By Lance Fortnow, David Pennock, and Yiling Chen.

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#1. Explainer On Prediction Markets

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A prediction market is a market for a contract that yields payments based on the outcome of a partially uncertain future event, such as an election. A contract pays $100 only if candidate X wins the election, and $0 otherwise. When the market price of an X contract is $60, the prediction market believes that candidate X has a 60% chance of winning the election. The price of this event derivative represents the imputed perceived likelihood of this partially uncertain event (i.e., its aggregated expected probability). A 60% probability means that, in a series of events each with a 60% probability, the favored outcome is expected to occur 60 times out of 100, and the unfavored outcome is expected to occur 40 times out of 100.

Each prediction exchange organizes its own set of real-money and/or play-money markets, using either a CDA or a MSR mechanism —with or without an automated market maker.

Prediction markets enable us to attain collective intelligence. Prediction markets produce dynamic, objective probabilistic predictions on the outcomes of future events by aggregating disparate pieces of information that the traders bring when they agree on prices. The event derivative traders are informed by the primary indicators (i.e., the primary sources of information), like the polls, for instance. These informed speculators then execute their transactions based on their anticipations about the future —anticipations that will be either confirmed or infirmed.

The value of a set of prediction markets consists in the added accuracy that these prediction markets provide relative to the other forecasting mechanisms, times the value of accuracy in improved decisions, minus the cost of maintaining these prediction markets, relative to the cost of the other forecasting mechanisms. According to Robin Hanson, a highly accurate prediction market has little value if some other forecasting mechanism(s) can provide similar accuracy at a lower cost, or if very few substantial decisions are influenced by accurate forecasts on its topic.

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More Info:

- The Best Resources On Prediction Markets = The Best External Web Links + The Best Midas Oracle Posts

- Prediction Market Science

- The Midas Oracle Explainers On Prediction Markets

- All The Midas Oracle Explainers On Prediction Markets

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#2. Objective Probabilistic Predictions = Charts Of Prediction Markets

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Put your mouse on your selected chart, right-click, and open the link in another browser tab to get directed to the prediction market page of your favorite exchange.

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2008 US Elections

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InTrade

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2008 US Electoral College

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- This is a dynamic electoral map, which is up to date. Click on the image, and open the website (ElectoralMarkets.com) in another browser tab to get the bigger version.

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- This is a dynamic electoral map, which is up to date. Feed readers: Download this webpage to visualize this InTrade widget.

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Source:

- The electoral map widget is from InTrade .COM.

- InTrade .COM.

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- All the charts below are also dynamic —they update themselves each time you open this webpage.

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2008 US Presidential Election Winner – Individual

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2008 US Presidential Election Winner – Political Party

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2008 US Congressional Elections Winner – Political Party

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2008 US Senate Control

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2008 US House Of Representatives Control

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Sources:
- The dynamic, compound prediction market charts are from InTrade .COM.
- The individual charts, however, are from InTrade .COM v2. We will later transition to the charts from InTrade .COM when the charting quality of their widgets improves.
- We are also waiting to be able to hot-link to the advanced charts of InTrade .COM.

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BetFair

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Winning Party

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Next US President

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Source: BetFair Politics Zone

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Iowa Electronic Markets

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2008 U.S. Presidential Election Vote Share Market

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2008 U.S. Presidential Election Winner-Take-All Market

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- Source: Iowa Electronic Markets

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NewsFutures

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Next US President Will Be Democratic.

© NewsFutures

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Next US President Will Be Republican.

© NewsFutures

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HubDub

- HubDub’s prediction markets on the 2008 electoral college

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Resources on US Politics

- CNN – US Political Dashboard

- Yahoo! News – US Political Dashboard

- Real Clear Politics – Polls

- Electoral-Vote.com – Polls

- Five Thirty Eight – Polls

- Wikipedia – 2008 US Presidential Elections

- Wikipedia – 2008 US House Of Representatives Elections

- Wikipedia – 2008 US Senate Elections

- Wikipedia – 2008 US Gubernatorial Elections

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Canadian Elections

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InTrade

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Winner of Next Canadian Federal Election – Political Party

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Conservatives

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Liberal

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BetFair

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2008 Federal Election

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Most Seats

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Overall Majority

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UK Elections

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BetFair

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Next General Election – Most Seats

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Next UK Prime Minister

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InTrade

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Winner of Next UK Election – Political Party

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UK Conservatives

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UK Labour

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The Prediction Exchanges

- List of the main real-money and play-money prediction exchanges (betting exchanges) at Midas Oracle

- Complete list of the real-money and play-money prediction exchanges (betting exchanges) at Midas Oracle

- Complete list of the real-money and play-money prediction exchanges at CFM

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Charts Of Expired Prediction Markets

- Charts Of Expired Prediction Markets

- Other Charts Of Expired Prediction Markets

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For more on probabilistic predictions, go to our “Predictions” page, or visit our webpage listing all the main prediction exchanges.

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Experts expect the initial reaction to CFTC regulation to be more low-cap, nonprofit markets like the one created by the University of Iowa. Some doubt the forecasting power in these small-scale markets, since there wouldn’t be enough monetary incentive for traders to seek and discover information. “We do not need nonprofit prediction exchanges,” says Chris Masse, editor and publisher of the prediction market blog midasoracle.org. He says that [offshore] exchanges like Intrade and Betfair, which are for-profit, have the capital to continually offer more cutting-edge pricing systems and additional contracts while nonprofits like the IEM have not.

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I meant that real-money prediction exchanges that make profits do support innovation (see BetFair’s new bet matching system and starting-price system) and are well positioned to foster socially valuable prediction markets (see the huge effort that InTrade is making in this direction).

Voila.

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Psstt… You’ll notice that I am the only one in that story to mention and speak favorably of InTrade-TradeSports and BetFair-TradeFair.

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In its request for comment, the CFTC reminded the public that the commission should “promote innovation for futures and derivatives.” It also added that —hint, hint— the Iowa markets have been valuable sources of public information and have predicted Presidential outcomes better than polls. The 2000 act gave the CFTC the authority “to promote responsible economic or financial innovation” by creating an exemption for certain types of contracts (such as one in a prediction market). [...]

“Basically I think they’re going to expand the IEM no-action letter and take legal measures to make sure that legal contracts aren’t subject to antigambling laws,” says Chapman law professor Bell. [...]

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BusinessWeek gets it right about where the CFTC is going. (Go reading the 2 pages.)

However, I still believe that HedgeStreet has a strong argument (about the political elections being “excluded commodities”) and I wonder what the CFTC will do about it.

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The CFTC should not limit “no action” status to markets run by tax-exempt organizations. The no-action letters that the CFTC issued to the IEM emphasized not the nature of the hosting institution, the University of Iowa, but rather the business model adopted by the IEM itself. Profitability could not have mattered, as tax-exempt organizations can and do earn profits (indeed, as their burgeoning endowments demonstrate, many universities earn immense profits). The CFTC apparently cared only that the IEM did not plan to profit from charging traders commissions. A tax-paying organization could satisfy that condition just as easily as a tax-exempt organization could. In either event, price discovery would flourish and consumers would win a safeguard against getting fleeced.

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- The American Enterprise Institute’s proposals to legalize the real-money prediction markets in the United States of America

- In the for-profit vs not-for-profit debate, our prediction market luminaries, doctored by Bob, are on the wrong side of the issue.

- The definitive proof that FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges (like BetFair and InTrade) are the best organizers of socially valuable prediction markets (like those on global warming and climate change).

- Analysis of the HedgeStreet’s comment sent to the CFTC.

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APPENDIX:

Paul Wolfowitz’s profile at the American Enterprise Institute

- How the neo-cons drove the United States of America into the unecessary Iraq war

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The deadline looms for interested parties to respond to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s request for comments about regulating prediction markets (“event markets” in the CFTC’s usage). I may or may not get around to a detailed, point-by-point response to the CFTC’s many questions. In the meantime, though, I’ve drafted a general statement that many of you might agree with. I invite you to sign it with me, so that together we might tell the CFTC where to go. Please see below for details on how to sign on. Here is the draft statement:

What regulatory treatment should the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) apply to event markets? We the undersigned, who represent a wide range of viewpoints, agree on three general observations. First and foremost, the CFTC should do no harm. Second, at a minimum, the CFTC should make more general the sort of “no action” status enjoyed by the Iowa Electronic Markets (“IEM”). Third, if the CFTC decides to regulate event markets more substantively, it should adopt clear and limited jurisdictional boundaries and allow affected parties to step outside of them.

First, do no harm: Many sorts of event markets—including public ones, private ones, ones that offer only play-money trading, and ones that offer real-money trading—already thrive in the U.S. They have provided a rich array of benefits without evidently harming anyone. The CFTC could help event markets achieve still greater success by clarifying their legality. Instituting the wrong sort of regulations could suffocate event markets in their cradle, however. The CFTC should exercise a light hand, taking care to do no more than offer qualifying event markets the shelter of federal preemption and freeing them to continue operating under the extant legal regime.

Second, open up the “no action” option: Thanks in part to the “no action” letters that the CFTC has issued to it, the IEM has for many years benefited the public by offering real-money event markets. No sound reason precludes the CFTC from giving similar treatment to other institutions that, like the IEM, offer event markets solely for academic and experimental purposes and without imposing trading commissions.

Although the CFTC’s “no action” letters do not specify the exact criteria the IEM had to satisfy, they took favorable note of the IEM’s account limits. Those account limits effectively prevent the IEM from supporting significant hedging functions. If the CFTC builds a similar requirement into any general “no action” guidelines, it should adopt limits considerably more generous than the meager $500/trader limit adopted decades ago by the IEM. Even a limit ten times that amount would still effectively preclude hedging.

The CFTC should not limit “no action” status to markets run by tax-exempt organizations. The no-action letters that the CFTC issued to the IEM emphasized not the nature of the hosting institution, the University of Iowa, but rather the business model adopted by the IEM itself. Profitability could not have mattered, as tax-exempt organizations can and do earn profits (indeed, as their burgeoning endowments demonstrate, many universities earn immense profits). The CFTC apparently cared only that the IEM did not plan to profit from charging traders commissions. A tax-paying organization could satisfy that condition just as easily as a tax-exempt organization could. In either event, price discovery would flourish and consumers would win a safeguard against getting fleeced.

Third, preserve regulatory exit options: If the CFTC decides to write substantive regulations for event markets, it should recognize and guard against the risk of overregulation. Even well-intentioned and well-informed regulators remain human and, thus, all too apt to make mistakes. They run an especially large risk of making mistakes when they first attempt to regulate new institutions, such as event markets. To make matters worse, regulators typically lack reliable signals to determine when they have gone too far. Industries wither away for many reasons, after all.

The CFTC’s approach to regulating event markets should accommodate these policy considerations by establishing clear jurisdictional boundaries and opening exit options. Thus, for instance, the CFTC might specify that it has no jurisdiction over event markets that offer trading only to members of a particular firm, over markets that offer only spot trading in negotiable conditional notes, or over markets that do not support significant hedging functions. Then, if the CFTC enacts unduly burdensome regulations, an event market could opt out of them by changing its business model. So long as markets publicly announce that they operate outside the CFTC’s purview, allowing them that freedom of exit would harm nobody. To the contrary, it would help the CFTC gauge the suitability of its regulations and serve the public by protecting the continued viability of event markets.

Interested in signing on? Please drop me a private email (tbell at chapman dot edu) with your name, institutional affiliation, and snailmail address. I welcome your comments—I’m sure a typo or two persists in my draft—but I of course cannot revamp the entire statement without mucking up the entire process. To leave me time to get everything together and out the door before the July 7 deadline, you’ll have to contact me before noon Pacific time on Sunday, July 6.

[Crossposted at Agoraphilia and Midas Oracle.]

American Scientist:

Forrest Nelson, a professor of economics at the University of Iowa, helped to found the Iowa Electronic Markets. He and his colleagues faced considerable push-back from their university’s lawyers in setting up a real-money exchange, but they persevered and eventually were granted “no-action” letters from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Why go to all that effort? “Economists think that incentives matter,” he says, noting that when traders use play dollars, “It’s all just matchsticks.”

Nelson does, however, accept the findings of studies showing that the predictions of some play-money markets are just as accurate as their real-money counterparts. But he points out that to get a good answer with play money requires more participants to average out a lot of ill-conceived and extreme positions. Play-money markets, Nelson says, tend to show excessive volatility.

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Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter? – (PDF) – by Emile Servan-Schreiber, David Pennock, Justin Wolfers and Brian Galebach – 2004-09-00

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A recent article in the prestigious academic journal Science (May 16, 2008, Vol 320, p. 877-8) once again makes the case for regulated prediction markets, more commonly known as “betting exchanges” to online gamblers. The authors make the case that such markets are useful in forecasting future events with less error than traditional measures such as polling. This argument is hard to ignore, with the authors including 21 top economists from such esteemed institutions as Yale, Stanford, Berkeley, and the University of Pennsylvania. Notable among the authors is Justin Wolfers from the Wharton School of business at UPenn, an economist who has gained notoriety in gambling circles due to his work on such topics as NBA referee bias (highlighted in a May 2008 article from MajorWager: http://www.majorwager.com/index.cfm?page=27&show_column=660).

The concept behind using prediction markets as a decision-making tool is simple. “Shares” are made available on an open market, and the participants use their capital (and the promise of profits) to make predictions on future events, which is incorporated into the share price. In general, information tends to be widely dispersed, and a market allows wide-ranging opinions to be gathered and consolidated into a market-wide prediction. In other words, an infinite amount of opinions can be aggregated, and an open market with potential for profit provides an incentive for individuals to make their opinions publicly known.

Prediction markets always get more than their fair share of press near the end of the 4-year U.S. Presidential election cycle. The Iowa Electronics Market, housed at the University of Iowa, is perhaps the most well-known. The authors of the Science paper show that, in the week immediately preceding the Presidential elections from 1988 through 2000, the Iowa Electronic Markets erred by an average of only 1.5 percentage points from the actual vote results, while the traditional Gallup poll was off by 2.1%. Numerous other studies have shown the superiority of markets compared to other forecasting tools.

Of course, there have been some dust-ups regarding prediction markets in the past, most notably the “terrorist strike market”, unveiled a little too close to 9/11 to be palatable to the general public. The official name was the “Policy Analysis Market“, and it was established by the Pentagon to act as a prediction market for Middle East political events. It was quickly scuttled after heated comments from U.S. Senators, calling it “grotesque” and “stupid”, due to the perception of using catastrophic events such as assassinations as profit-making tools. Regardless of its political correctness (and the misinformed opinions of a few politicians), such a prediction market still holds value as a glimpse into the collective mindset of everyone with an understanding of political currents in the region. Utilizing such a prediction market as a component of foreign policy decisions may have ultimately spared the U.S. much grief in Iraq.

In recent years, prediction markets have grown beyond academic and government roles. Dublin-based InTrade is rapidly growing and provides many more options than the Iowa Electronic Markets. Others such as MatchBook have focused more on sporting contests, but provide coverage of other events as demand calls. Of course, those outside the U.S. have access to the largest betting exchange of them all, the massive European markets of BetFair. The success of these exchanges speaks to the public interest and feasibility of prediction markets.

One factor holding back the growth of online prediction markets is their close association with the quasi-legal world of sports betting and internet casinos. InTrade has been fairly proactive in this regard, spinning off from Tradesports to clean up its corporate slate, but it is still knee-deep in the legal sludge surrounding offshore “gambling”. All have to deal with the legal and financial hurdles of operating offshore.

The authors of the Science paper propose that clarification of internet gambling laws is needed to exploit the benefits of prediction markets within the United States. Clearly, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) of 2006 is one such mechanism restricting the widespread use of prediction markets. Another is the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the regulatory agency which oversees futures markets in the U.S. The CFTC has provided a “no-action letter” to the Iowa Electronic Markets, an assurance that they will not seek any enforcement action against the exchange. However, this protection is not absolute and may not trump state and federal law if challenged. The Science authors propose a number of legal reforms which will allow prediction markets to begin to gain acceptance within the U.S. financial regulatory structure.

By no means does the Science article condone large-scale public markets, at least not initially. They take a (typically academic) conservative approach, recommending new legal framework to allow for the establishment of small markets with limited scope so as to evaluate the promise and use of prediction markets. But baby steps are going to be a necessity in the growth and acceptance of regulated public markets.

Clearly, there are negative aspects to financial markets, and regulation certainly has its place. Bear Sterns, Enron, the S&L scandal of the 80s, and the current housing bubble all caused tremendous loss of wealth resulting from missteps in the financial markets. The current oil crisis is due at least in part to speculation, leading to the introduction of no less than 9 separate bills in the U.S. Congress seeking tougher regulation over the trading of commodities. However, the existence of problems in the financial markets does not necessitate their dissolution. Likewise, prediction markets are sure to encounter bumps in the road, but their utility should far outweigh the risks.

Should prediction markets be legalized in the U.S.? Almost certainly. They would have benefit across numerous industries, from business decisions to political policies to financial forecasting. Unfortunately, this would require building an unlikely bridge over the Puritanical moral moat placed around gambling in the U.S. But there is no inherent difference in betting on who will win in an election than what the price of oil will be in 6 months, or what the S&P 500 will close at on a particular date. Distancing prediction markets from “illegal” gambling, and instead likening them to regulated financial markets, will be a necessary first step towards broader acceptance.

The academic groundwork on prediction markets has already been laid, and offshore exchanges have begun to turn these concepts into functioning businesses. As these markets grow and begin incorporating more diverse opinions, we can expect their success rate at predicting the future to only grow. To restrict such a promising tool simply due to its perception that it is a gambling outlet is silly indeed.

6-25-08
Jay Graziani
MajorWager.com
graziani@majorwager.com

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[This article is cross-posted from Major Wager.]

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#1. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the federal regulatory agency that oversees futures market activity, should establish safe-harbor rules for selected small-stakes markets. One limited safe harbor is the no-action letter, in which the CFTC market oversight staff confirms in writing that it will not recommend enforcement action if the recipient acts in specified ways. The only prediction market to receive a no-action letter (in 1992) is the Iowa Electronic Markets, which is run by professors at the University of Iowa and which initially focused on presidential elections. Although such no-action letters reduce the chances of legal action under other state and federal laws, they may not be adequate. We would therefore urge the CFTC to explore other approaches to ensuring safe harbors, for example, formal rules or guidance approved by the commission. We suggest that three types of entities be eligible for safe harbor treatment. The first would be not-for-profit research institutions, including universities, colleges and think tanks wishing to operate exchanges similar to the Iowa Electronic Markets. The second would be government agencies seeking to do research similar to that of nongovernmental research institutions. The third group would consist of private businesses and not-for-profits that are not primarily engaged in research, which would only be allowed to operate internal prediction markets with their employees or contractors. In all cases, markets would be limited to small-stakes contracts. Although the definition of small stakes is somewhat arbitrary, we use the term to mean an exchange in which the total amount of capital deposited by any one participant may not exceed some modest sum, perhaps something like $2,000 per year. The exchanges themselves would be not-for-profit but would be allowed to charge modest fees to recoup administrative and regulatory costs. Brokers and paid advisers would be barred, reducing the risks that contracts would be sold to inappropriate or vulnerable customers or that customers would be charged fees above the amounts needed to maintain the markets. Exchanges would be self-regulated, leaving them with the responsibility to make reasonable efforts to keep markets free from fraud and manipulation. For its part, the CFTC should allow contracts that price any economically meaningful event. This definition could allow for contracts on political events, environmental risks, or economic indicators, such as those offered by the Iowa Electronic Markets, but would presumably not include contracts on the outcomes of sports events.

The contracts qualifying under this safe harbor would also create opportunities for more efficient risk allocation. Although the small-stakes nature of these markets would necessarily limit their usefulness for hedging risk, they could serve as proofs of concept for larger-scale markets that could be developed under alternative regulatory arrangements. The CFTC should allow researchers to experiment with several aspects of prediction markets – fee structures, incentives against manipulation, liquidity requirements and the like – with the goal of improving their design. Prediction markets are in an early stage, and if their promise is to be realized, researchers should be given flexibility to learn what kinds of design are most likely to produce accurate predictions. Of course, exchanges would need to inform their customers so that they are aware of the risks and benefits of participating in these markets.

#2. Congress should support the CFTC’s efforts to develop prediction markets. To the extent that the CFTC incurs costs in promoting innovation, Congress should provide the necessary funding. More fundamentally, Congress should explore alternative ways of securing a legal framework for prediction markets if the CFTC’s existing authority proves inadequate. In particular, Congress should specify that a no-action letter, or similar mechanism, preempts overlapping state and federal anti-gambling laws. Because Congress did not intend the CFTC to regulate gambling, it is important to design new regulations so that socially valuable prediction markets easily qualify for the safe harbor but gambling markets do not.

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UPDATE: A great rebuttal here…

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THE MIDAS ORACLE TAKES:

- CALL TO ACTION: Let’s fight so that the CFTC allows the FOR-PROFIT prediction exchanges to deal with “event markets”.

- In the for-profit vs not-for-profit debate, our prediction market luminaries, doctored by Bob, are on the wrong side of the issue.

- COMMENTS TO THE CFTC: What to expect from Tom W. Bell and Jason Ruspini

- A young economist rebuts the American Enterprise Institute.

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BACKGROUND INFO:

- CFTC’s Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts… notably how they define “event markets”, how they are going to extend their “exemption” to other IEM-like prediction exchanges, and how they framed their questions to the public. Here are the comments sent to the CFTC.

- The Arnold & Porter lawyers explain the meaning of the CFTC’s concept release on “event markets”. — (PDF file)

- The Schulte & Roth & Zabel lawyers’ takes. — (PDF file)

- The Sullivan & Cromwell lawyers’ takes. — (PDF file)

- What Vernon Smith told the CFTC.

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APPENDIX:

Paul Wolfowitz’s profile at the American Enterprise Institute

- How the neo-cons drove the United States of America into the unecessary Iraq war

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At its feet, the river Thames…

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Previously: River rising. Power plant closed. Is the Iowa Electronic Markets at risk?

“This is an emergency such as we’ve never seen before, with unprecedented threats to our campus,” University of Iowa President Sally Mason said. “This is getting dangerous now.”

Wikipedia on the river Thames

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Street address of BetFair corporate office – (BetFair headquarters – The Sporting Exchange):

BetFair
The Waterfront, Hammersmith Embankment
Winslow Road – (Chancellors Road)
London, England
W6 9HP, United Kingdom, European Union

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“The river [which passes thru the U of I] is expected to reach 33 feet to 34 feet Monday or early Tuesday. Flood stage is 25 feet.“

“This is an emergency such as we’ve never seen before, with unprecedented threats to our campus,” University of Iowa President Sally Mason said. “This is getting dangerous now.”

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U of I

IEM

Des Moines Register

UPDATE: 15 buildings flooded + Cresting?

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