In the conclusion of their introduction, Robert Hahn and Paul Tetlock wrote that they want their readers to contemplate the idea that prediction markets could make a “big” difference and “revolutionize public- and private-sector decision-making”. Well, 4 years later, it is clear that those big dreams didn’t pan out. Not a single mass media outlet has praised the public prediction markets for their work on the 2008 US presidential election (I am taking about a post-mortem analysis about Election Day, not the primaries). Not a single one. (Not even Justin Wolfers.) And the number of corporations using enterprise prediction markets is still minute. The thinkers who wrote this book (“Information Markets”) all made the mistake to put the emphasis on accuracy instead of efficiency. That was the foundation flaw. We should reset and reboot the field of prediction markets.

Previously: The truth about prediction markets

July 4th 2008
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st Street NW
Washington, DC 20581
U.S.A.

Attention: Office of the Secretariat

RE: “Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts”

To Whom it May Concern:

It is an honour for me as Chief Executive Officer of Intrade the Prediction Market Limited (“Intrade”) to provide price discovery information on thousands of event markets free of charge to notable institutions such as yourselves at the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the U.S. Navy, the Federal Reserve Banks of New York, Richmond, and Chicago, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the American Enterprise Institute – Brookings Joint Centre, CATO Institute, and the Bank of England. We have similarly supplied our price discovery event market information to political organisations, students and staff at every Ivy League College, and students and staff at over 50 universities worldwide.

We estimate that over 300 global media businesses such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, The Financial Times, The Los Angles Times, Chicago Tribune, Economist, Bloomberg, Reuters, Forbes, Time, Fortune, CNN, CNBC, Fox, ABC and others have used Intrade event market information.

Investment firms on Wall Street, and the other major financial centres of the world, have solicited and been provided with Intrade price discovery event market information. The above lists are not exhaustive.

Further, Intrade provides free real-time transparent price discovery event market information to millions of people from the general public. While Intrade serves a global community and has registered members from 162 countries, our 82,000 plus membership are predominantly resident in the United States. The predictive probability information on event markets that we supply to the general public is both intuitive and readily and rapidly assimilated without the necessity for paid subscriptions or a financial education.

Intrade has been transparent and industrious, as have others, in nurturing the development of the event market industry. Intrade as a profit-maximizing business does of course expect to significantly benefit from its dedicated employment. However the benefits to society at large will be equivalently great from Intrade’s focus on event markets.

While U.S. institutions and society benefit from Intrade’s services it is perversely unclear as to whether Intrade, and indeed myself, are considered persona gratis by the United States. However, we are more optimistic than ever that Intrade as the de facto leader in the event market industry sector will soon have the ability to stand on a firm, transparent and appropriate regulatory footing thanks to the process that the CFTC has accelerated through their request for comments on how to regulate event markets.

Not since the Industrial Revolution have the risks and their commensurate opportunities of dealing with great uncertainty and rapid change that we all face been so high. Much of this change and uncertainty is technology driven, with most countries, organizations and households accepting, in theory at least, that they must change.

The recent implosion of credit markets is just one example of the great uncertainty and potential for events impacting citizens of the United States and farther afield.

To adapt to a changing world in an orderly and optimal manner requires access to information, robust decision-making processes and the courage and determination to grasp the opportunities that a dynamic world offers. The CFTC and indeed the United States itself has access to the information, the decisionmaking expertise, and a historical track record of determination and accomplishment.

But the relentless change that we all face will be best dealt with if we have the best information, in real time, to reduce uncertainty, risk and stress. Event market information can and has increased the quality and timeliness of decision-making. Event markets can act as a democratic mechanism that gives voice to the broadest range of event stakeholders and, in so doing, aggregates a peerless information set. By encouraging the aggregation, distribution, validation and appropriate use of the best event market information, society will benefit even more than it does today from event markets. To do otherwise than to encourage event market development would be a societal travesty.

The dynamic nature of the world that we live in, where the pace and systematic impact of change seem to be increasing, will be greatly aided if event markets are given a certain regulatory footing in the United States and other jurisdictions. This, coupled with the fact that markets excel in aggregating information and estimating the value of a product or the likelihood of an event occurring, testifies to the logic that the price discovery that event markets produce should now be encouraged by the CFTC.

The CFTC by clarifying the status of event markets now will be of great service to Americans. In this regard the CFTC has an important opportunity and one that the CFTC seem very positively biased to grasp in light of its statements, such as…
- The CFTC state on their website that they have “An Important Mission in the Ever-Changing World of Finance.”
- “The CFTC assures the economic utility of the futures markets by encouraging their competitiveness and efficiency.”
- “The CFTC is also mandated to enable futures markets to serve the important function of providing a means for price discovery and offsetting price risk.”

CFTC Acting Chairman Walt Lukken, when announcing the execution of a memorandum of understanding with the SEC on March 11, 2008, stated: “The regulatory structure that oversees the U.S. financial markets embrace innovation, growth and competition in the global marketplace, without compromising market integrity, customer protection and the public good.”

The above statements, in addition to the Concept Release by the CFTC, are very encouraging. It is specifically this price discovery and risk management mandate that justify the CFTC’s embrace of event markets, should justification be needed.

Intrade has listed 211,607 individual event markets and aggregated and distributed predictive event market information on subjects such as Arctic Oil Drilling, Climate Change, Commodities, Company Earnings, Constitutional Referenda, Currencies, Disease Outbreaks, Earthquakes, Economic Numbers, Entertainment Awards and Earnings, Indices, Euro Adoption, Federal Reserve Announcements, Gas Prices, Gasoline Tax, Geo Political Events, Homeland Security in the U.S., Mergers & Acquisitions, Social Security Reform and U.S. Taxes. This list is far from exhaustive.

No other platform has listed more event markets than Intrade. To the best of our knowledge and belief the event market leadership position that is often ascribed to Intrade is wholly justified from a review of the breadth of the event markets listed and information we have aggregated and distributed. Information, as noted above, that is used by governmental agencies, businesses, academics, and the general public to reduce uncertainty and in so doing increase the speed and quality of decisions being made.

While the obvious benefits to the general public in terms of price discovery and decision-making of some Intrade event markets will be more obvious than others, we can make robust arguments that all have the potential to serve the dual purpose of price discovery and a mechanism for offsetting price risk.

The CFTC by clarifying its position on event markets will give all event market stakeholders valuable direction on market and participant eligibility. Whether used at the federal government level or by the individual citizen, event markets provide a magnificent opportunity to use price discovery information in managing economic risk. Here are just a few examples from the 211,607 event markets we have listed.

Intrade has listed markets on the probability of the Homeland Security alert level being above or below a certain level at a certain date. “The United States spends roughly $100 billion per year on homeland security” according to the White House. The costs of migrating from a threat level of “Guarded” to a threat level of “Elevated” have very significant costs for the government, business, and society. By utilizing event market price discovery information on the probability that the alert level will be at a certain threshold on a given date, the economic consequences of the threat level can be managed in a more insightful way.

Jason Ruspini has suggested markets to Intrade on whether the marginal personal income tax rate for single U.S. filers will be equal to or greater than a range of specified percentages for tax years 2009, 2010 and 2011. Having spoken directly to a number of tax paying citizens from the United States, the transparency of this information undoubtedly serves a public good. Is there a Unites States resident taxpayer who will read this comment who is not interested in the taxes she or he will pay next year?

On a more macro level, Intrade has listed a market on whether the cold fusion experiment of Dr. Yoshiaki Arata will be replicated in a peer-reviewed scientific journal before 31 December 2009. The possible impact of such a development to our energy needs little hyperbolae. The fact that President Bush requested $25 billion for the U.S. Department of Energy’s 2009 Budget speaks to the importance of maximum transparency in such matters. It may also be interesting to note that $493 million of the $25 billion was allocated to Fusion Energy Services. Does transparency to such price discovery information serve positively the United States and others? Absolutely!

Professor Koleman Strumpf suggested that Intrade list a market on whether Blu-Ray Disc sales will outnumber HD-DVD disc sales in the United States in 2008. If an organisation’s employees or profits are potentially influenced by the outcome of this event, as were Toshiba’s, the main supporter of HDDVD, then access to such information is both valuable and gives opportunity for welfare maximisation.

Intrade has also listed, at the request of University of Westminster Business School, markets on whether the number of violent crimes committed in 2010 will be lower than those committed in 2007. Intrade has additionally listed at the request of a United States resident member of our platform a market on the impact of U.S. Government debt if a non-Democrat is elected president of the United States in 2008.

Professor Eric Zitzewitz, Professor Robin Hanson, Professor Justin Wolfers and others at the forefront of event market academia have all suggested event markets to Intrade in the past that have been listed and which provided event market information both for academic study and business and general public use.

Imagine if you were a resident of a state such as Florida that is frequently exposed to severe storms and how crucial information on the likelihood of a storm hitting your state can be if your business, family and friends are likely to be impacted by such an occurrence. Intrade lists event markets on such
eventualities.

The event markets listed on Intrade provide price discovery information on whether an earthquake measuring 9.0 or more on the Richter Scale will happen anywhere in the world in 2008; whether Avian Flu H5N1 is confirmed in the United States in 2008; whether the U.S. carries out an overt attack on North Korea; or even whether Robert Mugabe departs his presidency in 2008. These significant events are highly relevant to millions of people in the United States and elsewhere.

President Bush stated in an address on global climate change that: “This is a challenge that requires a 100 percent effort; ours, and the rest of the world’s.” It seems to us impossible to make a “100 percent effort” to address the challenge of climate change without using event markets to aggregate information, such as that provided by Intrade’s market on whether 2008 will be one of the warmest years ever recorded.

All of the markets cited above give information on the probability of the event occurring. Some of the information aggregated and distributed by Intrade has been more predictive than other. The predictive accuracy of Intrade’s event markets and event markets generally have been cited and studied extensively by academics and others including, but not limited to Professor Robin Hanson, Professor Charles Noussair, Professor David Paton, Professor Leighton Vaughan Williams, Dr. David Pennock, Professor Eric Zitzewitz, Professor Mark Perry, Professor Erik Snowberg, Professor Marco Ottaviani, Professor Justin Wolfers, Professor Koleman Strumpf, and Professor Paul Tetlock.

Nearly all leading academics, not known for their attraction to unanimity, have publicly supported event markets. A great majority of these academics have been supplied with Intrade market data in the past, a service that Intrade intends to continue, for all study leads to an increase in transparency and understanding of event markets. It seems that the leading event market academics make no distinction between the benefits derived from academic owned markets like Iowa Electronic Markets and commercial market platforms like Intrade.

Yet many academics, with some notable exceptions, do temper their policy prescription to suggest a “safe harbor” for academic sites where research might be more generally available. As noted above Intrade has gladly supplied its event market data, typically free of charge to most of the leading prediction market academics and their students, and we are committed to encouraging the future study of event markets by continuing to supply our event market data free of charge or at very deep discounts. The academics that study event markets do a great service in developing our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of event markets. Some commentators suggest that market liquidity and breadth typically benefit all event market stakeholders. Thus far commercial platforms like Intrade seem to be providing the greatest depth and breadth in event markets.

As Intrade has been a staunch supporter of event market academic study, and supplies greater depth and liquidity in its event markets than any other platform, it seems strange not to be a preferred purveyor. Perhaps the predominant reason many academics have held back from advocating and treating all event markets alike is a sense that initiatives to clarify or unwind the legislation restraining the optimal development of event markets is unlikely to be achievable. It seems many academics and commentators suggest a slow bureaucratic and pragmatic caution rather than focus on the optimal result. While the optimal result may be more challenging to achieve, for consistency, for better price discovery for the benefit of all, as well as for the development of Intrade, we encourage CFTC to apply common goals, objectives and standards for all participants.

While some evidence and event markets have highlighted that event markets do not always provide robust predictive information, the preponderance of the research suggests that event markets have both the ability and track record of providing the best available information upon which decisions may be based or optimised. Of course the uncertain regulatory status of event markets constrains the development of liquidity, price discovery and by logical extension societal benefits.

Intrade has received testimonials from numerous U.S. regulated businesses and private citizens which state they would like to trade on certain event markets but are unable due to the regulatory uncertainty. Therefore, unless and until event markets are given a certain status they will not develop to their full potential.

Based on the above and comments by many others, some of whom have been mentioned by name in this comment, the price discovery mandate that the CFTC has can only be served if event markets are embraced.

In terms of offsetting price risk and the opportunity for hedging, the overwhelming majority of markets listed by Intrade can easily be seen to have underlying economic implications and risks. For example, U.S. tax rate changes, a negative geopolitical event, an increase in the threat level to homeland security and the associated costs of a higher threat level, or indeed Social Security reform all have massive economic justifications across society.

As with the CFTC’s price discovery mandate, it is impossible for us to imagine how risks can be optimally assessed and managed without the status of event markets being clarified.

The CFTC are also sensitive to retaining the competitiveness of futures markets and retaining “competition in the global marketplace”. There has been much written about the United States losing its edge in global financial markets. Often cited is that burdensome and inflexible regulations, most notably the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation passed by Congress in 2002, are driving business to London, Hong Kong, Frankfurt and elsewhere. In this regard, the CFTC has an opportunity to be a world first and embrace event markets. In so doing the CFTC will ensure the United States’ leadership position is encouraged for the important and growing event market industry.

The greatest challenge in bringing about an appropriate and successful embrace of event markets by the CFTC is unlikely to be identifying and agreeing that the public good will be served, or that risks may be better managed. The challenge for the CFTC may well be the uncertainties relating to legal and jurisdiction issues. In these matters there are experts far better versed than Intrade to opine.

The financial events of the last six months in which virtually the entire world financial system stopped functioning to a greater or lesser extent has highlighted what can happen when many of the world’s largest financial institutions make concurrent similar mistakes. Such systemic contagion has led commentators to suggest a more fundamental approach to how and what we regulate. Where event markets are concerned we are hopeful that this is the case and that the level of regulation is such that the evolving stage of the event market industry is not stifled.

We are proud to be at the forefront of the development of the event market industry. We are determined to continue providing the best information on relevant event markets to the widest audience. We wish to solidify our regulatory position in the U.S. and elsewhere. We strongly encourage the CFTC to clarify the situation with regard to event markets for the benefit of all, even if there are costs to Intrade. We are highly optimistic that the CFTC will grasp this opportunity to benefit all society and we wish to serve our own most important role in an industry niche that we have been privileged to help shape.

Respectfully Submitted on behalf of the entire Intrade Team by
John Delaney
Chief Executive Officer

CC to Fax 202.418.5521 and e-mail: secretary@cftc.gov.

1. “Intrade … isn’t just an entertaining Web site. It is the latest iteration of one of the most important economic developments of modern times.” David Leonhardt, Economics Reporter, The New York Times, February 14, 2007

2. Costs of regulation are high in the U.S., “that’s a key reason the leading commercial prediction market, Intrade, is based in Ireland” Prof Paul Tetlock, Wall Street Journal, May 11th 2007

3. “On Dec. 11, 2003, Intrade’s contract on Saddam Hussein’s capture suddenly began to move. … Two days later, Saddam was in custody.” Bill Saporito, Time Magazine, October 24, 2005

4. “At FORTUNE we often write about the latest hot company, but it’s rare that we get a chance to introduce you to an entirely new market… Intrade is the only efficient market system around for investing in, well, almost anything” Andy Serwer, Managing Editor, Fortune, August 8, 2005

5. 78% of traffic to Intrade.com in the period 1 January to 30 June was from the U.S.

6. “Intrade futures market ~ the greatest time-saving invention of this century.” John Tierney The New York Times

7. The Uncertainty Stress Scale: its development and psychometric properties. Can J Nurs Res. 1994 Fall;26(3):15-30, PMID: 7889446

8. As of June 30 2008

9. For many people, Intrade is the king of the prediction markets.” Stephen Dubner, Freakonomics, The New York Times July 5 2007

10. http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/sect5.pdf.

11. http://feedroom.businessweek.com/?fr_story=5a3aa8086dbd52b35ae21c7f5abe94f85fa0a8ab&rf=sitemap.

12. http://www.energy.gov/news/5920.htm

13. “Want straight answers on what will happen in politics and current events? Answers without partisan bias or wishful thinking? You can’t do much better than the prices at Intrade.” Professor Robin Hanson, Professor of Economics, George Mason University

14. “My forecast? Prediction markets will become ever more important to business and public policy. And Intrade are running the most interesting markets around.” Professor Justin Wolfers

15. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html

16. “Analysts can debate about a recession as much as they want, but talk is cheap. It’s great to have [Intrade] futures trade where people put money behind their beliefs!” Professor Mark J. Perry, University of Michigan-Flint

17. http://www.international-economy.com/TIE_Sp07_Baker.pdf and http://knowledge.emory.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1015

18. “Regulatory Underkill,” Arthur Levitt Jr., Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2008

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NEXT: More from John Delaney about regulations

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Given the political implications of the rise in commodity prices, this is not the best environment in which to begin regulating markets like election contracts, but the consensus that seems to be building on the relevant questions is rather auspicious. Hedgestreet and I have presented similar legal and regulatory frameworks to allow for at least the types of election contracts we are familiar with through sites like Intrade. Given Hedgestreet’s vigorous and incisive comments, I regret not having argued more for the desirability of non-intermediated exchanges.

In their focus, however, Hedgestreet steered clear of the gaming pre-emption questions and did not present a comprehensive and general framework for event markets. In that respect, their broaching of the CFTC’s plenary option authority opens more questions than it answers, but several interesting and important markets could perhaps be traded without answering all such questions.

I encourage Hedgestreet to begin working with the NFA to develop the infrastructure necessary for the types of trading prohibitions that we each described in our comments. I encourage the CFTC to act decisively in light of the self-evident and massive value of certain event markets — even with the current political pressures, which are mainly relevant to event markets on a superficial level. Perhaps if the CFTC deems that an exercise of emergency powers is necessary at some point, that would be an appropriate day to also make a decision on event contracts public.

We are at a specific point where a little bit of additional regulation might cause an explosion in legal prediction markets, and possibly soon. As a libertarian, I generally dislike regulation, and of course it’s true, pretty much by definition, that over-regulation is bad, but I don’t believe that to be the most effective message for this comment process and the unique opportunity it presents.

Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st St. N.W.
Washington DC 20581
Attention: Office of the Secretariat

Re: Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts

JURISDICTION AND EVENT MARKETS IN GENERAL

Given the explicit statutory definitions of “excluded” and “exempt” commodities, it is reasonable to conclude that the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has jurisdiction over all exchange-traded event markets. That is, if an “occurrence, extent of occurrence or contingency” does not meet the additional “beyond the control” and “economic consequence” criteria, then contracts on such events should be considered exempt commodities. While currently all exempt commodities are associated with a deliverable other than cash, the open-ended definition of “exempt commodity” considered alongside the definitions of “commodity” and “excluded commodity” in 7 U.S.C. § 1a imply that contracts on events that are not beyond the control of participants or do not involve an outcome of economic consequence are exempt commodities.

This conclusion presents enforcement issues that the CFTC may wish to avoid, such as being obligated to pursue actions against exchanges offering contracts based on the outcome of sporting events. Unfortunately, without further statutory clarification, this conclusion seems like the most defensible one, based on the letter, if not the intent, of the law.

That said, until statutory clarification is attained, given the purposes and history of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), it would be appropriate for the CFTC to only assert jurisdiction over those event contracts satisfying “economic consequence” criteria, which would include the price discovery aspect of the former economic purpose test. An interpretation to this effect by the CFTC would not be inconsistent with the text of the CEA, and would best serve to minimize the burden on interstate commerce. This policy decision would effectively reconstitute the pre-Commodity Futures Modernization Act economic purpose test for event contracts in a way that avoids unwanted enforcement issues. Such a decision would be unlikely to meet significant resistance until such time that further statutory certainty is forthcoming.

The CFTC would be free to classify such contracts as either excluded or exempt commodities depending on their susceptibility to manipulation, before or after special trading prohibitions are in place. Although the anti-manipulation requirements that apply to exempt commodities are directed towards price manipulation, a fortiori they must also apply to outcome manipulation.¹

The CFTC is free to determine what qualifies as “economic consequence.” As with the economic purpose test, significant hedging and price discovery functions would comprise the principal criteria.² Regarding the latter, since event derivatives have no corresponding “cash” markets, the origination of prices that may improve economic decisions is all the more desirable in these cases. Furthermore, events that may only directly affect a group of private individuals may also have a strong bearing on commercial decision-making. Note that some general events and measures, as categorized and listed by the CFTC in its Concept Release, do in fact correspond to economic measures.³ Even if these events do not predictably correlate with asset prices, they may have predictable effects on market volatility. For example, from 1980 through present, the annualized weekly volatility of the S&P 500 in weeks in which a presidential or mid-term election took place was 19.97%, vs. 15.34% for all other weeks.⁴ It is difficult and ultimately undesirable to provide a quantitative recommendation for a bright-line demarcation between those markets that would satisfy an economic consequence criterion and those that would not. However, if a significant statistical test can easily be found that includes the price series of a more familiar asset, and has a logical basis, we can reasonably say that such events are associated with an economic consequence. In many cases the relevant time series may be unavailable, but in those cases the applicability of a proposed event market to other assets may be obvious. For example, consider a market predicting the likelihood of: (1) ethanol-related legislation, and its relationship to corn prices, or (2) offshore drilling legislation, and its relationship to oil prices, or (3) an attack on Iran, and its relationship to oil prices, or (4) future tax rates, and its relationship to municipal bond prices. In such cases, no quantitative test is necessary. In other cases, we may have moderately strong reasons to suspect that a given event or measure has an impact on asset prices, as we do with demographic trends, but those effects may be difficult to measure empirically.

Many potential markets may improve decision-making for a particular business, but have little bearing on the broader economy and asset prices in general. Examples of these markets include those predicting: (1) the revenue of a particular product, published title, film or performance series, (2) the launch or completion date of a particular product or project, and (3) the success of a particular approach applied to certain problem. The CFTC may find that only broad-based events or measures affecting an entire population, industry or significant percentage thereof would satisfy the economic consequence criteria. This would be nothing new, as commodity derivatives were not intended to be specialized insurance contracts. Such narrow questions also present issues from a manipulation and insider-trading perspective. In aggregate, these sorts of questions are quite relevant to the economy and will at times reflect broad trends, but may be more appropriately served by over-the-counter arrangements or riskless information aggregation, despite the obvious advantages of market incentives.

Contracts satisfying economic consequence criteria need not be approved for listing by the CFTC, though it is hoped that guidelines will be made public and remain flexible. At the limit, the CFTC will recognize that even a purely speculative market might serve an economic purpose in reducing portfolio variance.

Additionally:

The CFTC might levy a special fee on regulated event contracts to recoup expenditures related to a trading prohibition facility and other special demands on resources.

It may be required that exchanges pay interest on binary event contract collateral in order to reduce price distortions near extreme prices (100% and 0%). In illiquid markets, such distortions could be used to disguise transfers of money between anonymous participants.

The CFTC should welcome Securities and Exchange Commission opinion on contracts based on events like earnings and dividend announcements, a group of which might begin to replicate a security. Whenever a market is proposed that reflects the cash flow of a particular business or property, this opinion may be relevant.

To the extent that they subsequently conform to the CEA and CFTC policy, amnesty for any past violations should be considered with respect to Intrade and similar exchanges that have operated legally in their domestic jurisdictions.

ELECTION AND POLICY EVENT CONTRACTS

Election and policy event markets are within the jurisdiction of the CFTC based on the letter and spirit of the CEA. These markets represent the largest reasonably predictable yet unhedgeable risk facing businesses and the public. The regulation of such markets follows from the history of enlightened, flexible innovation exemplified by the CFTC. Because of their importance, election and policy event contracts naturally involve special consideration, although only in the course of satisfying the CEA.

Considering election contracts:

Trading prohibitions should be established such that candidates and proxies cannot participate due to their ability to determine the outcome of the contract. In addition to adhering to the “beyond the control” requirement of excluded commodities and general anti-manipulation precepts, the CFTC will want to consider to what extent such prohibitions might be expanded to act as insider trading restrictions similar in form to those of 7 U.S.C. § 13(f) or the proposed H.R. 2341.⁵ Especially given the all-or-nothing nature of many event contracts, this might be desirable in order to provide for fair and equitable trading.⁶

Upon the death of a candidate, the candidate’s contracts and those of all competitors must settle on the last known price before the event. A new set of contracts reflecting the new set of candidates could subsequently be offered.⁷

Analogous rules could be applied to policy and legislative contracts where appropriate. These rules, either directly administered by the CFTC and related associations, and/or required of exchanges, would firmly address outcome manipulation.

Because of their importance and sensitivity, these contracts also require special measures to ensure against price manipulation. However, it is important to note that election and policy markets have typically been traded as binary event options. Such contracts expire at a specific time according to a well-defined objective event and in that way are more resistant to manipulation than futures and perpetuities, the prices of which are unbound in one direction and always open to interpretation based on unobservable factors and developments in related markets. At the same time, the relative detachment of event contracts from the web of more familiar asset prices may make manipulation more difficult to prove.

As would be expected, large trader lists could be maintained and closely followed. A more powerful option is the enforcement of extraordinarily low position limits, which would greatly reduce the potential of price manipulation. At the same time, position limits should respect outstanding risks participants may have and be otherwise unable to hedge, as with traditional hedging and speculative limits. Low position limits also address trader protection concerns if such contracts were to be offered in a non-intermediated fashion. Leverage might likewise be limited. Several tiers of opt-out protection could be available to traders of various capitalization and expertise. Contracts might also be restricted to limit orders in order to curb short-term feedback trading.

Election and policy contracts ought to be restricted to domestic accounts only. This will avoid possible extradition problems where disciplinary action is required. In the case of event contracts that may reflect tax rates, this restriction will also determine that the Department of the Treasury will not lose revenue on a net basis.⁸

FLEXIBLE LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION

Instead of, or in addition to, claiming jurisdiction over some event markets, the CFTC has at its disposal a range of public interest exemptions, including some that interpret the 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)3(K)⁹ qualification clause liberally in order to include participants who might not normally trade in traditional futures and options markets. From my perspective, such exemptions may allow for a more flexible development of event markets in a less heavily-regulated environment. For example, it might allow for a contract in research science claims where trader-researchers capable of determining the outcome are not readily identifiable, or provide for trading in the sorts of narrow, business-specific questions previously mentioned. From the CFTC’s perspective, a public interest exemption may be desirable in order to avoid making a firm jurisdictional claim. However, the outcome of this comment process should be a decisive policy statement from the CFTC, not a sequence of ad-hoc actions. It is hoped that any future public interest exemptions would be offered alongside a substantial list of requirements and guidelines that would at least signal jurisdiction over a class of event markets possessing certain characteristics. Legal certainty is perhaps the most important outcome in this process, and it is not desirable for the CFTC to extend exemptions in a manner that leaves its jurisdiction completely ambiguous with respect to the markets so exempted.

This leaves aside the question of who may operate such markets. If exempted exchanges are to operate for profit, a jurisdictional statement from the CFTC is all the more necessary in order to ensure their legal standing. Exemptions directed at non-profits may be superfluous from a perspective of legal certainty, especially if such exchanges only offer trading in States where the predominant factor test holds.

The CEA allows that public interest exemptions may be issued for specified time periods. The CFTC may wish to consider to what extent exemptive or no-action letters with renew-by dates attached might be a useful tool in light of evolving legal conditions and technologies.

Note that theoretically the CFTC could also assert jurisdiction over all event markets and then direct no-action letters to the finite list of sports and gaming exchanges as a facility to repudiate jurisdiction over such markets. Typically, exempting markets formed principally for speculation would be considered against the public interest. However, if the CFTC finds no satisfactory way under the CEA to take jurisdiction over only those event markets that are associated with economic consequences, no-actioning sports and gaming exchanges would be in the public interest on a net basis, and would best promote interstate commerce. Furthermore, in some cases such exchanges operate under their own regulatory bodies and protections. It is also seldom that such exchanges allow for leveraged trading by beginner participants. In general, most gaming takes place via over-the-counter transactions.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST

I have neglected to argue for event markets in terms of the public interests they promote as these facts have been covered by others and have no doubt been obvious to the CFTC for a long time. I will only note some cases that are more subtle:

Information and estimates can be revealed in conditional form, as in the “decision markets” hosted on Intrade.¹⁰ One such market pays 100% if a Democrat is elected President in 2008 and the national debt rises in the calendar year preceding October 2011. Since the probability of the former event is also available on Intrade, by P(A | B) = P(A & B) / P(B), we can say that the probability of a Democratic president leading to a rise in the national debt is the decision market price divided by the election market price. This type of market is thus able to predict the result of electoral or legislative decisions, and different decisions can be so compared. With this in mind, consider that while prediction markets are usually described as ways to aggregate information, they are likely also useful in terms of collective problem-solving, even in cases where all information is transparent.

In terms of risk-sharing, eventually the utility of political event markets might begin to address some well-known problems with representative government. Consider the typical special interest problem in which a few relatively well-funded individuals would gain heavily by a particular piece of legislation such as an industry subsidy, and so will lobby heavily for it. Even if the legislation is not in the public interest, the costs will be distributed over so many tax payers that they will not care to argue against it, and most will not even realize what’s happening. When mature legislative and public policy markets are in place: (1) the dispersed interests will have the recourse of hedging against policy they dislike, (2) special interests will also have the option of hedging their legislative fortunes, which might lead to an overall reduction in lobbying, and (3) legislators may find compromises to be easier, since interests would be able to voluntarily “meet each other half way,” with price being the arbitrator. This could ease political log-jams, making law-making itself more flexible and efficient. Sensible yet otherwise politically infeasible measures such as unwinding entrenched subsidies could be made viable.

Even if iterations are required, the outcome of this comment process should be a clear statutory interpretation and policy statement from the CFTC regarding event markets. The CFTC should also publish self-certification guidelines for those markets that it determines are within its jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction and/or a public interest exemption framework is determined, it should not be ambiguous whether, for example, a contract based on a presidential election would be approved by the CFTC in principle.

There is good deal of apprehension among those who study prediction markets that regulation will stifle innovation. In truth, exchange requirements may not be as onerous as they are often portrayed, and in most cases are perfectly appropriate. A related, implied fear is that the CFTC may not approve certain contracts such as those on election and legislative events that undeniably possess economic purpose due only to their political sensitivity and considerations of the CFTC’s source of authorization and funding. I hope that this process will assuage such fears. I encourage the CFTC to act decisively and comprehensively in accordance with its purposes.

Sincerely,
Jason Ruspini

Footnotes:

¹ For example, a market on infrequent terrorist attacks would not be approved for the simple reason that outcome manipulators could not reliably be identified beforehand.
² cf. Robert Hahn and Paul Tetlock, “A New Approach for Regulating Information Markets,” AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper (December 2004).
³ Justin Wolfers and Eriz Zitzewitz, “Using Markets to Inform Policy: The Case of the Iraq War,” NBER Working Paper (June 2004).
Justin Wolfers, Erik Snowberg and Eric Zitzewitz. “Partisan Impacts on the Economy: Evidence from Prediction Markets and Close Elections,” NBER Working Paper (March 2006).
Erik Snowberg, Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz, “Party Influence in Congress and the Economy,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 2: No 3, pp 277-286 (2007).
⁴ F-test (α = 0.1126). If we instead only consider the Wednesdays following election day compared to all other days over this same period, α = 0.0246.
⁵ The “Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act”.
⁶ Trading prohibitions on insiders will also avoid a situation in which candidates are able to enjoy a multiplier effect on their campaign funds by shorting themselves. For example, Candidate A has a campaign fund of $2, and candidate B has $1. By hedging, candidate A can maintain a $2 risk while spending $4 on campaigning while candidate B can only spend $2 to maintain a $1 risk.
⁷ cf. Intrade rules. A more challenging possible scenario involves manipulation preceding the event such that the forced settlement locks-in profits, presumably just as market power is exhausted. See note below on restricting market access to US-based accounts.
⁸ Such restrictions would however tend to limit the growth of such markets and/or result in risk premia accruing to short tax-rate positions.
⁹ “Such other persons that the Commission determines to be appropriate in light of their financial or other qualifications, or the applicability of appropriate regulatory protections.”
¹⁰ For background, see: Robin Hanson, “Decision Markets for Policy Advice,” Promoting the General Welfare: New Perspectives on Government Performance, pp 151-173, Brookings Institution Press (November 2006).

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Here’s their section on politics:

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Here’s their section on finance:

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My thoughts:

1. Their “about” page still does not list the names of their editor(s) and publisher(s). It would give them credibility.
2. My understanding is that their blog is run by their PR department. That’s a problem. By essence, it means that readers will trust it less than the independent publications out there. Never in the history of the publishing business did a P.R. department of a commercial company managed to run a popular, credible publication —offline or online. It can’t be. Spin doctors want to control information, while journalists want to free it. It’s 2 different worlds, totally incompatible. It’ll never work.
3. They are mixing news articles written by outside journalists or bloggers with P.R. stuff written by people working at BetFair or TradeFair. Again, it’s not a good idea if you want to be trusted by the readers. The two kinds of postings should be published on 2 different blogs —the news blog should be kept completely separate from the corporate blog.
4. A close look at many of their entries show that the BetFair blog is not a quality publication. Their news stories mostly replicate, with less talent, what you can read elsewhere on the Web or in newspapers. There is no innovation.
5. Their postings consist entirely of texts —with very few charts, and almost no internal/external weblinks.
6. I find the BetFair blog very UK centric.
7. Sometimes, they would post for the search engine spiders, and not for the readers. The result is really bizarre, and leaves a funny taste in the mouth.
8. Their blog suffers from many technical problems. The most annoying issue is that their site feed does not reflect entirely their content. I’m a subscriber of their feed within Google Reader. I searched for “Robb”, “politics”, “Clinton”, and “TradeFair”, and I was not able to get the items related to the posts I saw on their website. They should fix this issue ASAP. (I blogged about this technical issue, some weeks ago. To no avail.)
9. Last time I reviewed the BetFair blog, I yelled against the fact that their main writer on prediction markets went with an anonymous byline, “The Predictor” (whose only qualification was that he has “long hair” and that he “eats cheese”). They backpedaled, and now their new prediction market writer goes with the “Mike Robb” byline. It’s much better. (Michael Robb is one of the BetFair employees working at their P.R. department, if I’m correct. His author profile page says he is their “resident political expert”. “Resident” means that he is a BetFair employee, in HammerSmith, as I take it. As whether he is really a “political expert”, as billed, I’ll leave it to you.)
10. From what I know, Michael Robb seems to be a decent and smart ‘chap’ (as they say in England). I wish him good luck. (Here’s his latest output.)
11. They restrict their prediction market approach to politics —that’s a huge mistake, which shows their total misunderstanding of the prediction market approach. They should apply it to sports, too.
12. They are completely clueless as to what form should take prediction market journalism. That’s grave. I’ll blog about that, later on. It’s a long story of prediction market mechanics, usage, intended audience, and strategy. I need to explain all this on an independent blog post, in the near future.
13. Professor Leighton Vaughan-Williams is billed as the “BetFair prof”. It’s a bad idea. It debases Academia. Scholars are paid to develop and propagate our global civilization’s knowledge, not to act as servile P.R. agents for commercial companies. Furthermore, a close look at his prediction market explainer shows that Leighton Vaughan-Williams lacks understanding of the concept of probability as applied to the market-generated predictions. And my readers remember that Leighton Vaughan-Williams has stubbornly refused to disclose the origin of the trading data he used to tout BetFair’s alleged extraordinary predictive power. (The suspicion is that he used InTrade’s data.) All the prediction market scientists I know (Justin Wolfers, Eric Ziztwitz, Robin Hanson, Koleman Stumpf, Paul Tetlock, David Pennock, Lance Fortnow, etc.) do disclose information easily. All this indicates to me that Leighton Vaughan-Williams is not to be trusted. (And scroll down to see the comment on his dubious post, and you’ll see that my negative opinion is shared by at least one informed BetFair trader.)
    
14. Finally, I was disagreeably surprised to see the presence of TradeFair in this BetFair blog. TradeFair was billed as independent from BetFair. If they are really independent, then they should publish on the TradeFair blog —not on the BetFair blog. Makes no sense at all. Makes the TradeFair independence looks like a P.R. trick at launch, as opposed to a reality. The P.R. department is what is worse at BetFair. The BetFair P.R. agents are arrogant ignorants, who don’t understand prediction markets, who don’t comprehend academic papers on prediction markets, who don’t listen, who don’t connect, who publish low-quality outputs that show how deep is their misunderstanding of the prediction markets, and hence, who generate bad publicity for BetFair in the prediction market circles (where InTrade is king). Yet, David Jack decided to put TradeFair in their incompetent hands. Immense error. And when you read each of their 3 binaries explainers, you realize that they are just typical (and mediocre) P.R. pieces, which could have well be published on the TradeFair trading site, in the “help” or “faq” section.

Even though InTrade-TradeSports and BetFair-TradeFair are not directly competitors, any web-literate internationalist interested in prediction markets can compare these 2 prediction exchanges and see almost instantly that the Irish are perfectly Americanized (with the caveat that they lack ethics, alas), whereas the HammerSmith people (in spite of their IT prowess) are just monkeying around with the grace of fatty toads. America hosts the best researchers and analysts in the field of prediction markets. America (not England) has produced the prediction market science (since the end of the nineties). BetFair-TradeFair should cross the Atlantic and get closer to this American bouillon de culture.

BetFair-TradeFair is the world’s #1 prediction exchange, and I value the fact that they decided to be ethical and legal (which contrasts with the pirates of InTrade-TradeSports). However, nobody in HammerSmith gets the prediction market approach (their attempts are superficial), and the BetFair P.R. agents have elevated mediocrity as a performing art. BetFair-TradeFair will have to change in the coming years —otherwise InTrade-TradeSports will remain the king of the prediction markets, forever.

1. George Tziralis
2. Robin Hanson
3. Jonathan Kennedy
4. and I’ll give the 4th spot to a combo, mixing takes from John Tierney, Adam Siegel (surprisingly pertinent –I bet he is on a fish diet, post Christmas ), and Steve Roman.
5. UPDATE: “Thrutch“, Emile Servan-Schreiber and Panos Ipeirotis.

AWOLs (so far): PMIA, AEI-Brookings, InTrade, TradeSports, BetFair, TradeFair, NewsFutures, Emile Servan-Schreiber, Jed Christiansen, Koleman Strumpf, Bo Cowgill, Richard Borghesi, Chris Hibbert, David Perry, Ken Kittlitz, Paul Tetlock, David Pennock, Mike Linksvayer, Brent Stinsky, David Yu, Mark Davis, David Jack, James Surowiecki, Tyler Cowen, Greg Mankiw, Donald Luskin, John Delaney [*], etc.

[*] Steve Bass tells us that John Delaney‘s pre-NH CNBC appearance was awesome. I was up that day, waiting for that CNBC segment, but failed to spot it. If somebody sends me the YouTube link, I’ll publish it here.

“Physics works!” Professor Lewin shouts, as the classroom explodes in cheers.

Are our good prediction market doctors [*] that charismatic and popular??? Have those introverts computed that good marketing is so important to convey ideas???

[*] Robin Hanson, Justin Wolfers, Eric Ziztzewitz, Koleman Strumpf, Paul Tetlock, David Pennock, etc.

External Link: Walter H. G. Lewin

The “Prediction Markets–New Empirical Findings” session, organized by Eric Zitzewitz, of Stanford University Dartmouth College, is slated to include:

• BO COWGILL, Google, JUSTIN WOLFERS, University of Pennsylvania, and ERIC ZITZEWITZ, Stanford University–Prediction Markets Inside the Firm: Evidence From Google
• FORREST NELSON and PHILIP POLGREEN, University of Iowa–Predicting Flu: Prediction Markets vs. Biostatistical Models
• PAUL TETLOCK, University of Texas-Austin–Does Liquidity Affect Securities Market Efficiency?
• RICARD GIL, University of California-Santa Cruz, and STEVEN LEVITT, University of Chicago–Testing the Efficiency of Markets in the 2002 World Cup

In addition to Zitzewitz and Wolfers, paper discussants include CHARLES PLOTT, Caltech, and ROBIN HANSON, George Mason University.

Sounds like quite the party. I predict that the good times will roll.

Hollywood Stock Exchange entry at Wikipedia:

The Hollywood Stock Exchange, or HSX, is a web-based, multiplayer game in which players use simulated money to buy and sell “shares” of actors, directors, upcoming films, and film-related options. [...]

HSX is a play-money prediction exchange… and a PM software firm.

Wikipedia does mention that HSX is owned by Cantor Fitzgerald, but does not mention that it was founded in 1996 by Max Keiser and Michael Burns.

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Max Keiser entry at Wikipedia:

Max Keiser is an inventor, a podcaster, broadcaster and journalist. [...] [Max] Keiser invented the virtual specialist technology and co-founded the Hollywood Stock Exchange. [...]

As the New York Times pointed out, the Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX) is unique amongst virtual markets for more closely mimicking the real markets. Max’s design for moviestocks, starbonds, virtual mutual funds, and the virtual currency whose value is controlled by a virtual central bank has been awarded three patents . HSX is the world’s first patented prediction market. While co-chairman of HSX, Keiser presented a weekly segment, “Battle at the Box Office,” for NBC’s Access Hollywood. Keiser’s segment caused the sort of controversy that often follows him when the major Hollywood studios threatened to boycott NBC if they continued to allow Keiser to predict that weekend’s box office. [...]

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And now, The Question Of The Day: Is Max Keiser “notable” enough to warrant a Wikipedia entry under his name? [Here's Wikipedia's "notability guideline".]

Here’s what I wrote to the Wikipedians:

Hi, my name is Chris Masse, the editor of Midas Oracle, a group blog on prediction markets ( http://www.midasoracle.org/ ). In my judgment, the “Max Keiser” entry on Wikipedia is useful because it gives additional information about the first version of the Holllywood Stock Exchange, which seems to be a more ambitious endeavor that what we have right now. And as you all know, the Hollywood Stock Exchange is the world’s most popular play-money prediction exchange. Economists who have been studying both real-money and play-money prediction markets say that their their relative accuracy is socially valuable. See the works from Robin Hanson, Justin Wolfers, Eric Zitzewitz, Koleman Strumpf, Paul Tetlock, and others. So for all these reasons, I vote to keep the “Max Keiser” entry.

I made the mistake of not logging in into Wikipedia before making this comment and here’s what a Wikipedian wrote 2 seconds after I saved the comment:

Note: The above comment was left by an IP address and it he/she seems to have a conflict of interest, I suggest you read WP:USEFUL and WP:ILIKEIT. All the best. The Sunshine Man 17:36, 22 June 2007 (UTC)

So I went reading the “Conflict Of Interest” page:

A Wikipedia conflict of interest (COI) is an incompatibility between the aim of Wikipedia, which is to produce a neutral encyclopedia, and the aims of an individual editor. COI editing involves contributing to Wikipedia in order to promote yourself or the interests of other individuals, companies, or groups. Where an editor must forego advancing the aims of Wikipedia in order to advance outside interests, he stands in a conflict of interest. COI edits are strongly discouraged. When they cause disruption to the encyclopedia in the opinion of an uninvolved administrator, they may lead to accounts being blocked and embarrassment for the individuals and groups who were being promoted.

Does Chris Masse have a “conflict of interest” promoting prediction market stuff on Wikipedia???

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Previous: All the Midas Oracle blog posts mentioning Max Keiser.

External Resource: From the promotional documentation of Kinooga CEO Max Keiser:

Max Keiser launched his career working as a registered securities brokers for some of the largest and most prestigious financial houses in the world, including Shearson Lehman, Alex Brown & Sons and Oppenheimer & Co. His tenure on Wall Street, at the beginning of the longest bull market in history, was a time of financial innovation that would change the foundations of markets and finance around the world. From junk bonds to leveraged buyouts, new ideas were being applied to old financial formulae.

In late 1995, at a meeting at the Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf on Sunset Blvd. West Hollywood California, Max Keiser pitched Michael Burns, a colleague from Wall Street who had moved to LA, on the idea of trading futures contracts based on Hollywood Box Office returns. To test the idea, a virtual exchange, the Hollywood Stock Exchange was built and launched in February of 1996. The site’s immediate success required a more robust, scalable technology to be built. Cambridge Technology Partners was hired for this task. Backed by Burn’s investment, Keiser, with input from Burns, invented the Virtual Specialist Technology; (U.S. pat. no. 5950176) a system for ‘making markets’ with virtual securities whose value is tied to a virtual currency, the Hollywood Dollar. A Virtual SEC, Reserve Bank, and Treasury were also created to manage and regulate this new economy. Esther Dyson’s Release 1.0 hailed the invention as a breakthrough in technologically and economics. It is widely understood that the Virtual Specialist Technology helped define an emerging school of economics that has, as its basis, Robert Metcalfe’s ‘network effect,’ or ‘increased returns economics.’ [...]

External Resource: Max Keiser

NEXT: WIKIPEDIA TERMINATES MAX KEISER.

Paul Tetlock of Texas

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Via Google’s Bo Cowgill, Robert Hahn and Paul Tetlock’s Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal (mirror at AEI-Brookings – mirror at AEI):

[...] These markets often predict more accurately than experts. Why? They draw on the knowledge of people who might otherwise be ignored. Their anonymity frees participants from pressures to agree with opinion leaders. And they create straightforward profit incentives that encourage participants to search for better information. [...] A consensus plan, endorsed by more than 20 leading researchers, including Nobel economics laureates Kenneth Arrow, Daniel Kahneman, Thomas Schelling, and Vernon Smith, and published by the AEI-Brookings Joint Center, suggests the creation of a safe harbor for small-stakes, not-for-profit prediction markets to encourage experimentation. One could, for example, introduce exemptions for research-focused markets in which the size of individual investments does not exceed $2,000 per participant. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) could provide this safe harbor in the form of a “no-action” letter. Alternatively, the commission could create formal guidelines that make it cheaper and easier to start these markets. [...] Prediction markets have become more than fodder for television news features on what those zany Internet folks will think of next. They are coming of age as serious tools for information gathering and analysis — tools with great potential for improving the efficiency of government and the productivity of industry. To help achieve that potential, Washington needs to nurture their development and keep them from becoming collateral damage in the endless war over who can gamble and where.

Step #1: Make some gullible economists sign a “petition”, entirely engineered by Bob Himself, and which is flawed and too timid.

Step #2: Make the gullible Wall Street Journal readers believe that a “no-action letter” is the solution, claiming that that’s the “consensus”.

Robin Hanson, who is at heart a free-gambling-for-all economist, took part of this pitiful farce. Bad judgment, doc. If Robin Hanson wants to stay the “reigning expert” of the field of prediction markets, he will have to mind a more pertinent industry analysis in the future. Viva Steve Levitt.

Previous: Steve Levitt of Freakonomics: I WON’T SIGN YOUR PETITION, BOB. + Chris Masse’s comment on the Freakonomics’ blog post about the legality of US prediction markets + Safe Harbor Letter too Timid – by Chris Hibbert + The limitations of logic (and the need for passion) – by Caveat Bettor + Jason Ruspini on the Economists’ Petition