingham University, United Kingdom, E.U.)
• David M. Pennock – David Pennock – (Principal Research Scientist, Micro-Economic and Social Systems, Yahoo! Research Labs, New York, U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Charles R. Plott – Charles Plott – (Economics and and Social Sciences, Division of Humanity and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, California, U.S.A.)
• David Porter – (Economics and Finance, Chapman University, California, U.S.A.)
• Todd Proebsting – Todd A. Proebsting – (Microsoft & University of Arizona, U.S.A.)
• Russ Ray – (Finance, College of Business, University of Louisville, Kentucky, U.S.A.)
• Daniel Reeves – (Micro-Economic and Social Systems, Yahoo! Research Labs, New York, U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Paul W. Rhode – Paul Rhode – (US Economic History, College of Management, The University of Arizona, Arizona, U.S.A.) – Formerly: (University of North Carolina, North Carolina, U.S.A.)
• Thomas A. Rietz – Thomas Rietz – Profile – (Iowa Electronic Markets, Finance, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa, Iowa, U.S.A.)
• Richard Roll – (University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.)
• Thomas W. Ross – Thomas Ross – (UBC Election Stock Market, Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada)
• Rahul Sami – (School of Information, University of Michigan, Michigan, U.S.A.)
• Sam L. Savage – Sam Savage – (Consulting Professor, Stanford U., California, U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Thomas C. Schelling – Thomas Schelling – (Economics, School of Public Affair, University of Maryland, Maryland, U.S.A.)
• Emile Servan-Schreiber – (NewsFutures, New York City, New York, U.S.A. & Paris, France, E.U.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Robert J. Shiller – Robert Shiller – Profile – (Economics, Yale University, Connecticut, U.S.A.)
• Bernd Skiera – (Electronic Commerce, Goethe University, Germany, E.U.)
• Vernon L. Smith – Vernon Smith – (Economics, Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, California, U.S.A.)
• Erik Snowberg – (Stanford University, California, U.S.A.) — Soon at CalTech
• Peter Norman Sorensen – (Finance, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, E.U.)
• Martin Spann – (Marketing and Innovation, University of Passau, Germany, E.U.)
• Koleman Strumpf – Koleman S. Strumpf – (Economics, School of Business, University of Kansas, Kansas, U.S.A.) – Formerly: University of North Carolina, North Carolina, U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Cass Sunstein – Cass R. Sunstein – (Law School, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.)
• James Surowiecki – (The Wisdom Of Crowds) – (New York, U.S.A.)
• Paul C. Tetlock – Paul Tetlock – (Finance, Business School, University of Texas at Austin, Texas, U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Philip Tetlock – Philip E. Tetlock – (Leadership, University of California at Berkeley, California, U.S.A.)
• Hal R. Varian – Hal Varian – (Chief Economist, Google, California, U.S.A.) — Formerly: (Haas School of Business, Department of Economics, University of California at Berkeley, California, U.S.A.)
• Dorina Tila – (Economics, George Mason University, Virginia, U.S.A.)
• Leighton Vaughan-Williams – (Economics and Finance, Business School, Nottingham Trent University, United Kingdom, E.U.)
• Michael Wellman – Michael P. Wellman – (Computer Science and Engineering, University of Michigan, Michigan, U.S.A.)
• Justin Wolfers – Justin J. Wolfers – (Business and Public Policy, Wharton Business School, University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle
• Eric Zitzewitz – Eric W. Zitzewitz – (Economics, Dartmouth College, Massachusetts, USA) – Formerly: (Stanford University, California, U.S.A.) — Post Archives at Midas Oracle

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• George R. Neumann
• Forrest Nelson
• Robert Forsythe
• IEM

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Photo Credit: Doug Benton – FishEye – for Scientific American magazine – Abstract

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CHRONOLOGY & HISTORY: Prediction Markets Timeline

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Feel free to post a comment or contact me, and I’ll correct or add a factoid. Thanks.

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#1. Historical Prediction Markets

According to Paul Rhode and Koleman Strumpf, prediction markets almost never got it wrong forecasting the 19 presidential elections that took place from 1868 to 1940. (PDF)

#2. The three Iowa Electronic Markets founders (Robert Forsythe, Forrest Nelson and George Neumann)

“We ran our first market in 1988. We didn’t have regulatory approval at that point so we were restricted solely to the University of Iowa community. We had under 200 traders and under $5,000.” – [Robert Forsythe - PDF file]

- [CFTC's no-action letter to the IEM - 1992 - PDF file]

- [CFTC's no-action letter to the IEM - 1993 - PDF file]

#3. Robin Hanson

a) Robin Hanson set up and ran a rudimentary prediction exchange (a market board, PPT file) in January 24, 1989. The outcome to predict was the name of the winner of a Poker party.

b) Until evidence of the contrary, it seems that Robin Hanson was the first to set up and run a corporate prediction exchange —at Xanadu, Inc., in April 1989. See: A 1990 Corporate Prediction Market + Anonymity is important for employees trading on internal prediction markets.

Robin Hanson: “I started a market at Xanadu on cold fusion in April 1989. In May 1990, I started a market there on whether their product would be delivered before Deng died.”

c) Until evidence of the contrary, it seems that Robin Hanson was the first to set up and run a bunch of imagination-based prediction markets. See the Murder Mystery Evening described by Barney Pell —circa June 8, 1989.

d) Until evidence of the contrary, it seems that Robin Hanson was the first to write a paper on prediction markets created and existing primarily because of the information in their prices (as opposed to markets created primarily for speculation and hedging).

Could Gambling Save Science? – (Reply to Comments) – by Robin Hanson – 1990-07-00
Market-Based Foresight: a Proposal – by Robin Hanson – 1990-10-30
Idea Futures: Encouraging an Honest Consensus – (PDF) – by Robin Hanson – 1992-11-00

e) Robin Hanson godfathered the Foresight Exchange (created in 1994) and NewsFutures (created in 2000).

f) Robin Hanson invented the concepts of decision markets (PDF) and decision-aid markets.

g) Robin Hanson invented a new market design (for the 2000-2003′s Policy Analysis Market), the Market Scoring Rules, a mix between CDA and Scoring Rules —now in use for most enterprise prediction markets and public, play-money prediction exchanges. Note that MSR is mainly used in a one-dimension version, but many researchers are interested in its combinatorial version.

#4. Other Pioneering Public Prediction Exchanges (Betting Exchanges, Event Derivative Exchanges) and Inventors/Innovators/Entrepreneurs

a) The Foresight Exchange was founded on September 22, 1994 by Ken Kittlitz, Sean Morgan, Mark James, Greg James, David McFadzean and Duane Hewitt. The Foresight Exchange is a play-money prediction exchange (betting exchange) managed by an open group of volunteers. It pioneered user-created and user-managed, play-money prediction markets. Any person can join the Foresight Exchange and interact with the rest of the Web-based organization. An independent judge (independent from the owner of the claim) should be appointed among the volunteers. [Thus, it's not "DYI prediction markets".]

b) The Hollywood Stock Exchange was founded on April 12, 1996, by Max Keiser and Michael Burns. See the patent for the Virtual Specialist. For more info, see: Is HSX the “longest continuously operating prediction market”??? – REDUX

c) BetFair was founded in 1999 by Andrew Black and Edward Wray, and was launched in England in June 2000. As of today, BetFair is the world’s biggest prediction exchange (betting exchange, event derivative exchange).

d) NewsFutures was founded in March 2000 and launched in September 2000 in France and in April 2001 in the US by Emile Servan-Shreiber and Maurice Balick. See: NewsFutures Timeline. NewsFutures was the first exchange to let people buy or sell contracts for each side of a binary-outcome event. The advantage of this design is that it avoids the need for “shorting”, a notion that tends to confuse novice traders. NewsFutures later extend that approach to deal with n-ary outcome events while implementing automatic arbitrage.

e) TradeSports was launched in Ireland in 2002 by John Delaney. InTrade was later purchased and became a non-sports prediction exchange (betting exchange). As of today, InTrade is the biggest betting exchange on the North-American market —where betting exchanges are still illegal. As for TradeSports, it closed at the end of 2008, alas.

#5. The Policy Analysis Market Brouhaha

a) Robin Hanson was the main economist behind the 2000–2003 US DoD’s DARPA’s IAO’s FutureMAP–Policy Analysis Market project. (For this project, Robin Hanson invented a new market design, the Market Scoring Rules.) On July 28, 2003, two Democratic US Senators called for the termination of PAM, the the big media gave airtime to their arguments, and the US DOD quickly ended the IAO’s FutureMAP program.

b) The second branch of the 2000–2003 US DoD’s DARPA’s IAO’s FutureMAP program was handled by the Iowa Electronic Markets and was intended to predict the SARS pandemic. (This project later gave birth to IEM’s Influenza Prediction Market.)

#6. James Surowiecki’s The Wisdom Of Crowds

a) James Surowiecki’s book, The Wisdom Of Crowds, was published in 2004.

b) Impact of The Wisdom Of Crowds.

#7. Recent Public Prediction Exchanges (Betting Exchanges, Event Derivative Exchanges) and Inventors/Innovators/Entrepreneurs

a) US-based and US-regulated HedgeStreet was launched in 2004 by John Nafeh, Russell Andersson, and Ursula Burger. A designated contract market (DCM) and a registered derivatives clearing organization (DCO), HedgeStreet is subject to regulatory oversight by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). In November 2006, IG Group bought HedgeStreet for $6 million.

b) Inkling Markets was launched in March 2006 and co-pioneered (with CrowdIQ, which later bellied up) the concept of DIY, play-money prediction markets.

c) In September 2006, TradeSports-InTrade was the first prediction exchange (betting exchange, event futures exchange) to apply Chris Masse’s concept of X Groups. See: TradeSports-InTrade prediction markets on Bush approval ratings.

d) HubDub was launched in early 2008 and is the second most popular play-money prediction exchange, behind HSX.

#8. Enterprise Prediction Markets

a) Until evidence of the contrary, it seems that Robin Hanson was the first to set up and run a corporate prediction exchange —at Xanadu, Inc., in April 1989. See: A 1990 Corporate Prediction Market + Anonymity is important for employees trading on internal prediction markets.

b) In the 1996–1999 period, HP ran a series of internal prediction markets to forecast the sales of its printers.

c) Eli Lilly sponsored 10 public, industry-level prediction markets in April 2003 (on the NewsFutures prediction exchange).

d) Eli Lilly began using internal prediction markets in February 2004 (powered by NewsFutures).

e) Google‘s Bo Cowgill published about their use of internal prediction markets in October 2005.

f) Since then, many companies selling software services for enterprise prediction markets have been created.

#9. Disputes Between Traders And Exchanges

a) The scandal of the North Korean Missile prediction market that erupted in July 2006 is, as of today, the biggest scandal that rocked the field of prediction markets.

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—

Executive Summary

Prediction markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the outcome of an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election. Using these markets as forecasting tools could substantially improve decision making in the private and public sectors. We argue that U.S. regulators should lower barriers to the creation and design of prediction markets by creating a safe harbor for certain types of small stakes markets. We believe our proposed change has the potential to stimulate innovation in the design and use of prediction markets throughout the economy, and in the process to provide information that will benefit the private sector and government alike.

Introduction

Prediction markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the outcome of an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election, the release date for new software, or the action taken by the Federal Reserve on short-term interest rates. A key benefit is that the market price of these contracts can potentially provide more accurate forecasts of future events than other methods. Using these markets as forecasting tools could substantially improve decision making in the private and public sectors. They also can help manage risk more efficiently. It is precisely because prediction markets have great potential that we think the government should facilitate rather than hinder the introduction of these markets.

There are significant regulatory barriers to establishing prediction markets in the United States, in part because they are potentially subject to gambling laws. We argue that U.S. regulators should lower barriers to the creation and design of prediction markets by creating a safe harbor for certain types of small stakes markets. We believe our proposed change has the potential to stimulate innovation in the design and use of prediction markets throughout the economy, and in the process to provide information that will benefit the private sector and government alike.

[...]

Conclusion

We believe prediction markets can significantly improve decision making in both the private and public sectors. One of the clear benefits of allowing small stakes, non-profit markets to operate would be the greater use of prediction markets to inform both public and private decision making. A second benefit would be that access to better information could promote greater transparency and accountability in decision making. A third benefit might be that other countries and regions would promote prediction markets with more sensible regulation. Finally, we think there would be benefits from the development of new knowledge on how to design prediction markets.

We are aware that Congress did not intend the CFTC to regulate gambling and we believe that it is important to design this safe harbor in such a fashion that socially valuable prediction markets can get in, but gambling markets cannot.

Prediction markets have great potential for improving economic welfare and the decisions of private and public institutions alike. To help achieve that potential, the regulatory impediments to the use of prediction markets in the U.S. should be lowered. Here, we have suggested one approach for reducing those regulatory barriers.

AEI-Brookings Joint Center – The views in this paper represent those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the institutions with which they are affiliated.

Kenneth J. Arrow – Stanford University

Robert Forsythe – University of South Florida

Michael Gorham – Illinois Institute of Technology

Robert Hahn – AEI-Brookings Joint Center

Robin Hanson – George Mason University

Daniel Kahneman – Princeton University

John O. Ledyard – California Institute of Technology

Saul Levmore – University of Chicago

Robert Litan – AEI-Brookings Joint Center

Paul Milgrom – Stanford University

Forrest D. Nelson – University of Iowa

George R. Neumann – University of Iowa

Charles R. Plott – California Institute of Technology

Thomas C. Schelling – University of Maryland

Robert J. Shiller – Yale University

Vernon L. Smith – George Mason University

Erik Snowberg – Stanford University

Cass R. Sunstein – University of Chicago

Paul C. Tetlock – University of Texas at Austin

Philip E. Tetlock – University of California at Berkeley

Hal R. Varian – University of California at Berkeley

Marco Ottaviani – London Business School

Justin Wolfers – University of Pennsylvania

Eric Zitzewitz – Stanford University

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Previous: Statement on Prediction Markets – by Robert Hahn – 2007-05-07