Archive for the 'Insider Trading' Category

The vetting of the many potential Democratic vice president nominees was not as secretive as I thought. — Bo Cowgill was right, in hindsight.

Chris F. Masse August 24th, 2008

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The New York Times has a recount on how Barack Obama reached his decision on Joe Biden. The final decision was probably made 10 days ago, while Barack Obama was vacationing in Hawaii.

[...] Mr. Obama’s decision had as much to do with Mr. Biden’s appeal among white working-class voters and compelling personal story, and his conclusion that the Delaware senator was “a worker.”

The important information in the NYT piece is that Barack Obama personally called governor Bill Richardson “late last week” to announce him that he was not considered anymore. That’s around the time the Joe Biden rumor began to have more weight in the media circles —see the InTrade chart below.

Bo Cowgill, back in May 2008 (when I started to act as a prophet of doom):

This is dumb. Cover them if something interesting happens. Maybe your theory will turn out to be wrong. Anyhow: Although the decision is made in secrecy, the Presidential nominees have a number incentives which we have plenty of information about. Specifically:
* They want someone who will balance their tickets in terms of geography, race and class.
* They want someone who will help with weak areas of their campaigns.
* They want someone who will be a good campaign surrogate — giving good speeches and attacking the opponents effectively.
* They want to avoid a VP who will de-motivate or offend the base.
* They want to avoid someone with a bunch of skeletons in the closet such as angry ex-wives, out-of-wedlock kids, etc.
* Etc etc.
Anyhow, I don’t see any reason to ignore these markets in case something interesting happens. I read Midas Oracle so that I don’t *have* to read a whole bunch of other websites!

Bo Cowgill was on the right track, now that I think of it —in a society where everything leaks out.

On the opposite of the spectrum, Tom Snee was too much extreme in his view:

According to Tom Snee of the Iowa Electronic Market, at Iowa University, futures markets need more hard information than they get in the veepstakes, to reliably predict a result.

Markets are very good at predicting elections, he says - but not choices being made inside Barack Obama’s or John McCain’s head.

Justin Wolfers was more measured.

So, Bo Cowgill and Justin Wolfers are the winners, on that one.

I was partially wrong. I am a bit too extreme, sometimes. (Did someone else notice that? :-D ) I need to learn more about… granularity.

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PS: On the Republican side, now…

Price for 2008 Republican VP Nominee (others upon request)(expired at convention) at intrade.com

My response to the CFTC on event contracts

Jason Ruspini July 5th, 2008

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Here is my response to the CFTC’s “Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts.” I appreciate this opportunity to help in working towards regulated prediction markets in the US, and I thank the Commissioners for it.

Given the political implications of the rise in commodity prices, this is not the best environment in which to begin regulating markets like election contracts, but the consensus that seems to be building on the relevant questions is rather auspicious. Hedgestreet and I have presented similar legal and regulatory frameworks to allow for at least the types of election contracts we are familiar with through sites like Intrade. Given Hedgestreet’s vigorous and incisive comments, I regret not having argued more for the desirability of non-intermediated exchanges.

In their focus, however, Hedgestreet steered clear of the gaming pre-emption questions and did not present a comprehensive and general framework for event markets. In that respect, their broaching of the CFTC’s plenary option authority opens more questions than it answers, but several interesting and important markets could perhaps be traded without answering all such questions.

I encourage Hedgestreet to begin working with the NFA to develop the infrastructure necessary for the types of trading prohibitions that we each described in our comments. I encourage the CFTC to act decisively in light of the self-evident and massive value of certain event markets — even with the current political pressures, which are mainly relevant to event markets on a superficial level. Perhaps if the CFTC deems that an exercise of emergency powers is necessary at some point, that would be an appropriate day to also make a decision on event contracts public.

We are at a specific point where a little bit of additional regulation might cause an explosion in legal prediction markets, and possibly soon. As a libertarian, I generally dislike regulation, and of course it’s true, pretty much by definition, that over-regulation is bad, but I don’t believe that to be the most effective message for this comment process and the unique opportunity it presents.


June 30th, 2008

Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st St. N.W.
Washington DC 20581
Attention: Office of the Secretariat

Re: Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts

JURISDICTION AND EVENT MARKETS IN GENERAL

Given the explicit statutory definitions of “excluded” and “exempt” commodities, it is reasonable to conclude that the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has jurisdiction over all exchange-traded event markets. That is, if an “occurrence, extent of occurrence or contingency” does not meet the additional “beyond the control” and “economic consequence” criteria, then contracts on such events should be considered exempt commodities. While currently all exempt commodities are associated with a deliverable other than cash, the open-ended definition of “exempt commodity” considered alongside the definitions of “commodity” and “excluded commodity” in 7 U.S.C. § 1a imply that contracts on events that are not beyond the control of participants or do not involve an outcome of economic consequence are exempt commodities.

This conclusion presents enforcement issues that the CFTC may wish to avoid, such as being obligated to pursue actions against exchanges offering contracts based on the outcome of sporting events. Unfortunately, without further statutory clarification, this conclusion seems like the most defensible one, based on the letter, if not the intent, of the law.

That said, until statutory clarification is attained, given the purposes and history of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), it would be appropriate for the CFTC to only assert jurisdiction over those event contracts satisfying “economic consequence” criteria, which would include the price discovery aspect of the former economic purpose test. An interpretation to this effect by the CFTC would not be inconsistent with the text of the CEA, and would best serve to minimize the burden on interstate commerce. This policy decision would effectively reconstitute the pre-Commodity Futures Modernization Act economic purpose test for event contracts in a way that avoids unwanted enforcement issues. Such a decision would be unlikely to meet significant resistance until such time that further statutory certainty is forthcoming.

The CFTC would be free to classify such contracts as either excluded or exempt commodities depending on their susceptibility to manipulation, before or after special trading prohibitions are in place. Although the anti-manipulation requirements that apply to exempt commodities are directed towards price manipulation, a fortiori they must also apply to outcome manipulation.1

The CFTC is free to determine what qualifies as “economic consequence.” As with the economic purpose test, significant hedging and price discovery functions would comprise the principal criteria.2 Regarding the latter, since event derivatives have no corresponding “cash” markets, the origination of prices that may improve economic decisions is all the more desirable in these cases. Furthermore, events that may only directly affect a group of private individuals may also have a strong bearing on commercial decision-making. Note that some general events and measures, as categorized and listed by the CFTC in its Concept Release, do in fact correspond to economic measures.3 Even if these events do not predictably correlate with asset prices, they may have predictable effects on market volatility. For example, from 1980 through present, the annualized weekly volatility of the S&P 500 in weeks in which a presidential or mid-term election took place was 19.97%, vs. 15.34% for all other weeks.4 It is difficult and ultimately undesirable to provide a quantitative recommendation for a bright-line demarcation between those markets that would satisfy an economic consequence criterion and those that would not. However, if a significant statistical test can easily be found that includes the price series of a more familiar asset, and has a logical basis, we can reasonably say that such events are associated with an economic consequence. In many cases the relevant time series may be unavailable, but in those cases the applicability of a proposed event market to other assets may be obvious. For example, consider a market predicting the likelihood of: (1) ethanol-related legislation, and its relationship to corn prices, or (2) offshore drilling legislation, and its relationship to oil prices, or (3) an attack on Iran, and its relationship to oil prices, or (4) future tax rates, and its relationship to municipal bond prices. In such cases, no quantitative test is necessary. In other cases, we may have moderately strong reasons to suspect that a given event or measure has an impact on asset prices, as we do with demographic trends, but those effects may be difficult to measure empirically.

Many potential markets may improve decision-making for a particular business, but have little bearing on the broader economy and asset prices in general. Examples of these markets include those predicting: (1) the revenue of a particular product, published title, film or performance series, (2) the launch or completion date of a particular product or project, and (3) the success of a particular approach applied to certain problem. The CFTC may find that only broad-based events or measures affecting an entire population, industry or significant percentage thereof would satisfy the economic consequence criteria. This would be nothing new, as commodity derivatives were not intended to be specialized insurance contracts. Such narrow questions also present issues from a manipulation and insider-trading perspective. In aggregate, these sorts of questions are quite relevant to the economy and will at times reflect broad trends, but may be more appropriately served by over-the-counter arrangements or riskless information aggregation, despite the obvious advantages of market incentives.

Contracts satisfying economic consequence criteria need not be approved for listing by the CFTC, though it is hoped that guidelines will be made public and remain flexible. At the limit, the CFTC will recognize that even a purely speculative market might serve an economic purpose in reducing portfolio variance.

Additionally:

The CFTC might levy a special fee on regulated event contracts to recoup expenditures related to a trading prohibition facility and other special demands on resources.

It may be required that exchanges pay interest on binary event contract collateral in order to reduce price distortions near extreme prices (100% and 0%). In illiquid markets, such distortions could be used to disguise transfers of money between anonymous participants.

The CFTC should welcome Securities and Exchange Commission opinion on contracts based on events like earnings and dividend announcements, a group of which might begin to replicate a security. Whenever a market is proposed that reflects the cash flow of a particular business or property, this opinion may be relevant.

To the extent that they subsequently conform to the CEA and CFTC policy, amnesty for any past violations should be considered with respect to Intrade and similar exchanges that have operated legally in their domestic jurisdictions.

ELECTION AND POLICY EVENT CONTRACTS

Election and policy event markets are within the jurisdiction of the CFTC based on the letter and spirit of the CEA. These markets represent the largest reasonably predictable yet unhedgeable risk facing businesses and the public. The regulation of such markets follows from the history of enlightened, flexible innovation exemplified by the CFTC. Because of their importance, election and policy event contracts naturally involve special consideration, although only in the course of satisfying the CEA.

Considering election contracts:

Trading prohibitions should be established such that candidates and proxies cannot participate due to their ability to determine the outcome of the contract. In addition to adhering to the “beyond the control” requirement of excluded commodities and general anti-manipulation precepts, the CFTC will want to consider to what extent such prohibitions might be expanded to act as insider trading restrictions similar in form to those of 7 U.S.C. § 13(f) or the proposed H.R. 2341.5 Especially given the all-or-nothing nature of many event contracts, this might be desirable in order to provide for fair and equitable trading.6

Upon the death of a candidate, the candidate’s contracts and those of all competitors must settle on the last known price before the event. A new set of contracts reflecting the new set of candidates could subsequently be offered.7

Analogous rules could be applied to policy and legislative contracts where appropriate. These rules, either directly administered by the CFTC and related associations, and/or required of exchanges, would firmly address outcome manipulation.

Because of their importance and sensitivity, these contracts also require special measures to ensure against price manipulation. However, it is important to note that election and policy markets have typically been traded as binary event options. Such contracts expire at a specific time according to a well-defined objective event and in that way are more resistant to manipulation than futures and perpetuities, the prices of which are unbound in one direction and always open to interpretation based on unobservable factors and developments in related markets. At the same time, the relative detachment of event contracts from the web of more familiar asset prices may make manipulation more difficult to prove.

As would be expected, large trader lists could be maintained and closely followed. A more powerful option is the enforcement of extraordinarily low position limits, which would greatly reduce the potential of price manipulation. At the same time, position limits should respect outstanding risks participants may have and be otherwise unable to hedge, as with traditional hedging and speculative limits. Low position limits also address trader protection concerns if such contracts were to be offered in a non-intermediated fashion. Leverage might likewise be limited. Several tiers of opt-out protection could be available to traders of various capitalization and expertise. Contracts might also be restricted to limit orders in order to curb short-term feedback trading.

Election and policy contracts ought to be restricted to domestic accounts only. This will avoid possible extradition problems where disciplinary action is required. In the case of event contracts that may reflect tax rates, this restriction will also determine that the Department of the Treasury will not lose revenue on a net basis.8

FLEXIBLE LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION

Instead of, or in addition to, claiming jurisdiction over some event markets, the CFTC has at its disposal a range of public interest exemptions, including some that interpret the 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)3(K)9 qualification clause liberally in order to include participants who might not normally trade in traditional futures and options markets. From my perspective, such exemptions may allow for a more flexible development of event markets in a less heavily-regulated environment. For example, it might allow for a contract in research science claims where trader-researchers capable of determining the outcome are not readily identifiable, or provide for trading in the sorts of narrow, business-specific questions previously mentioned. From the CFTC’s perspective, a public interest exemption may be desirable in order to avoid making a firm jurisdictional claim. However, the outcome of this comment process should be a decisive policy statement from the CFTC, not a sequence of ad-hoc actions. It is hoped that any future public interest exemptions would be offered alongside a substantial list of requirements and guidelines that would at least signal jurisdiction over a class of event markets possessing certain characteristics. Legal certainty is perhaps the most important outcome in this process, and it is not desirable for the CFTC to extend exemptions in a manner that leaves its jurisdiction completely ambiguous with respect to the markets so exempted.

This leaves aside the question of who may operate such markets. If exempted exchanges are to operate for profit, a jurisdictional statement from the CFTC is all the more necessary in order to ensure their legal standing. Exemptions directed at non-profits may be superfluous from a perspective of legal certainty, especially if such exchanges only offer trading in States where the predominant factor test holds.

The CEA allows that public interest exemptions may be issued for specified time periods. The CFTC may wish to consider to what extent exemptive or no-action letters with renew-by dates attached might be a useful tool in light of evolving legal conditions and technologies.

Note that theoretically the CFTC could also assert jurisdiction over all event markets and then direct no-action letters to the finite list of sports and gaming exchanges as a facility to repudiate jurisdiction over such markets. Typically, exempting markets formed principally for speculation would be considered against the public interest. However, if the CFTC finds no satisfactory way under the CEA to take jurisdiction over only those event markets that are associated with economic consequences, no-actioning sports and gaming exchanges would be in the public interest on a net basis, and would best promote interstate commerce. Furthermore, in some cases such exchanges operate under their own regulatory bodies and protections. It is also seldom that such exchanges allow for leveraged trading by beginner participants. In general, most gaming takes place via over-the-counter transactions.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST

I have neglected to argue for event markets in terms of the public interests they promote as these facts have been covered by others and have no doubt been obvious to the CFTC for a long time. I will only note some cases that are more subtle:

Information and estimates can be revealed in conditional form, as in the “decision markets” hosted on Intrade.10 One such market pays 100% if a Democrat is elected President in 2008 and the national debt rises in the calendar year preceding October 2011. Since the probability of the former event is also available on Intrade, by P(A | B) = P(A & B) / P(B), we can say that the probability of a Democratic president leading to a rise in the national debt is the decision market price divided by the election market price. This type of market is thus able to predict the result of electoral or legislative decisions, and different decisions can be so compared. With this in mind, consider that while prediction markets are usually described as ways to aggregate information, they are likely also useful in terms of collective problem-solving, even in cases where all information is transparent.

In terms of risk-sharing, eventually the utility of political event markets might begin to address some well-known problems with representative government. Consider the typical special interest problem in which a few relatively well-funded individuals would gain heavily by a particular piece of legislation such as an industry subsidy, and so will lobby heavily for it. Even if the legislation is not in the public interest, the costs will be distributed over so many tax payers that they will not care to argue against it, and most will not even realize what’s happening. When mature legislative and public policy markets are in place: (1) the dispersed interests will have the recourse of hedging against policy they dislike, (2) special interests will also have the option of hedging their legislative fortunes, which might lead to an overall reduction in lobbying, and (3) legislators may find compromises to be easier, since interests would be able to voluntarily “meet each other half way,” with price being the arbitrator. This could ease political log-jams, making law-making itself more flexible and efficient. Sensible yet otherwise politically infeasible measures such as unwinding entrenched subsidies could be made viable.

Even if iterations are required, the outcome of this comment process should be a clear statutory interpretation and policy statement from the CFTC regarding event markets. The CFTC should also publish self-certification guidelines for those markets that it determines are within its jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction and/or a public interest exemption framework is determined, it should not be ambiguous whether, for example, a contract based on a presidential election would be approved by the CFTC in principle.

There is good deal of apprehension among those who study prediction markets that regulation will stifle innovation. In truth, exchange requirements may not be as onerous as they are often portrayed, and in most cases are perfectly appropriate. A related, implied fear is that the CFTC may not approve certain contracts such as those on election and legislative events that undeniably possess economic purpose due only to their political sensitivity and considerations of the CFTC’s source of authorization and funding. I hope that this process will assuage such fears. I encourage the CFTC to act decisively and comprehensively in accordance with its purposes.

Sincerely,
Jason Ruspini

Footnotes:

1 For example, a market on infrequent terrorist attacks would not be approved for the simple reason that outcome manipulators could not reliably be identified beforehand.
2 cf. Robert Hahn and Paul Tetlock, “A New Approach for Regulating Information Markets,” AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper (December 2004).
3 Justin Wolfers and Eriz Zitzewitz, “Using Markets to Inform Policy: The Case of the Iraq War,” NBER Working Paper (June 2004).
Justin Wolfers, Erik Snowberg and Eric Zitzewitz. “Partisan Impacts on the Economy: Evidence from Prediction Markets and Close Elections,” NBER Working Paper (March 2006).
Erik Snowberg, Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz, “Party Influence in Congress and the Economy,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 2: No 3, pp 277-286 (2007).
4 F-test (α = 0.1126). If we instead only consider the Wednesdays following election day compared to all other days over this same period, α = 0.0246.
5 The “Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act”.
6 Trading prohibitions on insiders will also avoid a situation in which candidates are able to enjoy a multiplier effect on their campaign funds by shorting themselves. For example, Candidate A has a campaign fund of $2, and candidate B has $1. By hedging, candidate A can maintain a $2 risk while spending $4 on campaigning while candidate B can only spend $2 to maintain a $1 risk.
7 cf. Intrade rules. A more challenging possible scenario involves manipulation preceding the event such that the forced settlement locks-in profits, presumably just as market power is exhausted. See note below on restricting market access to US-based accounts.
8 Such restrictions would however tend to limit the growth of such markets and/or result in risk premia accruing to short tax-rate positions.
9 “Such other persons that the Commission determines to be appropriate in light of their financial or other qualifications, or the applicability of appropriate regulatory protections.”
10 For background, see: Robin Hanson, “Decision Markets for Policy Advice,” Promoting the General Welfare: New Perspectives on Government Performance, pp 151-173, Brookings Institution Press (November 2006).


[Cross-posted from Risk Markets and Politics]

The best research papers on prediction markets

Chris F. Masse June 11th, 2008

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As seen by Andreas Graefe…

IIF’s SIG on Prediction Markets

Research Papers

Basics

Several studies explain the concept of prediction markets and provide useful summaries of the method, e.g.

- Spann, M. & Skiera, B. (2003). Internet-based Virtual Stock Markets for Business Forecasting, Management Science, 49, 1310-1326. [Full text]
- Wolfers, J. & Zitzewitz, E. (2006). Prediction Markets in Theory and Practice, New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (in press). [Full text]
- Wolfers, J. & Zitzewitz, E. (2004). Prediction Markets, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, 107-126. [Full text]
- An overview and classification of 152 studies on prediction markets, published between 1991 and 2006, is provided by
Tziralis, G. & Tatsiopoulos (2007). Prediction Markets: An Extended Literature Review, Journal of Prediction Markets, 1, 75-91. [Full text]

Evidence on the accuracy of prediction markets

This section summarizes research that analyzes the relative performance of prediction markets and other forecasting methods.

Markets vs. polls (election forecasting)

- Berg, J., Nelson, F. & Rietz, T. (2008). Prediction Market Accuracy in the Long Run, International Journal of Forecasting, 24, 283-298. [full text]
- Erikson R. S. & Wlezien C. (2007). Are Political Markets Really Superior to Polls as Election Predictors? Public Opinion Quarterly, forthcoming. [full text]
- Stix, G. (2008): When Markets Beat the Polls, Scientific American Magazine, March 2008. [Abstract]

Markets vs. unaided experts and groups

- Pennock, D. M., Lawrence, S., Giles, C.L. & Nielsen, F.A. (2000). The Power of Play: Efficiency and Forecast Accuracy in Web Market Games, Technical Report 2000-168, NEC Research Institute. [full text]
- For predicting Oscar Award winners, Pennock et al. (2000) compared prices of the Hollywood Stock exchange to expert judgments of five movie columnists. On the day the experts revealed their forecasts, only one of them was better than the market predictions. From the day after, the market outperformed all experts as well as the expert consensus.
- Servan-Schreiber, E. J., Wolfers, J., Pennock, D. M. & Galebach, B. (2004). Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter? Electronic Markets, 14, 243-251. [full text]
- For predicting the results of NFL games, Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) compared the forecasts of two markets to those of 1,947 self-selected individuals. At the end of the season, the markets ranked 6th and 8th compared to the individuals. The human average – which would be the outcome of a classical survey – ranked 39th.

Markets vs. other forecasting methods

- Chen, K. Y., Plott, C. R. (2002). Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Concept, Design and Implementation for a Sales Forecasting Problem, Social Science Working Paper No.1131, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena. [full text]
- For forecasting sales figures, Chen and Plott (2002) reported on an internal market at Hewlett-Packard that beat the official forecasts of the company in 6 out of 8 events.
- Jones Jr., R. J. (2008). The state of presidential election forecasting - The 2004 experience, International Journal of Forecasting, 24, 308-319. [Abstract]
- Jones (2008) analyzed the forecasts of IEM’s vote-share market for the 2004 election and compared them to traditional polls, a Delphi expert survey, regression models and a combination of all four approaches, the Pollyvote. He concludes that in comparison with most methods of forecasting the popular vote, the IEM was the superior performer.Spann, M. & Skiera, B. (2003). Internet-based Virtual Stock Markets for Business Forecasting, Management Science, 49, 1310-1326. [Full text]
- Spann and Skiera (2003) compared forecast accuracy of an internal market at a large German mobile phone operator. They found that the market forecasts outperformed were more accurate than four extrapolation models (arithmetic mean, geometric mean, linear trend and exponential trend).

Corporate Markets

- Chen, K.-Y. & Plott, C. R. (2002). Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Concept, Design and Implementation for a Sales Forecasting Problem. Social Science Working Paper No.1131, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena. [Full text]
- Cowgill, B., Wolfers, J. & Zitzewitz, E. (2008). Using prediction markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence from Google, working paper. [Full text]
- Ortner, G. (1997). Forecasting Markets - An Industrial Application: Part I, working paper, TU Vienna. [Full text]
- Spann, M. & Skiera, B. (2003). Internet-based Virtual Stock Markets for Business Forecasting, Management Science, 49, 1310-1326. [Full text]

Decision Markets

- Hanson, R. (1999). Decision Markets, IEEE Intelligent Systems, 14, 16-19.

Manipulation

- [Except] Hansen et al. (1998), most empirical studies report that manipulative attacks on result accuracy have not been successful historically (Rhode and Strumpf 2006), in the laboratory (Hanson et al. 2006), and in the field (Camerer 1998).
- Camerer, C. (1998): Can Asset Markets Be Manipulated? A Field Experiment with Racetrack Betting, Journal of Political Economy, 106(3), 457-482. [Abstract]
- Hansen, J., Schmidt, C. & Strobel, M. (2004). Manipulation in Political Stock Markets - Preconditions and Evidence, Applied Economics Letters, 11, 459-463. [Abstract]
- Hanson, R., Oprea, R. & Porter, D. (2006). Information Aggregation and Manipulation in an Experimental Market, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 60, 449-459. [full text]
- Rhode, P. W., and Strumpf, K. S. (2006). Manipulating Political Stock Markets: A Field Experiment and a Century of Observational Data, Working Paper, University of North Carolina(2006). [full text]

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More research papers on prediction markets

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Is Big Brother being fixed in Great Britain? And are the alleged fixers using BetFair to make a fast buck (or “quid”, as they say in the U.K.)?

Chris F. Masse May 31st, 2008

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Via Ed, The Daily Mail:

The Daily Star reveals that some punters are set to earn more than half a million pounds after a total bet of £971 was staked via BetFair on Nikki to win at 1000-1 shortly after she was voted out of the house. [...]

Rumours of ‘insider dealing’ on BetFair chat forums continue to surround the clued up gamblers who stand to win £582,250. [...]

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That “Nikki” was evicted, an later on re-instated in the game.

Hence, the questions about the traders who did bet on her, after her eviction. Did they “know” something that the other traders didn’t?

On the other hand, it’s a constitutional right for Joe A. Doe to bet £971 on a loser. Many do that every day at the horse race track. We should not accuse people of insider trading (or corruption) without any evidence.

BetFair employs many specialists in their “integrity team” to deal with such occurrences.

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If the British legal betting companies offer bets on the sport, it is because there is demand for bets on the sport —and if that demand were not offered in a regulated environment, it would be filled in an unregulated one (like what we see with TradeSports-InTrade and MatchBook in the US market).

Chris F. Masse April 28th, 2008

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Mark Davies of BetFair (PDF file):

International Leaders in Sport conference, Auckland, New Zealand. April 3-4th 2008.
Keynote speech, April 4th. Mark Davies, Betfair.

“New Understandings in Sports Betting”

Minister, ladies and gentlemen… Thank you very much for your kind invitation to speak to you today. I have once before been asked by sport to address it, as a member of the bookmaking industry, and it was apparent when I got there that they expected me to tell them that sport was their business, and making money out of it was ours. I can tell you that those who spoke to me afterwards said that they left the conference surprised to hear that a bookmaking operation could hold views so different from what they expected. I hope to be able to break down a few perceptions today.

A number of perceptions have grown in recent years in relation to betting and sport which I believe are completely false and misleading, the first of which is that sport suddenly has a new problem as a result of sports betting on the internet.

Betfair is at the forefront of this debate for one very good reason. When we launched the business back in 2000, we did so under the bold slogan “revolutionizing betting”. By that, we meant not just that we planned to revolutionise the experience for the customer, by allowing him better choice, better value, and - for the first time - control over what he did; but, crucially, that we were going to transform the way that betting worked with regulators, both in the sport and government sphere.

The basis of our model was the business that the founding team had come from, in the main, which was the business of finance. I used to trade bonds at JPMorgan, and I can tell you that what our customers do is exactly the same as what I used to do in my previous life, with the single exception that where I had to pore over balance sheets and income statements, they pore over form and team-sheets. It could be argued - indeed, it has been - that they will therefore know a great deal more about the underlying mechanics of their markets than I ever knew of mine; but the principles are exactly the same. You express a view of value about a given outcome or a given currently-traded market price about an outcome. The extent to which this is true was really brought home to me when I was asked to speak at the Swiss Futures and Options Association’s annual gathering at Birkenstock - you can see I get all the good gigs - which was attended by all the leading exchanges of the world: The Chicago Board of Trade; the Swedish stock exchange, whose platform powers another eleven stock exchanges worldwide, the London Clearing House and representatives of the LSE, Nasdaq, and many more. My presence there was an irritation to many: what place had a sports betting exchange at such an event, people wanted to know. But by the end, they were so ready to accept that what happens in the sports betting world and what happens in their world is actually identical that they wanted to know why we weren’t taxed on the same basis.

So we came to the sports betting market saying this: why is it so opaque? And by that, we didn’t mean just, “why is it not clear what the customer is charged?” but “why doesn’t anyone know who is betting? The City had gone through the Big Bang in 1987: the sports betting market was continuing to exist as it had done for most of its legal history: with the power in the hands of a few, and everyone else ignorant of what was going on.

We sought to change that, and at first, people welcomed it. But the more successful we became as a company, the more people - led to a large extent by our commercial competitors - started to change their tune, for a very simple reason: that with transparency came issues which people had never been able to see clearly, and so had always wanted to believe didn’t really exist.

Before I go on, I want to give you a couple of analogies.

The first is perhaps a little high-brow. In his philosophical work Being and Nothingness, the French author Jean-Paul Sartre debates whether anything actually happens if we aren’t there to see it. The example he gives is of a tree falling in a forest. How can we know, he says, that the tree actually fell, unless we saw it happen? Just by virtue of seeing it lying down rather than standing up, he says, we assume it has fallen over. It is an absurdist argument which exists to enable philosophical theorising; but everyone would accept that in reality, you don’t need to witness something to be able to acknowledge that it has happened.

The second analogy is rather closer to home. As I understand it, the speed limit in this country is 100km/h. I would imagine that it was long-suspected that people broke this limit, particularly on the main highway. People observing cars drive past would have had a perception of this, but no evidence for it. Then, one day, someone came up with the idea of a speed camera, and a number were installed. The following week, a number of cars would have been recorded as speeding. Would anyone seriously suggest that what caused the cars to speed was the camera? It is self-evident that the camera did nothing but produce the proof of an existing fact.

The reason for these analogies is this: in recent years, there has been a growing clamour from the media and from sport that there is more corruption today than there ever was, and the cause of it is betting. In same cases, they even claim that the cause of it is Betfair, on the grounds that you will find very few corruption stories in the last seven years that do not mention Betfair, which has led some to argue that if the words ‘Betfair’ and ‘corruption’ appear in the same paragraph, that must somehow be evidence of the fact that Betfair is the cause, and corruption the effect.

Betfair takes a very different view. Our view is that we are the speed camera, showing you something that you never knew was there. We are shining a light into the darkness, and people give us a hard time for having a torch.

Why do we think that? Because the level of transparency which Betfair has brought to the sports industry is unprecedented. Every single bet placed on Betfair is recorded, to the second. Every click of your mouse; every movement of funds in and out of your account - we know where it has come from, and we know where it is going. As I mentioned, we brought financial markets best practice to the sports betting market. We came into a world that was entirely opaque, and made it entirely transparent. If there was anything hiding in the murk, it can now be seen.

An interesting example of this came in August last year, when a match at the Poland Open in Sopot between Nikolai Davydenko and Martin Arguello-Vasallo raised eyebrows, when Arguello won by default after Davydenko withdrew while leading. You cannot fail to have read about this: not an article about tennis and the ATP now appears without mentioning it. It was all over the press not just for days, but for weeks; and it continues to be brought up, as the ATP’s investigation into what happens continues.

Now, there are a number of things to note about this incident. The first is how it came to light. As I mentioned, we are fully aware of all the betting details on Betfair; but what I didn’t mention is that everyone looking at the site can see bets betting placed, and can see the prices moving in a free market. The 40 or 50,000 pairs of our customers’ eyes that we have on our markets at any one time can all see exactly what is happening to the odds. And our forum allows sports punters to discuss what they can see.

Davydenko’s lawyer criticised Betfair for having sought publicity from the incident but the reality is that we were called by the media, not the other way around; and the reason for that was that what was happening was in the public domain. Everyone on our site could see that the World Number 4 had started at $1.20 and moved out by the end of the first set to $2.28, even though he won it with no apparent difficulty, and was paying $3.75 after losing the opening game of the second set on his serve. And well before he actually pulled out through injury, hundreds of people on our forum were speculating that he must be about to pull out.

I cast no aspersions here: it is entirely possible that the player was carrying an injury and some group of people were aware of the fact. There is no consistent rule across sports, as things stand, against insider trading- the rights and wrongs of which can be debated later perhaps, but it might be worth me mentioning as an aside that we don’t make the rules; we just help to enforce them once they have been made. So I am not suggesting that the match was corrupt. We, as a company, made a decision to void the bets on it, because we felt that the betting itself was not fair. It was clear to us that the betting was leading events, and not the other way around. But I would also mention here that another fallacy of this position was that it served us to do so. A number of people commented at the time that it is all very easy for a bookie to void bets when a result is going against him. But this misunderstands the whole business proposition we have: we are set up like a stock exchange, matching up supply and demand, and taking a cut in the middle. This means that we have no exposure to the result, or, to put it another way, we don’t care who wins. We make money if the event happens, regardless of the outcome, and we make no money if the event is voided. It is also worth mentioning, as an aside, that while many were crying foul about the movement in prices, we also, of course, had full access to the information as to who was betting. The complete audit trail created by our systems and our Know Your Customer checks mean that we know exactly who was behind the bets.

So, we voided the market, at a cost to us. But what happened next is perhaps the most striking of all. One after another, big players around the world came out and said that they had been approached to throw matches. One after the other, they said that they knew of players who had, or had themselves, been offered money by people who wanted them to rig the result. In several instances, these offers were made before the advent of internet-based sports betting.

Now, for me, the big question is, Why did it take a company that stands for transparency to make a stand before anyone mentioned that there was a problem? If we had not voided the bets on the match, would tennis be better or worse off? Is it helpful to know if you have a problem, or would you rather remain ignorant of it until it kills you?

The answer, with some in sport, would appear to be the latter. One sporting body, unconnected with this case, which we approached with a view to signing an information-sharing agreement, actually told us directly that they didn’t want information because they were frightened about the level of corruption it would reveal. Time and again, since the Poland Open, we have been told (although not by the ATP, I should add, who were among the first to embrace the information-sharing agreements we have pioneered) that we are causing sport a problem that didn’t previously exist. And yet, the evidence is there for all to see: we made our stand after people had been approached. Once we made our stand, people started to come out and talk about things. And yet a sizeable number of people want to return to where we were before we blew the whistle.

The reality of this point of view is that it is childish. Corruption is something that no-one here wants to see, and every one of us wishes didn’t exist. But it does exist. And, we cannot, like children confronted by a monster, hope that if we close our eyes, the monster will disappear. Even less can we credibly say that all the time we were sitting with our eyes shut, the monster that stood before us wasn’t there, and that it was only the person that told us to open our eyes that put it there.

The nature of sport is that it produces clear-cut results, and where there are clear-cut results, there is money to be made speculating on the outcome. This, again, is a basic truth. You may not like the fact that for some people, this is the sport; and I accept that for many, in a perfect world we would simply have no betting at all. Some sports bodies still struggle to accept just how great the demand for betting is. For example, I went to talk to the IOC about betting about eighteen months ago, and they, in line with many others I have met (to be fair to them) were totally incredulous that anyone would want to bet on who would win the 100metres in Beijing. Again, I accept that this is not the Olympic ideal, but it is a fact that they do, and rather than close our eyes to the fact, we should work with it. Because the reality, strange as it may seem, is that for many people, having a bet on the 100metres final retains their interest. If that hundred metres final comprises six Americans, a Jamaican and a Cuban, there will be plenty of people won’t give a monkey’s who wins it, unless they have had a bet to make them feel involved.

Again, I accept that this is not what sports bodies might want in a perfect world. But we don’t live in a perfect world. And if you want to live in the real world, you have to accept that there are plenty of people with strong opinions who want to express them through a bet. Plenty of people don’t accept this. Just this week, the coach of the Brisbane Lions AFL team, Leigh Matthews, showed that he is among those who don’t. Described as “certainly neither a wowser nor a saint, and having no intention of ever becoming either”, Matthews is a four-time premiership coach and was named Player of the 20th Century. He told a press conference just a few days ago that the Australian Football League should sever all ties with the bookmaking industry. Let me quote him: “The one thing that really annoys me is any thought that whatever we do as a game has something to do with people betting on it. I hate that,” he said. “I would prefer that nobody bet on the AFL. Then all innuendo would not exist. It’s one of the unfortunate progressions in the evolution of the world that betting agencies now bet on everything. I think that’s really unhealthy, really unsavoury and really unfortunate.”

As I say, I can understand this view in the ideal: he would rather no-one bet on the sport. But what I do not accept is that betting companies offering bets on the sport is what makes people bet on it. If the legal betting companies offer bets on the sport, it is because there is demand for bets on the sport - and if that demand were not offered in a regulated environment, it would be filled in an unregulated one. So while I do not argue with Matthews’ picture of the ideal, I struggle with the argument that he follows it up with. Again, let me quote him directly: “I think [the AFL] should say to the betting companies `you want to bet on the footy, fine, but don’t include us. Don’t ask us to have rules and regulations that pander to people who might want to bet on a game.”

For me, this view is absurd. It is essential that there are rules in place, and essential that there is a mechanism for those rules to be upheld. The AFL’s own experience of having named information of who is betting on its sport has been that it has been able to help players with addictions, and drive out a problem which could, unchecked, lead to corruption. Having no rules or no means of enforcing them is precisely what leads to problems - not just here but in any walk of life. And yet Matthews’ criticism was taken up by the press. They argue that when people were caught breaking the AFL’s rules preventing players betting as a direct result of the agreement the AFL signed, the sport was shown in a poor light. It wasn’t the fact that rules were being broken that was troubling, but the fact that it had become apparent. It should, wrote one commentator, be all about perception, rather than reality. In other words, it would be better to sweep things under the carpet.

I think, in contrast, that we should accept that the demand of people to be able to bet on a clear-cut result is a fundamental reality, and in itself is not a problem. The trouble is that where there is money to be made, there are also people who would seek to corrupt. Sadly, this, too, is a basic reality of the world we live in. So we must protect against corruption, which means having rules and regulations in place, and a proper means of policing them.

The idea that corruption must be rooted out is uncontentious. The question is simply how we do it. In my view, agreement on this is hindered because many people think that betting causes corruption. But betting in itself is not corrupt. Corrupt betting is corrupt, but corrupt betting is not really betting at all, by definition: it is merely getting guaranteed financial reward through securing a fixed outcome, which isn’t the same as backing your analysis of a given contest and speculating on the chances of a particular outcome at all. In other words, the key part of the phrase ‘corrupt betting’ is not the betting part, but the adjective that precedes it: or to put it another way, corruption is corruption, through whatever channel it happens to manifest itself.

This is an important point, because the first thing that must be done if the battle against corruption is to be won is to work out who is on whose side here, and what tools we have to fight with. At the moment, the perception exists in sport that betting is the cause, rather than on occasions (and by no means on all occasions) a facilitator, and the inevitable next step in sport’s logic is to blame the betting companies for their problems. And this means that we have a fundamental issue, because the betting companies - by which I mean the legal, regulated, and co-operative betting companies - are actually a tool in the fight.

You can accept that betting for betting’s sake is not in itself the problem, and that 99% of people who make money out of the sporting result, through betting on it, would never consider affecting that result to suit. But that still leaves us with an issue: using the money being generated by that 99% of people to make money out of a corruptly fixed result clearly is a problem. But here we must consider what added ingredient is needed to allow someone to do that - to turn betting from a pastime into a facilitator for corruption. Put simply, “How do you corrupt?”

If you or I decide we want to rig the outcome of a horserace, or a rugby match, or any other sporting event, it isn’t immediately apparent how we would do it sitting here. We can very easily have a bet right here, and right now, on almost any sporting event taking place in the world at the moment; but what we can’t do, sitting here, by ourselves, is affect the outcome. For that, we need the collaboration of the people involved.

Now, there’s a story about Winston Churchill which goes something like this. Winston Churchill, apparently a few the worse for wear - as was his wont - allegedly once approached a lady and asked her if she would be prepared to sleep with him for £1million. She thought about it for a moment, and said she would. He then asked her if she would be prepared to sleep with him for a tenner, and she was horrified. “What do you think I am?” she exclaimed. “Madam,” he replied, “we have established what you are. We are now just negotiating the price.”

As was true of Winston and his target, so is true of sportsmen and corruptors. When I talk to people about corruption in sport, and protest at the idea that internet betting in particular has increased corruption just because the sums of money involved are that much greater, I think of that story about Winston Churchill. Because as far as I am concerned, either you can be corrupted, or you can’t. If you can’t bribe a sportsman or a group of sportsmen to rig a result, then you can’t get a result fixed. And what that means is that the heart of the problem in the issue of corruption in sport is not betting, but is sportsmen willing to be bought.

I realise that pointing the finger at sport, from what appears to be the betting side of the fence, might seem somewhat inflammatory. But the most important point I want to make is that when we consider whose side of the fence is whose, we are currently getting it absolutely wrong. The betting industry doesn’t want bad apples as customers any more than the sports industry wants bad apples participating; and just as more than 99% of your participants are clean, so are more than 99% of ours. Our less than 1% can do the buying; your less than 1% can deliver the goods. The challenge for us both is to rid ourselves of the 1%, and the best way to do that is to work together.

Put another way, the simple fact of the matter is this: if we are to draw a line - not to say dig a bloody great big trench - between sport and corruption, as obviously we must, then the first and most important thing is to understand that the legal betting industry is on the same side of that line as the sports industry. And I say this not just because it serves our purpose for sport to be clean, although it does: if people don’t have confidence in the fairness of the result, they will not bet. I say it because we were set up as a business philosophically because we are lovers of sport. And, having set up something which was designed, in part, to bring complete transparency to the market; and then having set out our stall to share information with sports to help them deal with problems that exist, it has been extremely frustrating to find ourselves attacked as if we are the cause of the problems. If ever there was a case of shooting the messenger, this is it.

In fact, the finger pointing from sport to betting, and to Betfair in particular, has been so great that there are calls around the world for betting to pay sport, because sport now has to deal with integrity issues which betting has caused. Let me say straight up that Betfair has never been against paying sport on the basis of a commercial agreement which recognises that sport is putting on a show and Betfair is benefitting from that. This is not the same as saying that sport ‘owns’ the product, but it simply recognises that there ought to be a symbiotic relationship between the two industries. And we are not suddenly coming to this party under pressure: I spoke at the Sport Accord conference in Madrid in 2003 and told the 80 or so delegates there from sports bodies all round the world that the two things they should expect from a bookmaker in the 21st century were information about what betting was taking place on their matches, to allow them to police their sport better; and a financial contribution to acknowledge that they were putting on the show. But I do have a fundamental problem with betting being asked to pay to ‘clean up’ something that exists whether they are there are not. The integrity of sport is the domain of sport, whether Betfair, or Ladbrokes, or any other betting company in the world exists or not.

In fact, I would go further than that. Imagine a world where bookmaking is illegal. Take Betfair, and Ladbrokes, and William Hill, and everyone else you care to mention, and close them all down. What happens to sport’s problem then? Does it go away, stay the same, or get bigger? Clearly, it gets bigger - and if you doubt that, let me give you two reasons why.

The first is best exemplified by Hansie Cronje. No-one in New Zealand will be unaware of the scandals that affected the world of cricket in the late 1990s - an era, incidentally, which preceded internet betting, and in which cricket was not alone in experiencing problems: floodlights went off in top-flight UK football matches for reasons which at first were not apparent. Talk to the ICC about those times in cricket and they will readily acknowledge that their problems came from the Indian sub-continent, where - no surprises - bookmaking is illegal. And the source of floodlight failures, too, was eventually traced to Far Eastern illegal betting syndicates, but only because someone was eventually caught red-handed with his hands more or less on the switch.

The second reason is this: tell me why betting was legalised and regulated in the first place, if it wasn’t that it existed illegally and unregulated, and if, being illegal and unregulated, it was not seen to be causing problems which could not be dealt with? The whole basis of regulation is that regulating makes it more difficult to corrupt.

Betfair took the level of regulation a significant step further. I have already talked about our audit trail, but what I didn’t mention was that any sports regulatory body in the world can have the information gathered by that audit trail from us, free of charge. In fact, we can deliver it, via our Bet Monitor technology, in real time - as Stewards not so very far away in Victoria will tell you. In other words, we are providing, without any obligation, information which would otherwise be unknown about betting that is taking place all over the world - information which makes it easier to know what is happening, not harder. And it seems to me that asking the legal, regulated betting market to pay to clean up problems of integrity in sport is like approaching a High Street pharmacy and asking it to pay for the fight against cocaine-smuggling on the grounds that their business is in drugs. The difference between the legal, regulated market and the illegal market is the difference between chalk and cheese. And asking Betfair, or any other well-regulated, well-run global brand, to pay for problems which are seen to originate in the murky world of unregulated, illegal, bookmaking seems to me to be entirely missing the point.

To illustrate my point a little further, here’s the page from Wikipedia on match-fixing. You will see if you look at it more closely that it claims that cheating on sport started with the Ancient Olympics, and with battles between gladiators. When I once mentioned this on a radio interview, I was taken to task over it by a journalist from a British national newspaper, the Guardian, who accused me of being disingenuous. The amount of match-fixing today, he said, was of a completely different proportion, and the sums of money involved were much greater.

Even aside from my story about Winston Churchill, I would take issue with that. First of all, on what empirical grounds can anyone justifiably claim that there is more match-fixing today than there was before? Isn’t the perception that there is simply born of the fact that we can see it better today than we could a decade ago? Are there more diseases these days, or do we just diagnose them better?

To go back to my earlier analogy, are there more speeding cars, or are we now in a position to clock them? Did people start taking drugs to improve their sporting performances the week after drugs testing came in, or were they taking them before we had tests, and just doing so undetected? Was Jacques Rogge, the President of the IOC, justified when he commented during the Athens Olympic that, “Each positive test is a blessing for us because it’s eliminating the cheats and protecting the clean athletes. The more we find, the better.” I would say absolutely he was.

In truth, the basic fact is that it is simply not possible to make any judgment whatsoever on what the level of corruption in sport was before we had a means of tracking it, just as it is impossible to know how many athletes in the past used performance-enhancers to bring them medals. We might think that in a bye-gone era, the world was a nobler place; and on the whole, we might be right. But if the Chicago White Sox were throwing the World Series in 1919, and Liverpool and Manchester United were colluding over a result in 1915 - on that occasion, not for a betting return, incidentally, but to ensure survival in the top division at the expense of Chelsea, who consequently went down - and if these are scandals we happen to know about because someone happened to sing about them, then how can we possibly make a judgment about the bigger picture?

The challenge now is to take the attitude that Jacques Rogge has to drugs testing and apply it to betting, not being fearful of instances we find to occur, but to be confident that transparency is rooting out the corruption and tipping the risk/reward ratio dramatically in favour of the regulator and away from the corruptor. For that, we first need to draw on another of Mr. Rogge’s pronouncements in Greece. “You have 10,500 athletes in the Olympic village,” he told the world’s press. “You do not have 10,500 saints. You will always have cheats.” We have to acknowledge that the only people who can corrupt sport are the players, and we have to educate those players about how they will be caught and how they will lose their livelihoods and their reputations when they are. And to do that, we first need to educate sport about how they can do the catching: the only way to know whether players are corrupted is to have the names of the people behind the bets, and then use forensic analysis to make the often easy links between the bettors and the participants. Any attempts to look at the betting quantum and make judgments on it are absolutely doomed to failure, and the only people who will gain anything from doing so are the media. So sport needs to put itself in a position where it has access to named information, wherever it can get it. If it is not doing that, it is not using the tools available. I find it amazing that any sporting body would turn down named information from a betting operator willing to provide it with no strings attached, and yet, from the top down, there are plenty who do.

Don’t get me wrong. I am not trying to suggest that sport is riddled with corruption. I am an optimist, and I hope and expect, like everyone here, that 99.9% of sport is played for the Corinthian ideal of winning. But it is clear that sports - perhaps because they are being told so by the media - now feel that they have a problem which they feel they didn’t have before. The immediate reaction is to point the finger, rather than take steps to do something to tighten regulation in a manner which perhaps should have happened years ago, and it is not difficult to see why this has happened. It is easy enough to make what appears at first a logical jump: betting has increased; corruption has become apparent; therefore betting is causing corruption. It’s like saying, “it’s raining, and I don’t have an umbrella, therefore I will inevitably get wet”.

But what if it’s pointed out that there is no reason for you to go outside? Suddenly, the argument falls apart. And what if you understand that the increase in betting has moved in parallel with the increase in transparency? Suddenly, the logic doesn’t hold there either. But that growth in transparency of betting has led people to believe that there has been a growth of corruption, and the result is that sport is setting itself against the very people it should be working with. Again, I can understand how this is happening. Many in sports regulation genuinely don’t see that this problem is not new, like a patient diagnosed with cancer who insists that he felt fine yesterday and still feels fine today. But understanding why we are where we are doesn’t mean we should continue to plough the same furrow. We have to get out of it before we dig it so deep that we’ll never be able to do so. As a first step, that means understanding that transparency is not to be feared, and the people who bring it should not be resisted and looked at suspiciously. And second - away from words and onto concrete actions - it means sport starting to use the tools provided for them by betting operators who want to work in partnership, which would make it easier to combat the problems facing them than any other measure. Use the audit trail, link betting to names, and root corruption out of sport.

Understanding this, and acting on it, would allow sport to make the most of the commercial advantages that the betting market brings. I am not talking specifically about betting companies paying them directly for commercial agreements, although that is precisely what Betfair is doing voluntarily in Australia with the AFL, NRL, and cricket among others; we have done it with British greyhounds, and Irish horseracing; and we have committed to doing it elsewhere. I am also not talking about sponsorships coming from the betting companies, although it is interesting to note that just last week, Reinhard Rauball, the President of the Bundesliga in Germany, affirmed that the ban on foreign gambling advertisements would cost German football between €100 million and €300 million every year in lost revenues. I understand that even if we got to the point where regulators and betting operators were working in partnership to stop corruption, many sports would prefer to keep at arms length from betting companies in other areas, and I fully respect that. Rather, I am referring to the notion that betting plays a significant role in helping sports to internationalise their marketplaces, and ultimately, we now all compete in the global village.

In other words, although sports today recognize that they need to embrace a modern, global audience, they spend a lot of time working against the very sorts of organizations which might help it to achieve one.

Let me give you an example. There is a racing newsletter published in Australia called BetAngel. It is dedicated to a whole new audience who, since the arrival of Betfair, trade the sports markets as if they were the financial markets. Their March edition began with the words, “Wind back nearly eight years ago, when Betfair started and I joined them, I had no idea what Cheltenham was all about” - before going on, for eleven pages, to lay out the best strategies for punting on Britain’s premier Jumps Racing festival. In a similar vein, Betfair this year had e-mails from all over the world eulogising about the up-to-the-minute coverage and ideas being distributed far and wide by Betfair Radio on that same Cheltenham Festival - from Cyprus, Belgium, India, Singapore and - yes - New Zealand. The extent to which we are broadening the appeal of British horseracing is incontestable if you look at our international audience and the 85 or so countries from which we list customers. By virtue of the mechanism by which we pay to British racing a percentage of the profits which we achieve on British racing, it is fair to say that today money is coming in from the four corners of the earth which just a few years ago was staying firmly put.

Betfair is committed to paying sports bodies a percentage of the profits achieved on betting on events run under their jurisdiction. But if the betting markets continue to be seen as a problem, then they cannot at the same time be seen as an opportunity, and sports worldwide cannot make the most of that commitment. In contrast, if we could get sports administrators to realise that we do not threaten their integrity in a regulated and open environment; if we could get them to work with us, on commercial terms, and not against us; if we could get them to understand that the utopian world of no betting on sport is exactly that - utopian - and that the sensible thing is to work with the regulated market to ensure maximum transparency and minimum outlets for those would corrupt; if we could do all these things, then it wouldn’t be a question of sport putting on the show and the betting industry benefitting. It would be a question of sport broadening and maintaining its audience; of sharing in the first derivative market which stems from it - the betting market; and of the two industries working together to ensure that every tool is used to keep both the underlying commodity and the derivative market clean.

So I am here today to try to give you a new understanding of sports betting. I want you to understand that as far as we at Betfair are concerned, the regulated betting industry today is not some backwater of corruption in smoke-filled rooms, but a modern leisure industry which engages its customers and allows them to get involved on a participatory level that enhances their enjoyment; that it is an industry which harnesses those customers, and wants to do so in partnership with sport rather than at the expense of sport; that what sport today should expect from a modern bookmaking operator, as I told Sport Accord back in 2003, is a financial return which recognises that sport is putting on the show and seeks to demonstrate the good faith that leads to partnerships that leads to everyone growing the cake; and - entirely unconnected with any commercial agreement - they should expect information on what betting is taking place on their product, and - and I cannot over-emphasize this enough - by whom, in order to allow it to fulfil its role of policing the sport.

There are plenty of issues facing sport today, as there always will be. But feeling it has to fight betting should simply not be one of them. Sport has to fight corruption, using every tool it can; and the betting companies, who also, like the sports bodies, have brand names to defend; and, in a way that sports do not, more often than not have market values and share prices to protect, have to fight it too. So in conclusion, let me say it one more time: the legal and regulated betting companies around the world want to work with sport, not against it. But they need sports to recognise that it isn’t betting that causes problems, but corruption. I hope we can fight it together.

Thank you.

Mark Davies of BetFair

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Mark Davies (Managing Director of Corporate Affairs of BetFair)

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The best text that I have ever read about sports betting.

It’s that kind of speech that the US Congress should hear.

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The Winston Churchill joke was lame.

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Took me like one hour to read it in full, but every sentence was worth my effort.

All the issues he raised were known to me, but it was fine to see them all gathered in one place.

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I’m still persuaded that the Winston Churchill joke was lame.

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The Betting King — The ATP Tour was his NASDAQ.

Chris F. Masse February 17th, 2008

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ESPN

At Google, employees are encouraged to place bets on an enterprise prediction exchange, which tries to forecast events based on the money wagered on a particular outcome.

Chris F. Masse January 7th, 2008

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About the academic paper, “Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence From Google”.

New York Times:

[...] The other crucial finding of the report was that there was a detectible “optimism bias” among Google employees. That is, results that were good for the company tended to be overpriced, particularly for “subjects under the control of Google employees, such as, would a project be completed on time or would a particular office be opened.” [Said Eric Zitzewitz.] This optimism was most evident among new employees, the report found, and it was bound to show up on days when Google stock had climbed. [...]

Google, however, is no ordinary company. As detailed in a footnote, one Google employee, looking to be a profitable trader, wrote the code for an extremely prolific trading robot. As a result, he “was participating in about half of all trades” and made a profit (in Goobles). So the authors had to compensate for these trades. Who knew that someone from Google would try to game the system?

Using Prediction Markets to Track Information Flows: Evidence From Google - (PDF file) - by Bo Cowgill (Google economic analyst), Justin Wolfers (University of Pennsylvania) and Eric Zitzewitz (Dartmouth College)

A big YES to insider trading on prediction markets

Chris F. Masse December 28th, 2007

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Mike Smithson publishes info showing UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s decision to call off a general election was known to some bettors before that decision was made public. And he concludes:

One of the risks of political betting is that at times you can be gambling against those who are “in the know”. There’s nothing illegal about it but if price movements on the scale recorded on that afternoon had happened on the stock market ahead of a big announcement then an inquiry would have surely followed.

Yeah, but we would like our prediction markets to be the best forecasting tool ever (besides being a fun game and a profitable money machine). So we all favor insider trading on event derivative markets, don’t we, Mike Giberson? [Trick to make this economist write for Midas Oracle, for free. :-D ]